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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis studies issues related to the enforcement of environmental laws 
and to environmental justice. The two main research questions are: 1) How do 
firms and environmental enforcement authorities interact, given their respective 
objective functions; and 2) Is there any evidence in Italy of environmental 
injustices or social inequalities being linked to air pollution. The thesis combines 
theoretical and empirical methods of investigation. Two game theoretic models 
are set out in chapter two to analyze the possible interactions among the main U.S. 
enforcement and justice authorities [i.e., the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)] and the firms. The models are able to 
rationalize a role for discretion by the environmental authorities in deciding how 
to pursue environmental violations. 
Chapter three explores the role of environmental agencies in deterring 
firms from polluting by means of two laboratory experiments. Evidences on the 
compliance behaviour of agents, faced with enforcement conditions consistent 
with the theoretical models of chapter two, are reported and discussed under the 
different experimental treatments performed. 
Chapter four provides an empirical investigation on air pollution emissions 
using data from the latest available Italian Census to assess the role that the 
demographic structure of Italian population could play in influencing 
environmental outcomes and the role that specific economic factors, such as 
income, could have on pollution emissions, alongside measures of the efficiency 
of the judicial system. 
A discussion of the potential policy implications from both the theoretical 
models and the empirical analyses, together with indications for possible future 
research, is provided in the concluding chapter five. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“[…] Most of the rules of conduct which govern our 
actions, and most of the institutions […] are 
adaptations to the impossibility of anyone taking 
conscious account of all of the particular facts 
which enter into the order of society”. 
 
Friedrich August von Hayek 
Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973, page 13 - vol.1) 
 
 
1.1 LAW AND ECONOMICS - ORIGINS OF THE DISCIPLINE 
 
The development of Law and Economics is the history of a success 
deriving from the application of economics, in particular microeconomics, to law. 
Norms are considered not only in reason of their legal content, but especially for 
their effects on individual behaviour and for their ability to lead toward efficient 
allocations. The main objective of law and economics is to evaluate how norms 
can improve the use of scarce resources and maximize social welfare.
1
 More 
specifically, David Friedman (1998) identifies three advantages of applying 
economics to law. First, economics can be used to predict the effects of legal 
rules. Second, economics can be used to determine which rules are economically 
efficient. Third, economics can be used to predict legal rules. 
The basic idea of law and economics is that the application of economic 
theory can improve the knowledge of legal phenomena, either to explain the 
implications of norms and their reforms on individual behaviour, or to better 
understand the implications deriving from the use of alternative norms. As 
emphasized by Cooter and Ulen (1988), economics allows to perceive a legal 
system in a way which is extremely useful to jurists and policy makers; if 
economists learned how to understand the law, their models would be closer to 
                                               
1 Many are the books in law and economics. I would like to remember, in particular, Posner 
(1972); Polinsky (1983); Shavell (1987); Cooter  and Ulen (1988); Friedman  (2000); Backhaus 
(2005). 
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reality. 
Despite the fact that the earliest historical roots of law and economics can 
be traced back to economists like Adam Smith (1776) with the analysis on the 
economic effects of legislation, Jeremy Bentham (1782, 1789) with the theory on 
legislation and on utilitarianism, and Arthur Pigou (1932) with the application of 
the pigouvian tax to correct negative externalities, it is, in reality, in the first half 
of the 1960s that a more mature awareness develops about the interdependences 
between economics and law and the analysis, among others, of Ronald Coase 
(1960), Guido Calabresi (1961)
2
 and Pietro Trimarchi (1961). It is, in fact, starting 
from these years that a new methodological perspective begins to emerge 
combining the different methods proper of the two disciplines, thereby generating 
a strong interaction between economic theory and legal studies.
3
 
There is a certain tendency to subdivide law and economics in two 
branches of studies (Posner, 1983). The “old” law and economics, which dates 
back to Adam Smith (1776), was focused on studying mainly the legislation 
regulating the market (i.e., individuals’ and firms’ market behaviors).4 The “new” 
law and economics pioneered by Coase, Becker (1968) and Calabresi studies the 
legislation regulating non-market behaviour (e.g., criminal law and family law) 
whose objective is to apply “economics to core legal doctrines and subjects such 
as contract, property, tort and criminal law” (Duxbury, 1995). 
It has been argued (Dari Mattiacci, 2000) that we are now in the third 
generation of law and economics. The first generation was created by the 
founding fathers and was dominated mostly by lawyers with some understanding 
of economics. The second generation was characterized by economists who 
placed more emphasis on the use of mathematical methods, with a consequent 
shift towards a dialogue between economists and lawyers. The third generation is 
the actual generation of young professors and researchers, who have studied both 
                                               
2 The paper by Coase published on the Journal of Law and Economics in the 1960 and the one by 
Calabresi published on the Yale Law Journal in the 1961, in reality, were written 
contemporaneously; the paper by Calabresi, in fact, was published in the 1961 for purely editorial 
matters. 
3
 The work by Backhaus (ed., 2005), The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics, contains 
several biographic sections devoted to the precursors and to the first European exponents of the 
law and economics movement. 
4 An extensive review of the history of law and economics is provided by MacKaay(2000). 
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law and economics, and of lawyers and economists who have become able to 
share issues of mutual interest. 
 
1.2 DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 
 
Law and economics builds on a number of diverse contributions which 
have converged into a unified paradigm but originate from different roots 
(Backhaus, 2005). The economic analysis of law stems from different schools of 
thought: the Chicago school, the Yale school, the Public Choice school, the neo-
paretian, and the neo-institutionalist (Chiassoni, 1999). However, its two main 
souls are the Chicago school (characterized by a neoclassical approach, in which 
individuals are always informed rational maximizers and their behaviour is easily 
predictable) with Posner’s “positive” analysis, and the Yale school with 
Calabresi’s “normative” analysis. The economic analysis of law, at its very 
beginning, was qualified as “Chicago-style” or “Yale-style” according to the 
positive and normative approach of each school (Parisi, 2004). 
While the positive (or descriptive) approach focuses on the analysis of 
economics to analyze if and how legal rules are consistent with the Pareto 
efficiency criterion, the normative (or prescriptive) approach takes a step forward 
and aims to recommend which legal rules, if applied, would deliver the most 
efficient solution both for legislators and judges.
5
 The economic analysis of law, 
tout court, includes both these approaches since it tries to explain not only socially 
undesirable behaviour but also to suggest the optimal ways to control such 
conduct. 
These two schools of thought, developed almost simultaneously, are 
characterized by methodological differences concerning mainly the idea of 
economic efficiency. According to the Chicago school, the idea of efficiency 
corresponds to the economic efficiency of a competitive market. It focuses on 
static aspects (a norm is efficient or not) and keeps efficiency and distributive 
                                               
5 Posner (1972) provides an example on crime. Positive law and economics can help explain and 
predict how punishment will affect the behaviour of criminals (i.e., a certain sanction might deter 
from committing a crime). This analysis by itself does not mean that the law should be adopted, 
but it can be used to influence normative analysis on whether the law would be beneficial to 
society. 
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considerations separate. The idea of efficiency according to Calabresi and to the 
Yale school, by contrast, holds that there is a greater need for legal intervention to 
correct market failures (Parisi, 2004; MacKaay, 2000). Distributional concerns are 
central to this school. An important implication of the Chicago approach to law 
and economics is the idea that the common law induces efficient results. This 
result is known as the “efficiency of the common law hypothesis”, according to 
which common law rules are able to allocate resources in either a Pareto or 
Kaldor-Hicks
6
 efficient manner (Ehrlich and Posner, 1974; Rubin, 1977; Priest, 
1977). 
So, whereas the Chicago school emphasizes the inherent efficiency of 
legal rules and maintains that efficient legal rules evolve naturally, the Yale 
school views the law as a tool for solving market failures and distributional 
inequalities. According to Calabresi, the legal rule “becomes instrument” for the 
achievement of economic objectives while, according to the Chicago school, 
efficiency is considered an instrument able to evaluate the goodness of legal rules 
(Pulitini, 2002).
 
Unlike its Chicago counterpart, the Yale school maintains that the 
ultimate goal of a legal system can never be efficiency as such, but rather the need 
to pursue justice and equity in the distribution of resources. 
More recently a third approach has developed: the so-called Virginia 
school, which has been defined (Parisi, 2004) as “functional” since it is neither 
fully positive nor fully normative. The Virginia approach stems from Public 
Choice theory. By integrating the findings of the public choice theory into law and 
economics, it seeks to bridge the different perspectives between the positive and 
the normative approaches (Parisi, 2004). The functional school, by recognizing 
that while there are economic forces that lead to markets’ failures, there are also 
structural forces that can inhibit the development of efficient legal rules, rejects 
both the ex-post corrective function of law assumed by the normative school and 
                                               
6 Under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, an outcome is considered more efficient if a Pareto optimal 
outcome can be reached by arranging sufficient compensation from those that are made better-off 
to those that are made worse-off, so that all would end up no worse off than before. The Kaldor-
Hicks criterion is typically used as a test of Pareto efficiency rather than as an efficiency goal in 
itself. It is used to determine whether a reallocation shifts the economy towards Pareto efficiency. 
Any change usually makes some people better-off while making others worse-off, so these tests 
ask what would happen if the winners were to compensate the losers. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion 
provides a rationale for cost-benefit analysis. 
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the naturally evolving efficient system view endorsed by the positive school 
(Parisi and Klick, 2005). This way, the functional approach extends the field of 
research of law and economics to include the analysis on how institutions can 
affect legal regimes. 
 
1.3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 
 
The earliest theoretical applications of law and economics were mainly to 
issues pertaining to corporate law, contract theory and competition law. At 
present, law and economics has come to encompass remarkable and innovative 
methods for the analysis of legal rules in all areas of law, from tort and property 
law to commercial law, constitutional law, criminal law and environmental law. 
As noted by Pardolesi (1987, p. 312), the economic analysis of law by itself "is 
susceptible to be adapted to the most diverse and disparate situations”. It has 
been argued (Nicita and Pagano, 2005) that the most recent developments of the 
standard law and economics approach have shifted from legal rules to a more 
general concept of “institutional” rules, including informal rules, and enforcement 
institutions. Nicita and Pagano (2005) also stress the need to go beyond both the 
traditional (Chicago school) law and economics approach to assessing the possible 
interactions among legal rules, economic behaviour and institutional changes. 
Since Coase’s (1960) article “The Problem of Social Cost” which has 
established a new paradigm for controlling environmental pollution by 
challenging the conventional pigouvian approach, there has been a large body of 
literature (Bouckaert and De Geest, 1992; 2000) on optimal environmental 
policies. It is difficult to delineate the boundaries of environmental law and 
economics literature since, by one side, the law literature focuses essentially on 
law and environmental regulations and does not study how to control 
environmental risk in an economic perspective (i.e., emission taxes, transferable 
permits); the economic literature, on the other side, analyses the effects of 
economic instruments for controlling the level of environmental pollution, but the 
legal instruments (i.e., liability, criminal law) are not usually considered (Faure, 
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1998).
7
 
In the economic literature, the early contributions on environmental risks 
have considered models in which the regulator maximizes a welfare function 
decreasing with the level of damage and the level of abatement costs (Roberts and 
Spence, 1976; Kwerel, 1977; Dasgupta et al., 1980; Baron, 1985). The law and 
economics literature has focused mainly upon the role of legal institutions and 
common law rules in achieving efficiency and distributive goals (Calabresi, 1970; 
Landes and Posner, 1987; Shavell, 1987), in particular in the area of 
environmental policy (Polinsky, 1980; Landes and Posner, 1984; Tietenberg, 
1989; Kornhauser and Revesz, 1994). The challenge that the economic analysis of 
law poses to scholars and researchers is to realize increasingly stronger 
interdisciplinary interactions between law and economics in favour of a unified 
frame of analysis. 
Environmental law and economics focuses not only on the role that 
institutions can play in the presence of environmental problems, but also on the 
potential interactions among agents due to negative externalities and on all the 
instruments, both economic (pigouvian tax, marketable permits, etc.) and legal 
(civil liability regimes, i.e. strict liability and negligence),
8
 that can be used to 
maximize social welfare or to minimize environmental damages. 
Thus, environmental law and economics focuses on several issues related 
not only to the effects of regulations and to the alternative instruments (economic 
and legal) for controlling environmental risk, but also on the importance of 
designing optimal schemes of enforcement. Enforcement is any action or 
intervention taken in case of non-compliance (Weiss, 1999): it includes actions 
that encourage (through incentives) or force (through sanctions) compliance with 
environmental law. According to Becker (1968), the authorities have to determine 
                                               
7 It is nevertheless important to remember that among the numerous textbooks on environmental 
economics, there are several ones that do discuss the importance of legal instruments. These 
include, for instance, Ackerman et al. (1974), Baumol and Oates (1979), Eide and Van den Bergh 
(1996), Endres (1985), Field (1994), Kahn (1995), Oates (1996), Pearce and Turner (1990), 
Portney (1990), Revesz (1997), Richardson, Burrows and Ogus (1982), Tietenberg (1992) and 
Ward and Duffield (1992). 
8 Faure (1998) has highlighted a methodological issue that overcomes the terminological 
distinction between these instruments arguing that legal instruments are also economic, in the 
sense that they provide an incentive to comply with certain policy objectives, and economic 
instruments are also legal in the sense that a system of taxes or marketable pollution permits needs 
an adequate institutional framework to be effective. 
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the amount of resources to prevent offenses and to apprehend offenders. In 
particular, Becker tries to identify those expenditures on law enforcement and on 
punishment that minimize the social loss. This loss is the sum of damages, costs 
of apprehension and conviction, and costs of carrying out the punishments. 
Assuming that potential criminals are rational utility maximizers, who base their 
decisions to commit or not to commit a crime on an expected utility calculation, 
they will comply with the law as long as their benefits of compliance outweigh 
their costs (Becker, 1968). 
The vast theoretical literature on enforcement (e.g., Polinsky and Shavell, 
1984, 2000; Posner, 1985, 2003; Shavell, 1993, 2003; Stigler, 1970; Garoupa, 
1997, 2001, 2004) show the fundamental importance of acting upon socially 
efficient enforcement strategies. The basic prescription of enforcement theory 
(Becker, 1968) is that potential violators behave according to both the probability 
of being detected and the severity of the sanction. This implies that deterrence 
may be improved either by raising the sanction, by increasing the expenditures on 
enforcement in order to raise the likelihood that the violator is captured, or again 
by changing the legal rules in order to increase the probability of detection 
(Cohen, 1998). From an economic perspective, perfect compliance is neither 
possible nor desirable: since monitoring and enforcement activities are costly for 
the regulatory authority, the socially optimal level of enforcement has to be found 
at the point where the costs of law enforcement outweigh the benefits of harm 
prevention. This is a very crucial point and its importance is demonstrated by the 
fact that most of the law and economics literature above mentioned has been 
focusing on how best to induce compliance at a lower enforcement cost. 
 
1.4 THE U.S. ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 
 
In the present thesis, the U.S. enforcement of environmental laws is 
examined. This generally consists of three basic forms of enforcement: 
administrative, civil, and criminal. In addition to these three government 
enforcement options, each specific environmental law also provides that civil 
actions seeking injunctions and civil penalties can be pursued by individual 
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citizens or by organizations through citizen suits. This system can be viewed as a 
pyramid (see figure 1.1), formed by a base level where a large number of 
relatively minor violations is handled through administrative actions, followed by 
an intermediate level where a smaller number of more serious violations is 
handled through civil actions and, finally, a superior and last level where a small 
number of very serious violations is handled though criminal prosecution 
(Mandiberg and Smith, 1999). Also Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) have suggested 
the use of an enforcement pyramid consisting of several layers, in which each 
layer represents a different enforcement strategy that could be used to enforce the 
law. The enforcement strategies escalate from lenient approaches at the bottom to 
more severe enforcement strategies with sanction-based approaches like the 
revocation of licenses and the application of jail time sentences at the top of the 
enforcement pyramid. 
 
Figure 1.1 The enforcement pyramid 
Criminal
Administrative
Civil
 
 
As emphasized by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), environmental laws 
should be enforced by way of a bottom-up approach: when enforcing 
environmental law, persuasive mechanisms should be utilized first, and gradually 
harsher sanctions should be adopted if the regulated parties continue to breach the 
law. Almost every normative provision, any regulation emanated by the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and any permit condition is assisted by one or 
more enforcement options. While the choice of electing the administrative action 
belongs only to the EPA, the use of civil and criminal proceedings requires the 
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involvement of the DOJ and the U.S. Attorneys, and usually implies an increase in 
both the time required and the cost of enforcement. EPA has broad discretion to 
choose among administrative, civil judicial, and criminal proceedings when it 
seeks to impose environmental penalties. A civil judicial environmental 
enforcement actions begins with a referral from EPA to DOJ. DOJ will not go 
ahead with a civil action on its own initiative; its only authority is to proceed on 
EPA’s behalf. If DOJ does decline, EPA can in theory proceed on its own. If and 
when it refers to DOJ, EPA will request criminal or civil prosecution. A more 
detailed discussion on the mechanisms underneath both EPA’s administrative and 
investigative discretion and DOJ’s prosecutorial discretion is provided in chapter 
two. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
The present thesis addresses two key research questions: 1) how do the 
regulated community (firms) and environmental enforcement authorities interact 
in order to maximize their respective objective functions, and 2) whether there is 
any evidence in Italy of environmental injustices or social inequalities linked to 
air pollution, that is to say, if economic characteristics, such as income levels, and 
the demographic composition of population, such as the percentage of foreigners, 
might have some influence on air pollution emission levels. 
The thesis combines theoretical and empirical investigations. This allows, 
on the one hand, to improve the understanding of the importance of different 
enforcement strategies in the environmental regulatory context, and on the other 
hand to investigate the relationship between air pollution and enforcement of 
regulations, in order to beseech that economic and political limitations of 
minorities or disadvantaged groups may apply. 
 
1.5.1 CHAPTER 2 
In chapter two, by examining the U.S. environmental enforcement 
authorities, i.e. the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department 
of Justice (DOJ), it is shown how a discretionary enforcement can be interpreted 
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as an essential component in a coherent strategy to encourage firms to adopt a 
compliant environmental behaviour, in the context of game theoretic models 
where the firm’s behaviour is influenced by the course of actions discretionally 
implemented by both the EPA and the DOJ. 
More specifically, the results of two different game theoretic models, 
based on strategic interactions among the players, are analyzed through a 
morphological analysis of the U.S. environmental authorities’ behavioural 
mechanisms. Two game theory models are developed: i) a first model which is 
based on the assumption that EPA and DOJ share the same objective function, and 
ii) a second model which is based on the assumption that EPA’s objective 
function is different from DOJ’s objective function. The two game theoretic 
models explore the role of discretion that such authorities enjoy, either in deciding 
how to pursue environmental violations (investigative and prosecutorial 
discretion) or in judging them (judicial discretion), with the purpose of identifying 
both the optimal firms’ behaviour in terms of compliance, and the DOJ’s and 
EPA’s optimal strategies in terms of enforcement actions to undertake. 
The innovative contribution of this analysis resides in the fact that, 
contrary to most of the literature, discretion is interpreted as a key element in 
encouraging firms to adopt compliant environmental behaviour, and thereby 
constitute a crucial element in the management of any environmental policy. It is 
shown that an enforcement strategy partially unpredictable can produce a greater 
level of compliance compared to an environmental policy known in advance and 
with certainty. From a policy perspective, the results obtained allow to identify the 
most effective strategies to maximize firms’ compliance and, thus, environmental 
quality. 
 
1.5.2 CHAPTER 3 
In chapter three, the outcomes of two experimental empirical validations 
are presented. Departing from the setting of the game theory models developed in 
chapter two, the role of EPA and DOJ in deterring firms from polluting is 
empirically tested, by means of two laboratory experiments. Laboratory evidence 
on compliance behaviour of firms when faced with enforcement conditions 
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consistent with the theoretical models set up are discussed for the different 
experimental treatments performed. 
The overall experimental findings lead to somewhat mixed considerations 
in terms of environmental policy implications. The first set of experimental results 
(relative to the game theory model in which EPA and DOJ are assumed to share 
the same objective function) suggests that it is more efficient to let the EPA 
resolve the cases internally (administratively) rather than refer them to the DOJ 
for civil or criminal prosecution. From the experimental test it emerges, in fact, 
that the intervention of the DOJ acts merely as an additional enforcement cost, 
which, in turn, might reduce the probability of conducting inspections by the EPA 
without affecting the probability of firm’s compliance. This implies that 
enhancing criminal enforcement programs would not necessarily strengthen 
deterrence since criminal fines might not be able to give polluters the adequate 
incentives to prevent environmental crimes. The second set of experimental 
results (relative to the game theory model in which EPA and DOJ are assumed to 
have different objective functions) however, shows that criminal enforcement 
enhances deterrence by improving firms’ compliance. 
On the whole, the results are supportive of the view that an environmental 
approach in which the choice of the enforcement strategy is randomized can be 
successful in encouraging firms’ compliance. One of the main implications of the 
experimental results in terms of environmental policy recommendations is that the 
EPA and the DOJ, even though jointly working towards a better environmental 
quality, should not share the same objective functions but should keep them 
separate. 
The main innovative contribution provided by this chapter consists in 
bringing new evidence on enforcement and discretion in the law and economics 
experimental literature. The chapter represents, to the best of my knowledge, the 
first attempt to offer an empirical validation on the combination of administrative 
and civil/criminal environmental enforcement approaches by means of laboratory 
experiments. The experimental treatments allow us to study how compliance 
choices respond to the different enforcement approaches in a novel theoretical 
framework in which the enforcement agency and the Department of Justice 
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interact together. 
 
1.5.3 CHAPTER 4 
The fourth chapter provides an empirical investigation on environmental 
justice issues in the context of air pollution in Italy. Environmental Justice refers 
to the fair treatment of people of all races, income levels, and cultures with respect 
to the implementation and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations 
(US EPA, 2004). Fair treatment implies that no one group should bear a 
disproportionate environmental risk in terms of polluted air or water and under-
enforcement of environmental laws. Environmental justice issues are closely 
related to enforcement issue. Only a coherent and homogeneous enforcement of 
laws guarantees against the presence of social or ethnic inequalities in exposure to 
environmental risk. 
Air pollution emissions data at provincial level were combined with data 
from the latest available Italian Census to assess the role, if any, that the gender 
composition of Italian population could play in influencing environmental 
outcomes and the role that economic factors, such as income, could have on 
pollution emissions. 
The estimates obtained are consistent with an inverse U-shaped 
environmental Kuznets curve: once income exceeds a turning point, air pollution 
decreases with increasing income. Moreover, the results show evidence of higher 
air releases in provinces with higher concentration of females as households’ head 
and higher concentration of children.  
This chapter provides an innovative contribution aiming at filling the gap 
in the environmental justice literature since, by contrast to the United States and to 
several others European countries, in Italy the impact of socioeconomic factors on 
environmental outcomes has been rarely studied. The results of the research yield 
new insights in the sense that they do not find evidence of any environmental 
discrimination based on ethnicity, suggesting that environmental justice issues in 
Italy are not likely to be perceived in racial and ethnic terms but rather in terms of 
social categories and gender composition of the population. 
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1.5.4 CHAPTER 5 
The concluding chapter gives a brief summary of the main findings of the 
research. It offers some discussions of its policy implications, from the theoretical 
models and from the empirical analyses, and suggests possible proposals for 
future research directions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
DISCRETIONARY ENFORCEMENT AND STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN FIRMS, 
REGULATORY AGENCY AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENT. 
 
«[...], greater uncertainty will cause rule-governed 
behavior to exhibit increasingly predictable 
regularities, so that uncertainty becomes the basic 
source of predictable behavior.» 
 
Ronald A. Heiner 
The Origin of Predictable Behavior, in American 
Economic Review, 1983, 73(4), p.570. 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
 The traditional approach of law and economics (Shavell, 1987) has 
focused on two regulatory approaches:  the ex ante and the ex post regulation 
systems. An ex ante regulatory system is based on a control scheme a priori 
defined and is applied before (or at least independently of) the occurrence of 
harm. An ex post regulatory system, also defined as a liability system, occurs after 
the damage is verified. An ex ante regulation is based upon both direct (i.e., the 
traditional command and control system, such as standards) and indirect 
regulation instruments (i.e., green taxes, tradable permits and voluntary 
agreements). Since the polluting firm must compensate the victim for the damage 
eventually brought, it will be induced to prevent meaningful environmental 
damages in all those circumstances in which the prevention costs are smaller than 
the damage. An ex post regulation system, instead, is based upon compensation 
mechanisms, mainly through the application of two liability regimes: fault (or 
negligence) and strict (or objective) liability.
9
 If the damage is verified, the firm is 
                                               
9 Under strict liability, injurers are liable for damages they cause regardless of culpability, i.e. of 
the level of care they exercise. Under a fault-based liability regime, a person is held liable for 
environmental damage only if he or she is proven to be at fault. Fault is determined on the basis of 
whether or not the person to whom the damage is attributed observed the prescribed duty of care in 
carrying out the activity. This must normally be proven by the person bringing a claim. Strict 
liability, on the other hand, applies regardless of whether or not the person to whom the damage is 
attributed is at fault, i.e. whether or not he or she observed the duty of care. The claimant is only 
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held responsible to reimburse the victims and, thus, to sustain the cost of the 
externality. 
In the U.S., the activity of the EPA provides a clear example of ex ante 
regulation by an independent environmental authority. This agency establishes 
standards, runs inspections and brings actions to the federal courts. In the E.U., by 
contrast, the European Environmental Agency (EEA) plays only a very limited 
role,
10
 firstly because its task consists mainly in providing relevant and reliable 
information to policy makers and to the public and, secondly, because it does not 
make or enforce European Union environmental policy or legislation (which is 
responsibility of the European Commission and of other E.U. institutions). 
The U.S. experience is well established also with regard to the ex post 
regulatory system. The issue of environmental damage liability has emerged since 
the beginning of the 1980s, when the U.S. Congress enacted the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and 
created a Superfund for the quick and effective clean-up of dangerous waste 
sites,
11
 based upon a strict liability regime accordingly to the polluter pays 
principle (for which who causes an environmental damage is financially 
responsible for it).  
In Europe, the different juridical system and the normative fragmentation 
of the different member States give a less homogeneous picture. The European 
Community has been trying for many years to define a common system of 
liability for environmental damages. In 1993, the European Commission 
published the Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage
12
 and in 2000 
                                                                                                                                
required to prove the damage and the causal link, but not a failure to observe the duty of care. 
Strict liability is generally advantageous for the claimant, as fault can be difficult to establish.  
10 The European Environment Agency was formally established by EEC Regulation 1210/90 in 
1990 (amended by EC Regulation 933/1999 and EC Regulation 1641/2003). The decision to locate 
in Copenhagen was taken in 1993 and the Agency has been operational since 1994. The European 
Environment Agency is the leading public body in Europe dedicated to providing timely, targeted, 
relevant and reliable information to policy makers and the public, to support sustainable 
development and to help achieve significant and measurable improvements in Europe’s 
environment. 
11 The Superfund enabled the government to begin cleaning-up of priority sites placed on the 
National Priority List with money generated principally by taxes on cruel oil, corporate income, 
petrochemical, feedstock, and motor fuels. 
12 Commission of European Communities, Communication from the Commission of the Council 
and Parliament: Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47 final, Brussels, 
14 May 1993, OJ 1993 C 149/12. 
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released the White Paper on Environmental Liability.
13
 It is only with the 
Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
environmental liability that it has been established a common framework of 
liability based on the strict liability principle. 
Shavell (1984) shows that no regulation system alone leads to exercise the 
socially desirable level of care, emphasizing that a complete solution to the 
problem of the control of risk should involve the joint use of liability and 
regulation. In addressing the problem of the comparison between ex ante and ex 
post regulation, Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson (1990) conclude that the two policies 
should be applied jointly in a complementary (and not substitutive) relationship. 
 Over the last three decades in both the E.U. and the U.S., notwithstanding 
their different juridical systems, environmental regulatory regimes have become 
increasingly centralized (Vogel et al., 2010). In the U.S. by the second half of the 
1970s federal standards have been established for all forms of air and water 
pollution. In the E.U, actually the majority of environmental laws in the Member 
States are effectively European law (it consists of European environmental 
regulations and directives which have been implemented into national law).  
 However, a crucial difference between the two regulatory systems is that 
while in the U.S. the EPA has direct enforcement power, it can control directly 
environmental quality setting federal standards and undertake enforcement actions 
in court, the E.U. has no EPA with centralized enforcement power, and it is 
dependent upon Member States to implement and enforce European 
environmental law. The European Commission does not dispose of inspectors to 
verify whether environmental laws are actually applied. Thus, while the rules are 
set at the European level, implementation and enforcement is entirely left to 
Member States. For its effectiveness, therefore, European environmental law 
needs a strong cooperation between the E.U. and the Member States (Faure and 
Johnston, 2008; Goodrich, 2004; Krämer, 2002; Kelemen, 2000). 
 Nevertheless, in both the E.U. and the U.S., state regulations continue to 
play an important role in environmental policies generating often some disputes 
                                               
13 Commission of European Communities, “White Paper on Environmental Liability”, COM 
(2000) 66, 9 February 2000. 
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about the relative competence of central and state authorities to regulate matters of 
environmental policy (Vogel et al., 2010).  
 Another, not less important, longstanding debate focuses on the best way 
to achieve compliance with the provisions of environmental statutes and 
regulations. As a matter of fact, law and economics scholars (Ogus and Abbott, 
2002; Ogus, 2004; Bowles et al., 2008; Faure and Svatikova, 2009; Almer and 
Goeschl, 2010) have given substantial attention to the question of why the 
criminal law is used at all and why criminal sanctions are applied (in terms of 
their cost-effectiveness).  
 The environmental enforcement strategies adopted in the United States and 
in Europe have been quite different. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the United 
States have become increasingly vulnerable to criminal liability for violations of 
environmental laws and this tendency, proved by the recent stiffening of criminal 
environmental sanctions, suggests that tougher enforcement is likely to continue 
(Babbit et al., 2004). In Europe, instead, the most common approach for inducing 
compliance with environmental regulations has been mainly through 
administrative and civil remedies, even though, recently, the European Union has 
reviewed its environmental enforcement strategies (European Commission, 2007). 
After various unsuccessful attempts, Europe has promulgated Directive 
2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment trough criminal law, 
harmonizing and strengthening the role of criminal law and forcing the Member 
States to enforce a large number of environmental violations through criminal 
law. This directive seems to favour criminalization but is in contrast with the trend 
in several European countries (Germany and Netherlands, for instance) where the 
use of administrative sanctions is the main enforcement tool for environmental 
regulation (Faure and Svatikova, 2009). This opens up the question of whether 
relying strongly on criminal law, as the E.U. Directive does, is socially desirable.  
In this chapter the role of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is investigated with regard to 
their discretion in the enforcement of environmental laws. This can take the form 
of administrative and investigative discretion for the EPA, and prosecutorial 
discretion for the DOJ. More specifically, we explore the motivations behind the 
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use of discretion in terms of the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanisms 
available to the environmental authorities. 
This analysis is motivated by the observation that in the enforcement of 
environmental laws some violators are sentenced at criminal level while some 
others, who have in substance committed the same crime, are not punished or are 
sanctioned with a purely administrative or civil fine. For instance, it has been 
demonstrated (Cory and Germani, 2002; Babbit, Cory, et. al., 2004) that for 
similar violations to the U.S. Clean Water Act, seemingly similar defendants may 
receive very disparate sentences. 
These inconsistencies run the risk of creating serious social and economic 
policy distortions, either toward an over-criminalization attitude or in favour of a 
more lenient approach, by creating respectively over-deterrence or under-
deterrence. One of the main tasks for the EPA is to determine which violators to 
prosecute, and whether to pursue violations at the administrative, civil or criminal 
levels. In fact, the major U.S. environmental statutes, together with the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines,
14
 afford substantial discretion to the EPA, the Department 
of Justice, and the courts: they can be more aggressive or more friendly on 
environmental violations, and can carry out a weaker or a stronger enforcement. 
Our contribution consists mainly of trying to gain a better understanding 
of why there are these apparent inconsistencies in the prosecution of 
environmental violations. We present two game theoretic frameworks to explore 
the possible interactions between environmental authorities and firms. Even 
though unpredictable and contradictory enforcement can create uncertainty and 
adverse effects that could potentially limit the effectiveness of environmental 
policies, we provide a possible rationale for these apparent incongruities. Since 
there are no dominant strategies for the environmental agencies, their optimal rule 
of conduct requires that they randomize among their alternative strategies. 
                                               
14 In 1984, the U.S. Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) that completely 
transformed the traditional sentencing process in an attempt to reduce unwarranted disparity in 
sentencing, to ensure certainty, proportionality and uniformity of punishment, and to establish 
more serious penalties for specific categories of offenses. In order to achieve these goals, Congress 
created the United States Sentencing Commission as an independent, permanent agency in the 
judicial branch with the main purpose to develop an unprecedented body of laws to regulate 
federal sentencing: the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Sentencing Guidelines went into effect 
in November 1987, and apply to all federal crimes committed on or after that date. 
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Overall, we suggest that making environmental enforcement less predictable for 
the firms, and thus creating a degree of uncertainty for the violators, can help 
encourage deterrence and, thus, improve compliance. In other words, a partly 
unpredictable enforcement strategy may generate more compliance than an 
environmental policy that is known with certainty in advance. 
The unpredictability of the enforcement strategy need not be meant as a 
literal randomization of the strategy of the environmental authorities. Rather, it 
can be seen as reflecting the heterogeneity of the members of the environmental 
agencies, and the impossibility by the firm of knowing in advance with which 
members it will be matched. Thus, even if each individual member of the 
environmental agency were to follow a pure strategy, their heterogeneity would 
lead the firm to behave as if the agency as a whole were randomizing its 
strategies. This interpretation of the results is consistent with Harsanyi’s 
Purification Theorem (Harsanyi, 1973) in game theory. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the main 
literature directly related to this issue. Section 3 identifies the key points 
underlying the two enforcement game theory models developed. Section 4 
explores, within the context of the first theoretical model, the strategic interactions 
between the EPA and the firm, first, and then, in a more complex game, the role 
of the DOJ and its relationship with the EPA. Section 5 analyzes, within the 
context of the second game theory model, the probability of compliance by the 
firm and the enforcement strategies of the two environmental agencies when they 
have different objective functions. Section 2.6 discusses the main policy 
implications of the analysis and offers some conclusions. 
 
2.2 RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Our analysis is closely related to the literature on selective enforcement 
(Friesen, 2003; Lando and Shavell, 2004) pioneered by Harrington (1988), who 
had noted the following paradox: firms' rate of compliance is high even though 
the EPA's enforcement activity is carried out at low levels and often violators are 
not punished even if discovered. This paradox shows, therefore, that even though 
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enforcement and monitoring actions are often weak, firms may still be 
substantially compliant.
15
 Revisiting the Harrington paradox, Heyes and Rickman 
(1999) analyze the role of regulatory dealing by which the enforcement agency 
can use tolerance in some contexts and for some types of violations, in order to 
increase compliance in other contexts and for other violations. The authors 
interpret discretion as an important aspect of the strategic agency’s behaviour and 
as a necessary element of any environmental policy, by showing that the 
introduction of a regulatory dealing will improve both the rate of compliance and 
the whole environmental performance of the firms. 
While the focus of Harrington and of Heyes and Rickman is on studying 
the optimal enforcement scheme and the optimal use of sanctions (Polinsky and 
Shavell, 1984, 2000; Posner, 1985, 2003; Shavell, 1993, 2003; Stigler, 2002; 
Garoupa, 1997, 2001, 2004), our contribution consists of analysing how the EPA 
and the DOJ can influence firms’ behaviour by randomizing, on purpose, 
enforcement rules and by modeling their interactions in a strategic game 
characterized by discretion. We can thus investigate: 1) whether the 
implementation of administrative or civil/criminal actions could help improve 
environmental compliance, and 2) how both EPA and DOJ choose to handle 
cases, that is civilly or criminally. 
According to Firestone (2003), the EPA does not pursue all enforcement 
cases administratively. In order to explain why and how EPA makes its decisions, 
Firestone, in his work, explored the implications of five main theoretical 
“alternative” motivations for EPA enforcement decisions: social welfare 
maximization; violation minimization; case maximization; environmental harm 
minimization; and political support maximization. Firestone’s main results are 
that when EPA seeks to maximize social welfare, to minimize the number of 
violations, or to maximize political benefits, it would find judicial remedies less 
attractive and thus increasingly will choose to handle violations administratively. 
Only when EPA seeks to minimize environmental harm, as the actual or potential 
for harm increases, it will invest greater financial resources to punish the conduct 
                                               
15 The main result of Harrington's paradox is that firms may have an incentive to comply with the 
law even though their cost of compliance exceeds the expected penalty for violation or even the 
maximum penalty that can be applied. 
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criminally. Overall, the objectives of maximizing social welfare and minimizing 
environmental harm appear to be the main motivations for EPA, while there is 
little empirical support for the political maximization objective.  
Our findings are consistent, in some respects, with Firestone’s results, in 
the sense that we observe a greater probability for violations to be resolved 
administratively, but we also provide further insights on the possible interactions 
between the violator and the EPA and especially between the EPA and the DOJ. 
Related works are also those by Franckx (2001; 2002) and by Tsebelis 
(1989). In Tsebelis, individuals’ offending behaviour has been modelled as a one-
shot 2x2 game between public and police; the game does not have a pure strategy 
equilibrium, instead it has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Franckx considers 
inspection games between polluting firms and an inspection agency to identify 
under which conditions ambient inspections can improve compliance. In another 
game theoretic framework by Scholz (1991) the EPA’s enforcement approach 
depends on where the agency and firm are in the enforcement process implying 
that the regulatory enforcement involves the regulator and firm in an ongoing 
series of prisoner's dilemma games. Because the regulatory game is played 
repeatedly, the regulator chooses its action based on the firm’s behaviour in the 
prior round. If the firm has cooperated, the agency should cooperate, but if the 
firm defects, the agency should punish until the firm again adopts a cooperative 
behaviour.
 
Compared to the extensive theoretical literature on monitoring and 
enforcement aspects of environmental regulation (Cohen, 2000a; Polinsky and 
Shavell, 2000), the empirical literature is still lagging behind. In particular, 
relatively little is known about why firms decide to comply or not with 
environmental regulations, partly because comprehensive data on compliance and 
enforcement have been difficult to obtain (Cohen, 2000b), but also because there 
is a serious lack of empirical data on the motivations influencing firms’ 
compliance behaviour. However, most of the empirical research looks at the 
factors that can influence the inspection decisions of environmental agencies - 
some examples are Magat and Viscusi (1990), Laplante and Rilstone (1996), Dion 
et al. (1998), Helland (1998), Dasgupta et al. (2000), Stafford (2003), Anderson 
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and Stafford (2003), Rousseau (2007) - where it is extensively shown that 
increases in the frequency of inspections in regulated facilities increase 
compliance. Glicksman and Earnhardt in their work (2007) show that the threat of 
inspections improves firms’ compliance. They contrast the effects of 
administrative and civil fines, finding that civil fine are significantly more 
effective than administrative fines in terms of their general deterrence. Other 
studies focusing on the effects of sanctions show that an increase in penalties also 
results in an increase in compliance rates (Stafford, 2002; Shimshack and Ward, 
2005). 
There is, therefore, the need for more empirical research especially for 
what concerns authorities’ discretion in their enforcement of environmental 
regulation, in order to better understand how firms perceive their relationship with 
environmental regulators and how they react to their enforcement strategies. The 
need for further empirical analysis is equally essential for regulators to assist them 
in undertaking the mix of enforcement approaches more suitable to attain the 
highest level of compliance by regulated industries. 
Related literature also includes, in the macroeconomic field, the literature 
on rules versus discretion on the conduct of monetary policy (Kydland and 
Prescott, 1977). Other relevant studies are those by Subrahmanyam (1995) in 
which rules versus discretion in the context of market closure rules are analyzed, 
and by Kleinig (1996) in which several analyses on the use of discretion by police 
in law enforcement are provided. Our work relates to these papers, since the 
utilization of randomized strategies can be interpreted as the exercise of discretion. 
 
2.3 THE TWO GAME THEORY MODELS 
 
The economic structure of the enforcement problem is analyzed throughout 
two game theory models in both of which the violator’s behaviour is influenced by 
the course of actions discretionally implemented by both the EPA and the DOJ. In 
particular, firms' behavior is likely to change as a consequence of its revised 
expectations on the exercise of discretion at both the EPA and the DOJ levels. We 
describe these interactive situations through strategic games in order to determine 
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the payoff maximizing strategies for the players and consequently determine the 
expected outcomes of the game. 
We develop two game theory models: 
1. a model under the assumption that EPA and DOJ share the same objective 
function (model I: section 2.4); 
2. a model under the assumption that EPA’s objective function is different from 
DOJ’s objective function (model II: section 2.5). 
Regarding the objective functions of regulatory agency, in the literature, 
there is no consensus on their specification, ranging from minimization of levels 
of noncompliance to maximization of social welfare, from minimization of agency 
budgets constraints to maximization of agency political support (Viscusi and 
Zeckhauser, 1979; Jones and Scotchmer, 1990; Niskanen, 1975; Peltzman, 1976). 
The most common objective function incorporated in theoretical models of 
enforcement assumes that the enforcer acts to minimize non-compliance subject to 
a budget constraint (examples include Heyes and Rickman, 1999, and Harrington, 
1988).  
In the first model that we set out, we assume that both EPA and DOJ share 
the same objective function, i.e., minimization of environmental violations at the 
minimum costs of enforcement. We assume also a profit maximizing firm. 
In the second model, we assume that EPA and DOJ do not share exactly 
the same objective function, since the DOJ aims to minimize environmental 
violations but it has to take into account also other factors, such as its own 
prestige/ popularity/reputational factors  related to prosecutors’ concerns (as in 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Rasmussen et al., 2009; Posner, 1993, etc.). 
Each of the two game theory models is subdivided into two sub-games. 
The first sub-game we consider has the following structure, which is identical for 
the two models. The firm can decide between complying with environmental 
regulations and not complying, by assessing the costs and benefits of compliance 
versus pollution. The EPA, not knowing the strategy chosen by the firm, must 
decide whether to carry out inspections or not. If the firm complies, it has to 
sustain a cost. This cost is not incurred if the firm decides not to comply. The EPA 
also has to incur a cost if it decides to carry out an inspection. If EPA carries out 
  
 38 
an inspection and the firm is not complying, EPA can levy a fine on the firm. 
However, if the EPA does not carry out an inspection and the firm does not 
comply, the EPA will internalize the cost of the environmental damage. 
In the second game, the DOJ is introduced in the model (the structure of 
this game within the two models will be explained in more details in the next 
sections). Now, the EPA could serve a notice of violation to the firm and the latter 
will be referred to DOJ which exercises its discretion by deciding whether to 
initiate a civil or a criminal proceeding. 
Therefore, EPA’s exercise of discretion comes into play in two instances: 
first with regard to the decision of whether to investigate or not on the violation, 
and then, in the case it does decide to investigate, regarding whether to initiate an 
administrative, civil or criminal enforcement action. Moreover, if EPA decides to 
pursue a case civilly, it has two options: it may handle the matter internally or 
seek fines in a federal court.
16
 If the EPA decides to deal with the case 
administratively, then it issues a Notice of Violation (NOV) ordering compliance 
and/or assigning a penalty to the violation. A notice of violation describes the 
violation and commands the violator to stop the activity.
17
 At this point, the firm 
must again decide whether to be compliant or non-compliant. If it does not 
comply and if the case cannot be resolved at the administrative level, then the 
EPA will refer it to the Department of Justice for civil or criminal prosecution. At 
this stage, the DOJ can exercise its discretion on whether to initiate a civil or a 
criminal proceeding. Solving the game by backward induction allows us to see 
how the enforcement strategy chosen by the DOJ will affect the game between the 
environmental agency and the firm. 
A similar structure of analysis is conducted in the second game theory 
model (section 2.5) in which EPA’s and DOJ’s objective functions are different. 
Both games show that, since there are no pure strategies Nash equilibria, the 
                                               
16 As noted by Firestone (2003), administrative and civil judicial enforcement share many 
elements. The primary distinguishing characteristic is that with administrative enforcement, EPA 
typically functions as both the enforcer and the adjudicator. A judge or EPA, as appropriate, may 
impose a civil sanction in an environmental matter whenever a person has violated or is violating a 
law or a permit condition [see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (2000)]. 
17 The purpose of a NOV is to initiate corrective action that will stop the violation. To provide an 
incentive for continuing compliance, NOVs for the Clean Water Act may result in monetary 
penalties up to $27.500 per day, per violation, according to 33 U.S.C. §1319. 
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environmental authorities have to resort to randomized strategies consistent with a 
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
 
2.4 MODEL I: THE BASELINE MODEL 
 
2.4.1 STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE FIRM AND THE EPA 
The interactions between the firm and the EPA are modelled as a 
coordination game. The game tree corresponding to the extensive form of the 
game is illustrated in Figure 2.1, and the payoff matrix associated with the normal 
form of the game is given in Table 2.1. All figures and tables are presented at the 
end of the chapter. The firm decides whether to comply with the environmental 
regulations or not. The environmental agency must then decide whether to carry 
out an inspection or not, without knowing the action of the firm. We denote by v 
the value to the firm if it does not comply, by c the cost of compliance to the firm, 
by e the environmental damage that is generated if the firm does not comply and 
that would be internalised by EPA, by i the cost of inspection, and finally by f the 
fine that would be levied by EPA on the firm if the latter is found to be non-
compliant. 
For simplicity, all players are assumed to be risk neutral. All the above 
parameters are strictly positive. We assume that the following additional 
restrictions on parameter values must hold: 
 
(1)  ei   
 
(2)  ffc   
 
Condition (1) states that the environmental damage must be larger than the 
cost of inspection and is required to rule out the trivial result that never to inspect 
is a dominant strategy for EPA. Allowing for a corner solution in which the EPA 
never inspects (when i > e) does not add substantive insight to the analysis. The 
first part of condition (2) requires that the value of the fine levied by the EPA 
must be greater than the cost of compliance, and is required to rule out the trivial 
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result that never to comply is a dominant strategy for the firm. Again, to keep the 
analysis straightforward, it is convenient to rule out the possibility that c > f 
because in this case the costs of compliance would be higher than the fine, and the 
firm would never comply no matter how great the firm’s value is. The upper 
bound on the fine, f , rules out the possibility that EPA may set its fine at an 
infinite value.
18
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the strategic form of the game by showing the moves 
that the firm and EPA can make. It is immediate to verify that, if the firm knows 
that the EPA will carry out an inspection, it will be better off by complying, since 
its expected pay-off is v-c if it complies and v-f  if it does not comply, with v-f < v-
c by assumption (2). On the other hand, if EPA decided not to carry out the 
inspection, the firm will be better off by not complying, since its expected pay-off 
is v-c if it complies and v if it does not comply, with v > v-c. 
Conversely, if the firm complies then the EPA would be better off by not 
carrying out the inspection. By contrast, if the firm does not comply, it would be 
preferable for the EPA to inspect. 
Hence, the game has no Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. There does 
exist, however, a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium where the firm and the EPA 
randomize their choice of action (Ordershook, 1986). In a mixed-strategy Nash 
equilibrium, a player is indifferent between all of the available pure strategies with 
positive probabilities, but he randomizes so as to hide his intentions from the other 
players.
19
 In 1973, Harsanyi presented the so-called “purification” interpretation of 
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium: the idea is that players play pure strategies, but 
by introducing some kind of heterogeneity (generated, for example, by incomplete 
information or random matching), a player is no longer sure that his opponent is 
choosing the same action, but has a diffuse belief over his opponent’s moves. In 
Harsanyi’s interpretation, a mixed strategy represents uncertainty for a player on 
                                               
18 Some of the justifications for assuming an upper bound for the feasible fine are: i) financial 
constraints on the side of the firm lead to reasonable fines in order to avoid bankruptcy; ii) the 
“punishment fits the crime” principle (Michael, 1992) requires that the severity of penalty for a 
wrongdoing should be reasonable and proportionate to the severity of the infraction and is another 
reason for assuming a restriction on the feasible fine. 
19 This is a standard property of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, since the objective function is 
linear in the probability. 
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how the other players will choose their strategies, rather than deliberate 
randomization (Morris, 2008). 
According to the purification theorem of Harsanyi, thus, it could be that the 
firm and the EPA randomize their behaviours in the following way. Let us denote 
by p be the probability of compliance by the firm and by q be the probability of 
inspection by the EPA. The expected payoff to EPA if it carries out an inspection 
is given by: 
 
(3)  fpepfeifeipipE
I
EPA  ))(1()()(  
 
The expected payoff to EPA if it does not carry out an inspection is: 
 
(4)  eepeppE
NI
EPA  ))(1()0()(  
 
The firm will choose the probability of compliance, p, in such a way that 
the EPA must be indifferent between inspecting or not. This requires that 
)()( NIEPA
I
EPA EE   . Solving for p yields: 
(5)  
f
i
p 1  
 
Note that p is a well defined probability ( 10  p ) since ei 0  by 
condition (1). Hence, i < f  for p > 0 and i > f  for p = 0. 
The expected payoffs to the firm under compliance and non-compliance 
are respectively: 
 
(6)  cvcvqcvqE
C
F  ))(1()()(  
 
(7)  qfvvqfvqE
NC
F  )1()()(  
 
The EPA will choose the probability of inspection q in such a way that the 
firm is indifferent between complying or not: )()(
NC
F
C
F EE   . Solving for q 
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yields: 
 
(8)  
f
c
q 
 
 
Note that 1q  since fc   by condition (2). The above results can be 
summarised by the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. The game played by the firm and EPA has no pure strategy 
Nash Equilibrium. The mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium is characterised by the 
following randomized strategies: 
(a) The firm complies with probability fip /1 ; 
(b) The EPA carries out an inspection with probability fcq / . 
 
The probability of compliance by the firm is a decreasing function of the 
cost of inspection and an increasing function of the fine. An increasing penalty 
would have a deterrent effect and the firm would have a greater incentive to 
comply. On the other hand, if the cost of inspection increases, the probability of 
compliance decreases: given that inspections may induce firms to improve their 
environmental performance, if they perceive that inspection and monitoring costs 
are high for the environmental authority, they will tend to decrease their level of 
care thus reducing the level of compliance. 
The probability of inspection by EPA is an increasing function of the cost 
of compliance by the firm. This implies that when compliance costs are higher 
and the firm would have greater incentive to violate, the probability of firm’s 
inspection by EPA must accordingly increase. On the other hand, the probability 
of inspection is a decreasing function of the fine. This implies a trade-off between 
the fine and the probability of inspection: the greater the fine, the lower the 
probability of inspection. In other words, a greater fine, which would increase the 
costs of violating for the firm, is compensated by a lower probability of 
inspection. This confirms the classic results by Becker (1968) and by Polinsky 
and Shavell (2000) that, in any optimal enforcement scheme, it always makes 
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sense to substitute a higher fine for a lower probability of detection and vice versa. 
Hence, if the EPA wishes to minimize its enforcement cost, it will set the fine at 
the largest possible level: ff  , which would imply that the probability of 
inspection becomes fcq / . 
Proposition 1 also provides a possible solution to Harrington’s paradox. In 
equilibrium, the probability of compliance by the firm, p, can be high even if the 
probability of inspection by the environmental agency, q, is low. 
 
2.4.2 THE STRATEGIC GAME BETWEEN THE FIRM, THE EPA AND THE DOJ 
In this second version of the interaction between the firm and EPA we 
introduce a role for the DOJ by letting EPA serve a notice of violation if the firm 
is found to be non-compliant. The firm is then referred to the DOJ and has the 
opportunity to put right its wrongful action. The DOJ may proceed against a 
violator with either a civil suit or a criminal charge.
20
 It retains exclusive authority 
to prosecute criminally
21
 and has the authority to initiate all criminal cases referred 
by the EPA.
22,23
 
The DOJ can exercise discretion on whether to initiate civil or criminal 
                                               
20 The DOJ’s charging decision is subject to administrative guidance. Prosecution should proceed 
only if there is probable cause to believe such a crime has been committed and the evidence is 
likely to sustain a conviction (2000 United States Attorneys’ Manual, at § 9-27.200). In the 
decision to proceed the following seven factors are considered: 1) federal law enforcement 
priorities; 2) the nature and the seriousness of the offense; 3) the deterrent effect of prosecution; 4) 
the offender’s culpability; 5) the offender’s criminal history; 6) the offender’s willingness to 
cooperate; and 7) the offender’s probable sentence or other consequences of conviction (United 
States Attorneys’ Manual 2000, at § 9-27.200). More specifically, with regard to the decision to 
prosecute environmental crimes, DOJ guidelines consider the following four factors: 1) voluntary 
disclosure of a violation or other cooperation with the authorities; 2) the entity’s level of 
noncompliance; 3) the existence of preventative measures and compliance programs; and 4) 
whether the entity pursues its own internal disciplinary actions and produces subsequent 
compliance. 
21 See generally, U.S. Dept. of Justice in cooperation with the National Association of Attorneys, 
General Guidelines for Joint State/Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement Litigation (2003), 
available at http://www.naag.org/issues/pdf/env-joint_enf_guidelines-full.pdf 
22 In the memorandum entitled “Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental 
Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by the 
Violator” (1991) are described the factors that the DOJ in order not to create a disincentive to or 
undermine the goal of encouraging critical self-auditing, self-policing, and voluntary disclosure. 
23 The U.S. DOJ considers all of the following factors in deciding whether to exercise prosecutorial 
discretion: voluntary, timely, and complete disclosure of the matter under investigation; the degree 
and timeliness of cooperation; existence and scope of any regularized, intensive, and 
comprehensive environmental compliance program; pervasiveness of non-compliance; effective 
internal disciplinary action; and efforts to remedy any ongoing non-compliance promptly and 
completely. 
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proceedings. It is assumed that a criminal prosecution is more expensive than a 
civil prosecution, but also that jail can be a more effective deterrent than a 
pecuniary sanction that takes the form of a fine. A jail term would be more costly 
to administer than a fine, but the DOJ would suffer a penalty – that could be 
rationalised as a reputation cost - if an offending firm is punished with a fine 
rather than with a jail term. 
The structure of the game is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The additional 
notation relative to the game of section 2.4.1 is as follows. We denote by c1 the 
additional compliance cost if the firm did not comply in the first instance, by f the 
fine from civil prosecution, by j the cost to the firm from criminal prosecution, by 
kc the cost to DOJ of enforcing civil prosecution, by kj the cost to DOJ of 
enforcing criminal prosecution, and finally by r the reputation cost to DOJ of 
letting off an offending firm with a fine. 
The previous parameters are all positive. In addition, we assume that the 
following plausible restrictions hold: 
 
(9)  jjcf  1  
 
(10)  
jc kk   
 
(11)  rkk cj   
 
Condition (9) requires that the additional compliance cost must exceed the 
fine from civil prosecution, but must be less that the cost to the firm if a criminal 
sentence is imposed. Even though the first part of condition (9) might seem 
peculiar, Harrington (1988) has already found out that a firm could have an 
incentive to comply with regulations even though the cost of compliance exceeds 
the expected penalty for violation. The logic behind these additional costs is the 
following. If the firm that has been ordered to return to compliance does not 
comply with that order in the first instance (c), its delay to return to compliance 
implies higher costs (c1) to due to higher clean up costs.  
Condition (9) might seem to contradict one of the main optimal 
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enforcement theoretical prescriptions (Becker, 1968) which requires that the ﬁne 
should be set at its maximum level, but we do not analyze the determination and 
the magnitude of the optimal fine by the regulator and we do not look at the 
impacts that a low fine or a high fine might have on the degree of compliance by 
the firm. We focus, instead, on the interactions between EPA, DOJ and the firm 
and characterize the conditions under which enforcement and compliance 
decisions take place. Similarly to condition (2) for civil prosecution, there is an 
upper bound j  to the largest criminal sentence that can be imposed. Condition 
(10) says that the cost to DOJ of enforcing criminal prosecution must be greater 
than the cost of enforcing civil prosecution. Finally, condition (11) requires that 
the reputation cost to the DOJ of letting off an offending firm with a fine is larger 
than the difference between the cost of enforcing criminal prosecution and the cost 
of administering a fine. 
The model can be solved by backward induction in two steps. In the first 
step, we solve the sub-game between the firm and DOJ. In the second step, we 
replace the outcome of this sub-game into the sub-game played between the firm 
and EPA to find their optimal strategies. 
 
2.4.3 THE SUB-GAME BETWEEN THE FIRM AND THE DOJ 
Let us consider first the sub-game between the firm and the DOJ. The 
payoff matrix for this game is shown in Table 2.2. It is possible to verify that this 
sub-game has no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. For instance, if the DOJ were to 
resort to civil prosecution, the firm would find it profitable not to comply. 
However, if the firm does not comply, the DOJ would be better off by enforcing a 
criminal rather than a civil prosecution. 
The sub-game between the firm and the DOJ does, however, admits a 
mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the probabilities of 
compliance by the firm and of enforcing a civil prosecution by DOJ are obtained 
by requiring that the other player is indifferent between its actions. 
The outcome of the sub-game is then replaced into the game played 
between the firm and EPA in order to compute the mixed strategy Nash 
Equilibrium of this game. 
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The expected payoff to DOJ if it enforces a civil prosecution is: 
 
(12) eprperkrkepkpE ccc
CI
DOJ 1111 )())(1()()(   
 
The expected payoff to DOJ if it carries out a criminal prosecution is: 
 
(13)  eepkkepkpE jjj
CR
DOJ  111 ))(1()()(  
 
The firm will choose the probability of compliance, p1, in such a way that 
the DOJ is indifferent between a civil and a criminal prosecution:
)()( CRDOJ
CI
DOJ EE   . Solving for p1 yields: 
 
(14)  
r
kk
p
cj 
11  
 
Note that 10 1  p  since cj krk   by assumption (11). 
The expected payoffs to the firm if it complies or does not comply are 
respectively: 
 
(15)  11111
,2 ))(1()()( ccvccvqccvqE CF   
 
(16)  )())(1()()( 111
,2 fjqjvjvqfvqE NCF   
 
The DOJ will choose the probability of civil prosecution q1 in such a way 
that the firm is indifferent between complying or not: )()(
,2,2 NC
F
C
F EE   . 
Solving for q1 yields: 
 
(17)  
fj
ccj
q


 11  
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where 10 1  q  since fcc  1  by assumption (9). 
The above results can be summarised by the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2.  The sub-game played by the firm and DOJ has no pure 
strategy Nash Equilibrium. The mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium is characterised 
by the following randomized strategies: 
(a) The firm complies with probability rkkp cj /)(11  . 
(b) The DOJ carries out a civil prosecution with probability 
)/()( 11 fjccjq  . 
 
The probability of compliance by the firm is a decreasing function of the 
cost of criminal prosecution and an increasing function of the cost of civil 
prosecution and of the reputation cost to DOJ. This implies that when the cost of 
civil prosecution and the reputation costs are higher and DOJ would have greater 
incentive to avoid these costs, the probability of compliance by the firm must 
accordingly increase. On the other hand, it is a decreasing function of the cost of 
criminal prosecution: the greater this costs, the lower the probability of 
compliance. The probability of civil prosecution by DOJ is an increasing function 
of the fine and of the criminal sanction and a decreasing function of the cost of 
compliance by the firm. The DOJ can minimise the probability of enforcing a 
costly criminal prosecution ( 11 q ) by committing itself to imposing the maximum 
sentence j , which would imply that the probability of a civil prosecution becomes
)/()( 11 fjccjq  . 
Note that, in equilibrium, the expected payoff to the firm from the second-
stage sub-game is: 
 
(18)  1
2 )( ccvE F   
 
and the expected payoff to DOJ is: 
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(19)   
r
e
kckkE jjDOJ )(  
 
2.4.4 THE GAME BETWEEN THE FIRM AND EPA 
The payoff matrix for this game is shown in Table 2.3. Also in this case, 
the game has no pure strategy Nash equilibria. The game however does have a 
unique mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium. 
The expected payoff to EPA if it carries out an inspection is: 
 
(20)  fpepfeifeipipE
I
EPA  ))(1()()(  
 
The expected payoff if it does not carry out an inspection is instead: 
 
(21)  eepeppE
NI
EPA  ))(1()0()(  
 
The firm will choose the probability of compliance, p, in such a way that 
the EPA is indifferent between inspecting or not: )()(
NI
EPA
I
EPA EE   . Solving for 
p gives: 
 
(22)  
f
i
p  1  
 
Note that 10  p  since ei 0  by assumption (1). 
The expected payoffs to the firm if it complies and if it does not comply 
are respectively: 
 
(23)  cvcvqcvqE
C
F  ))(1()()(
,1  
 
(24)  )()1()()( 11
,1 ccqvvqccvqE NCF   
 
The EPA will choose its probability of inspection q in such a way that the 
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firm is indifferent between complying or not: )()( ,1,1 NCF
C
F EE   . Solving for q 
yields: 
 
(25)  
1cc
c
q

  
 
Note that 10  q  since 0c , 01 c . The above results can be 
summarised by the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3.  The game played by the firm and EPA has a no pure 
strategy Nash Equilibrium. The mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium is characterised 
by the following randomized strategies: 
(a) The firm complies with probability fip /1 . 
(b) The EPA carries out an inspection with probability )/( 1cccq  . 
 
The probability of compliance by the firm in the first stage of the game is a 
decreasing function of the cost of inspection and an increasing function of the fine. 
The probability of inspection by EPA is an increasing function of the cost of 
compliance by the firm in the first stage of the game and a decreasing function of 
the cost of compliance in the second stage of the game. 
There are some interesting aspects of these results that need to be 
emphasized. The probability that the firm complies under proposition 3 is the 
same probability we find under proposition 1, that is fip /1 . This implies 
that, in equilibrium, the threat posed by the application of criminal sanctions does 
not affect the probability of compliance by the firm. This is important, of course, 
because indicates that compliance can occur even without the need of recurring to 
criminal enforcement. Financial and/or interdictive sanctions, such as the 
revocation of the license or the suspension of the firm’s activity, can also be harsh 
deterrent measures.
24
 
The probability of inspection by the EPA under proposition 3 is 
                                               
24 Penalties for non-compliance may take various forms, including legal costs, fines, loss of 
reputation, etc. See, among others, Dewees (1990), Hamilton (1995), Lanoie and Laplante (1994). 
  
 50 
)/( 1cccq  , while under proposition 1 it is fcq / . With an unvarying 
probability of compliance by the firm, the probability of inspection decreases 
compared to the one obtained in the first stage of the game in which the 
intervention of the DOJ was not considered. This implies that it would seem more 
efficient to let the EPA resolve the cases internally (administratively) rather than 
refer them to the Department of Justice for civil or criminal prosecution. 
Combining these findings with the fact that the firm’s probability of compliance is 
not affected by the presence of the DOJ, leads us to state that, within the 
framework of our model, the intervention of the DOJ acts merely as an additional 
enforcement cost, which in turn, reduces the probability of conducting inspections 
by the EPA without affecting the probability of firm’s compliance. Hence, we 
shall maintain that, under the assumptions of our model, the criminal enforcement 
reduces the effectiveness of enforcement policies. 
 
2.5 MODEL II: AN EXTENDED MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS OBJECTIVE 
FUNCTIONS 
 
2.5.1 EPA’S AND DOJ’S DIFFERENT OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS 
In this and the following sections we still consider a strategic model 
between EPA and DOJ, but now we assume that they may be characterized by 
different goals, with possibly conflicting objective functions.
25
  
The first author to hypothesize some sort of divergence between EPA and 
DOJ has been probably Niskanen (1975) for whom, instead of being driven by a 
desire to maximize general deterrence, EPA or DOJ may be driven by self-
interest. In particular, EPA may choose to maximize the number of enforcement 
cases. Yeager (1991) with regard to the enforcement of the U.S. Clean Water Act 
underlines a problem of regulatory competition between EPA and DOJ: “The 
                                               
25 Blondiau and Rousseau (2010) discuss three objective functions for the enforcing authority: 1) 
social welfare maximization: it implies that the regulator balances compliance costs with 
environmental damages; 2) deterrence maximization: it implies that the costs associated with 
violating the rules should always be larger than the cost of compliance; 3) providing justice. The 
main objectives for a judge when penalizing violators are to protect society from harm, to show 
that society disapproves of certain acts and to foster recovery from the harm done; these elements 
are mainly related to reducing environmental harm and thus with maximizing deterrence and 
providing justice. 
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Agency refrains from referring some prosecutable cases because the EPA does 
not wish to share credit for the case with the Department.” 
In the literature there has been, in fact, a widespread support for 
introducing a certain degree of differentiation between the regulatory agency and 
the justice authority. Barker (2002) affirms that coordination between the two 
agencies can be exacerbated by varying goals, prosecutors giving more 
importance to conviction rates and being less tolerant of losing cases. Due to the 
fact that EPA may wish to have independence without coordination with the DOJ, 
or to the fact that EPA does not wish to share merit for the case with the 
Department, different motivations can be assumed as the basis for their respective 
enforcement decisions. This can also open up the problem of prosecutorial 
behaviour, which is extensively studied in the law and economics literature, 
especially with regard to career concerns underlying the importance of the 
incentives facing State and federal prosecutors. Posner (1993) was the first author 
to maintain that judges behave just like “ordinary people”, in a rationality-based 
framework; since then, a significant body of theoretical research has been 
developed for understanding judicial behaviour at a trial.
26
 
Prosecutors are assumed to be concerned not only with providing justice
27
, 
but to be also sensitive to their own personal goals: factors such as the possibility 
of promotion to a higher position or political re-election can affect their decisions 
(i.e., what penalty to seek, which offenses to prosecute). Dimento (1993) notes 
that prosecutors may respond to incentive structures that favour pursuing cases 
other than the most important environmental violations. 
Rasmussen et al. (2009) focus on the problem of prosecutorial discretion 
in terms of case selection, i.e., whether to allocate resources broadly over many 
cases or intensively to a few cases. Forced by limitations of time and resources, 
prosecutors drop some cases, prosecute others, and prosecute some more intensely 
                                               
26 Public choice has developed around the notion that political and bureaucrats behaviour can be 
explained, in part, as a result of individual utility maximization. 
27 Justice has been approached in many different ways such as procedural justice, retributive 
justice and restorative justice. Procedural justice incorporates a theory of procedural fairness for 
civil dispute resolution (see Solum, 2004). The concept of retributive justice is based on the 
principle "Let the punishment fit the crime" such that the severity of the penalty for a violation 
should be reasonable and proportional to the severity of the infraction (see Zaibert, 2006). 
Restorative justice, on the other hand, is concerned with making the victim whole and 
reintegrating the offender into society (see Braithwaite, 2002). 
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than others. A prosecutor’s high conviction rate may not be a sign that he is tough 
on crime; instead, he might just be taking on easy cases and letting too many 
criminals go without prosecuting them. 
Glaeser et. al. (2000) in their model of prosecutors’ behaviour find that 
they tend to select which cases to pursue. Even though they generally aim to 
reduce crime, different incentives can create a desire among them on one hand to 
pursue the most dangerous criminals (“crime reduction” incentive) and, on the 
other hand, to pursue violators who will bring them private returns (“private 
career” concerns). 
So, in formulating the expected payoff of DOJ in this second model, it 
seemed reasonable to assume that its objective may not be merely to minimize 
environmental damages but that it might be concerned both with stopping 
environmental violations and with the success/reputation of prosecutors, who are 
the most significant representative component of DOJ. Therefore, the firm’s 
objective function is to maximize profits at minimum compliance costs, the EPA’s 
objective function consists of minimizing environmental violations at minimum 
inspection costs. We assume that the DOJ’s objective function is to minimize 
environmental violations taking into account not only social costs of civil and 
criminal sanctions (as in Blondiau and Rousseau, 2010) but also prestige/ 
popularity/ voting/ reputational factors  related to prosecutors’ concerns (Glaeser 
et al., 2000; Rasmussen et al., 2009; Posner, 1993, etc.). 
 
2.5.2 THE STRATEGIC GAME BETWEEN FIRM, EPA AND DOJ 
The structure of this game is substantially the same as discussed in 
sections 2.4, except for the fact that a variation is introduced before the EPA’s 
decision of referring the case to the DOJ, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. Now the 
EPA, if after inspections it finds out that a firm is not compliant with some 
regulatory prescriptions, orders the violator to stop the activity (with a notice of 
violation). If the firm complies (spontaneously or through informal negotiations) 
then the case ends (on the game tree, the firm chooses to move on the left). If the 
case cannot be resolved in the administrative process, then the EPA will refer it to 
the Department of Justice for civil or criminal prosecution (the firm chooses the 
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strategy on the right).  
The additional notation relative to the model of section 2.4 is as follows. 
We denote by c1 the abatement and clean-up costs to the compliant firm, by c2 
abatement and cleanup costs to the non-compliant firm, by f1 the fine from EPA if 
the firm is compliant after being served with a notice of violation, by f2 the fine 
from civil prosecution when the firm chooses to remain non-compliant, by j the 
cost to the firm from criminal prosecution, by kc the cost to DOJ of enforcing civil 
prosecution, by kj the cost to DOJ of enforcing criminal prosecution, and finally 
by r the reputation cost to DOJ of letting off an offending firm with a fine. 
The previous parameters are all positive. In addition, we assume that the 
following plausible parameter restrictions must hold: 
 
(26a)  122 cccf   
(26b)  jcjccc  221  
(26c)  21 cc   
(26d)  
jc kk   
(26e)  rkk cj   
(26f)  rf 2  
(26g)  
cj krkf 2  
(26h)  jf 2  
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Conditions (26a)-(26i) rule out the possibility of trivial solutions to the 
strategic game between firm, EPA and DOJ. For instance, (26a) rules out 
compliance as a dominant strategy for the firm in the sub-game with the DOJ. If 
(26a) does not hold, the firm would always trivially find it optimal to comply 
irrespective of whether the DOJ implements a civil or a criminal prosecution. 
Similarly, (26b) rules out that non-compliance is always a dominant strategy for 
the firm, irrespective of the DOJ’s prosecutorial decision. Similarly to condition 
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(2) for civil prosecution, there is an upper bound j  to the largest criminal 
sentence that can be imposed. 
As before, the model can be solved by backward induction in two steps. In 
the first step, the sub-game between the firm and DOJ is solved; in the second 
step, the outcome of this sub-game is replaced into the game played between the 
firm and EPA to find their optimal strategies. 
 
2.5.3 THE SUB-GAME BETWEEN THE FIRM AND DOJ 
Following the same methodology as before, let us consider first the sub-
game between the firm and the DOJ. The payoff matrix for this game is shown in 
Table 2.4. It is possible to verify that this sub-game has no pure strategy Nash 
Equilibrium. For instance, if the DOJ were to resort to civil prosecution, the firm 
would find it profitable not to comply, since 122 ccvcfv   by condition 
(26a) above. However, if the firm does not comply, the DOJ would be better off 
by enforcing a criminal rather than a civil prosecution since 
cj krfcekce  222  by (26g). 
The sub-game between the firm and the DOJ does, however, have a mixed 
strategy Nash Equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the probabilities of compliance by 
the firm and of enforcing a civil prosecution by DOJ are obtained by requiring 
that the other player is indifferent between its actions. 
The outcome of the sub-game is then replaced into the game played 
between the firm and EPA in order to compute the mixed strategy Nash 
Equilibrium of this game. 
The expected payoff to DOJ if it enforces a civil prosecution is: 
 
(27) ))(1()()( 22212 rkfcepkcepE cc
CI
DOJ    
  
)222222212 erkfcrpfpcpcp c   
 
The expected payoff to DOJ if it carries out a criminal prosecution is: 
 
(28) jjj
CR
DOJ keccpcpkcepkcepE  222122212 ))(1()()(  
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The firm will choose the probability of compliance, p2, in such a way that 
the DOJ is indifferent between a civil and a criminal prosecution:
)()( CRDOJ
CI
DOJ EE   . Solving for p2 yields: 
 
(29)  
2
2 1
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p
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

  
 
Note that 12 p  since it is assumed that cj kk   and 2fr  . 
The expected payoffs to the firm if it complies or does not comply are 
respectively: 
 
(30) 11212
,2 ))(1()()( ccvccvqccvqE CF   
 
(31) )())(1()()( 22222222
,2 fjqjcvjcvqcfvqE NCF   
 
The DOJ will choose the probability of civil prosecution q2 in such a way 
that the firm is indifferent between complying or not: )()(
,2,2 NC
F
C
F EE   . 
Solving for q2 yields: 
 
(32)  
2
21
2
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cccj
q


  
 
where 10 2  q  since by assumption (9a) 221 fccc  . 
The above results can be summarised by the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4. The sub-game played by the firm and DOJ has no pure 
strategy Nash Equilibrium. There is a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium which is 
characterised by the following randomized strategies: 
(a) The firm complies with probability p2 = 1-[(kj-kc)/r-f2] 
(b) The DOJ carries out a civil prosecution with probability 
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)/()( 2212 fjcccjq  . 
 
The probability of compliance by the firm is a decreasing function of the 
cost of criminal prosecution and of the fine f2, and is an increasing function of the 
cost of civil prosecution kc and of the reputation cost r to DOJ. The probability of 
civil prosecution by DOJ is an increasing function of the fine f2, of the criminal 
sanction j and of the cleanup costs by the firm c2, and is a decreasing function of 
the cost of compliance c and of the abatement pollution costs by the firm c1. Also 
here, we can assume that the DOJ can minimise the probability of enforcing a 
costly criminal prosecution ( 21 q ) by committing itself to imposing the 
maximum sentence j , which would imply that the probability of a civil 
prosecution becomes )/()( 2212 fjcccjq  . 
Note that, in equilibrium, the expected payoff to the firm from this sub-
game is: 
 
(33)  1
2 )( ccvE F   
 
and the expected payoff to DOJ is: 
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2.5.4 THE GAME BETWEEN THE FIRM AND EPA 
The payoff matrix for this sub-game is shown in Table 2.5. Note here that, 
in equilibrium a firm will never comply when the EPA serves a notice of 
violation/refers the case to DOJ because for the firm the non-compliance strategy 
dominates, since v - c - c1  < v – c. 
The expected payoff to EPA if it serves a notice of violation and if DOJ 
implements civil prosecution is: 
 
(35)  ))(1()()( 2212
1 ceipceipE EPA   
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The expected payoff to EPA if it serves a notice of violation and DOJ 
prosecutes criminally is: 
 
(37)  )1)(())(1()0()( 2222
2 peeepeppE EPA   
 
Since we are solving the game by backward induction, we can replace 
these expected payoffs at the node that initiates the first game between the firm 
and EPA. The payoff matrix for this game is shown in Table 2.6. Now, the 
expected payoff to EPA if it carries out an inspection is: 
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and the expected payoff if it does not carry out an inspection is: 
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The firm will choose the probability of compliance, p1, in such a way that 
EPA is indifferent between inspecting or not: )()(
NI
EPA
I
EPA EE   . Solving for p1, 
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We can rewrite (40) as follows: 
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Note that 10 1  p  because of condition (26i). 
The expected payoffs to the firm if it complies and if it does not comply 
are respectively: 
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The EPA will choose its probability of inspection q1 so that the firm is 
indifferent between complying or not: )()(
,1,1 NC
F
C
F EE   . Solving for q1 yields: 
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Note that 10  q  since 0c  and 01 c . 
In equilibrium, then, the expected payoff to the EPA is: 
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The above results can be summarised by the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5.  The game played by the firm and EPA has no dominant 
strategy Nash Equilibrium. However, there exists a mixed strategy Nash 
Equilibrium which is characterized by the following randomized strategies: 
(a) The firm complies with probability
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(b) The EPA carries out an inspection with probability )/( 11 cccq   
 
The probability of compliance by the firm is a decreasing function of the 
cost of inspection, of the reputational costs and of the cost of civil prosecution and 
is an increasing function of the fine, of the cost of criminal prosecution, and of the 
cleanup costs if compliant (c1) and of the cleanup costs when it is not compliant 
(c2) and is forced to clean up by DOJ. 
In equilibrium, the expected payoff of EPA is a decreasing function of 
both inspection costs and environmental damages, and is an increasing function of 
the cleanup cost if compliant (c1), the cleanup cost when non compliant (c2) and 
the incentive that the DOJ might have to prosecute civilly    2frkk cj  . 
There are some interesting aspects of these results that need to be 
emphasized. Comparing the EPA’s payoffs in the potential different strategies 
prefigured in the game between the firm, EPA and DOJ, we can observe that the 
EPA’s payoffs, independently of the strategy chosen by DOJ, is )( 1cei  if the 
firm is compliant, and )( 2cei  if the firm is not compliant. 
If 21 cc  , the EPA is indifferent to the strategy chosen by the firm, but if 
12 cc  , the EPA will be better-off  if the firm decides to be non-compliant since 
the cleanup costs in this case are higher. This implies that, in equilibrium, the EPA 
will be better-off in expected value of its payoff if  the firm decides not to comply. 
Note also that, if 12 cc  , the probability of compliance by the firm increases if the 
incentive the DOJ might have to prosecute civilly    2frkk cj    increases. If 
12 cc  , the incentive for DOJ to prosecute civilly    2frkk cj   increases as 
the cost of criminal prosecution and the fine increase, and as the cost of civil 
prosecution and reputational costs decrease. So, if DOJ has a greater incentive to 
prosecute civilly (because it is less resource intensive), the firm is more likely not 
to comply, generating higher cleanup costs and making the EPA better-off for this. 
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Since the EPA would have greater incentive to inspect, the firm will try to offset 
this motivation by increasing its probability of compliance. 
Therefore, all these considerations imply that in equilibrium: a) the DOJ, 
when the cost of criminal prosecution increases, is more likely to initiate a civil 
action; b) the EPA would have greater incentive to inspect; and 3) the firm will 
increase its probability of compliance. 
In equilibrium, when the EPA is indifferent to the strategy chosen by the 
DOJ, the firm has a even greater probability of compliance, given that v-c > v-c-
c1.  
So, while in the first type of theoretical framework (under the assumption 
that EPA and DOJ share the same objective function), the intervention of the DOJ 
does not affect the probability of firm’s compliance and this, in turn, reduces the 
probability of conducting inspections by the EPA, within the second framework of 
our model the involvement of DOJ might improve the firm’s probability of 
compliance, strengthening, as a result, the effectiveness of enforcement policies.  
 
2.6 POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS OF THE MODELS 
  
 The interactions between the firm, the EPA and the DOJ were modelled as 
games in which the players simultaneously decide the strategy to choose and were 
developed in two different ways to make them fit the reality to which they are 
being applied. However, there are a number of potentially interesting extensions 
that could be explored in future research. Investigating the dynamic aspects of the 
compliance and enforcement problem might enrich the results of optimal policy 
derived from the static models developed here. In a context in which regulators 
(EPA), justice authority (DOJ) and firms interact repeatedly through time, the 
rules of the game may change since the “history” (which accumulates as time 
elapses) also changes. Moreover, we have restricted our analysis to a single firm. 
Setting up repeated games with several firms to assess the aggregate behaviour of 
polluting firms is another possible subject for future research. 
 For instance, Harrington (1988), Harford and Harrington (1991) and 
Harford (1991) have developed dynamic repeated games between the enforcement 
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agency and the firm, where the agency’s enforcement strategy depends on the 
ﬁrms’ past compliance behaviour (i.e., it alters the expected penalty and the 
inspection frequency on the basis of the firms’ past compliance performance). In 
Harrington (1988), firms are assigned to two groups depending on their 
compliance history. Ignoring firms that are never monitored, group 1 contains 
firms found to be in compliance at their last inspection (low-risk of violation 
group) and group 2 contain those firms found to be out of compliance (high-risk 
of violation group). Group 2 firms would be subject to a higher monitoring 
probability, to stricter regulatory standards, or to higher fines than firms in group 
1. Harrington shows that firms’ optimal strategy in this scheme depend upon their 
individual costs of compliance. Low cost firms are always in compliance, high 
cost firms are never in compliance and medium cost firms move in and out of 
compliance depending on the results of previous inspections. Harrington shows, 
also, that the compliance rate of ﬁrms in the second group is maximized by setting 
ﬁnes as high as possible for the second group but equal to zero (the lowest 
possible) for ﬁrms in the ﬁrst group. 
 Two main approaches are employed in the literature on dynamic 
relationships [see, for instance, Franckx, (2001)]. The first approach considers the 
existence of reputation effects. It might be interesting to develop a model in which 
there is some kind of reputational issue on the side of the EPA, too. The EPA may 
decide to inspect firms in order to develop a reputation that it will inspect again in 
the future. The second approach employs infinitely repeated games. Given that, in 
reality, pollution has stochastic features, constructing repeated games with 
imperfect or asymmetric information between the firm and the EPA could be an 
appropriate way to extend the actual game theoretic framework. Most results in 
the theory of repeated games are based on the assumption that the actions of all 
players are revealed after each interaction (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995, pp. 146-
147). However, the action chosen by the firm, in any stage of the game, would be 
revealed to the EPA only if an inspection takes place. The EPA can make its play 
observing the history of the game only if it chooses to inspect the firm: if it does 
not inspect, the strategy chosen by the firm will never be revealed to the EPA. In a 
repeated game framework, a firm might have different compliance cost in every 
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round of the game and the EPA may treat the firm differently given its prior 
records of non-compliance. This suggests that if the EPA and the firm meet more 
than once, equilibrium behaviour could be different from the equilibria in a non-
repeated interaction. 
 For instance, in the first type of theoretical framework (under the 
assumption that EPA and DOJ share the same objective function), the EPA would 
be able to differentiate the firms who have committed a violation in the previous 
inspections and those who have not. Through this selective enforcement (using 
tolerance for some types of violations and being more severe for others), the EPA 
may improve the rate of compliance by the firms (Harrington, 1988; Heyes and 
Rickman, 1999) and the results obtained in the static models might remain the 
same. In fact, the use of selective enforcement can improve the effectiveness and 
the efficiency of the EPA’s activities and one could expect that the intervention of 
the DOJ might still not affect the probability of firm’s compliance, thereby 
strengthening the results already obtained. 
In the second theoretical model (under the assumption that EPA’s and 
DOJ’s objective functions are different), however, once repeated interaction is 
taken into account and the EPA can differentiate its enforcement strategies among 
firms based upon their past performance, whether and how the probability to 
inspect by the EPA may vary (namely either increase, decrease or remain the 
same) is not a clear-cut intuition. It is plausible to think that, through the use of 
selective enforcement, the EPA may be able to inspect a greater number of 
outrageous non-compliant firms and since the DOJ will also take account of 
firm’s previous compliance history in determining a sentence, the DOJ may well 
have a stronger role to play in deterring violating firms, thus confirming one of the 
main results of the second theoretical model,. However, if, accordingly to 
Harrington (1988), the EPA (after observing the firms’ compliance history) does 
not apply any penalty upon a group 1 firm (low-risk of violation group) but a 
maximal penalty upon a group 2 firm (high-risk of violation group), thus 
confirming the scenario in which 12 cc  , one possibility might also be that the 
DOJ would have a greater incentive to prosecute criminally (because it has to deal 
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with firms who have committed more serious violations) in contrast to what, in 
equilibrium, we have observed in the current model. 
So, within the second game theory model, in a repeated framework one 
might expect that, with a more selective approach by the EPA, the involvement of 
DOJ might still improve the firm’s probability of compliance (it may be that firms 
comply more fully or more frequently than would be suggested by consideration 
of the payoffs in a static game). In equilibrium, however, this would imply a 
disincentive for the EPA to inspect and, consequently, the firms would decrease 
the probability of compliance. The extent to which these intuitions are valid 
remain, of course, work to be done. 
 
2.7 CONCLUSIONS  
  
 In the U.S. environmental enforcement system, predicting whether an 
environmental violation will be pursued administratively, civilly or criminally is a 
difficult task. In some circumstances civil injunctions are issued to prevent further 
harm and to begin cleanup procedures, while in some others, criminal sanctions 
are applied to further punish the violator.
28
  
As noted by Rechtschaffen (2003), the enforcement process is filled with 
discretionary decision points at literally every stage of the process and, to use the 
words of Yeager (1991), “rightly or wrongly some cases are handled 
administratively instead of ending up in the courts […]”. When a violation or a 
case is raised, the EPA has wide discretion in choosing how to enforce the law; it 
may choose which cases to decline to pursue, which ones to deal with 
administratively, which ones to refer to the DOJ for civil action, and which ones 
to refer for criminal charges (Mandiberg and Smith, 1997). 
The selective enforcement policy of the DOJ turns also upon two critical 
discretionary decisions: the initial decision to prosecute and the decision whether 
to settle the case through civil or criminal actions. Even though the exercise of 
                                               
28
The application of civil sanctions, generally, includes fines, negative publicity and installation of 
pollution-control technology, while the application of criminal sanctions includes also fine and 
imprisonment. The main distinction between sanctions in the criminal and civil systems is the 
availability of criminal non-monetary sanctions, such as incarceration and probation. 
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discretion is generally considered as a source of discriminatory enforcement, we 
show that the actual approach used by both the EPA and the DOJ, in which the 
choice of the enforcement rule is randomized, is successful in encouraging firms’ 
compliance.  
We do believe that the results can offer important insights into the 
regulator’s behaviour. The main result of the first theoretical model shows that it 
is more efficient to let the EPA solve the cases internally (administratively) rather 
than refer them to the Department of Justice for civil or criminal prosecution. It 
emerges, in fact, that the intervention of the DOJ acts merely as an additional 
enforcement cost, which, in turn, might reduce the probability of conducting 
inspections by the EPA without affecting the probability of firm’s compliance. 
This may suggest that some institutional mechanisms (such as that of enhancing 
criminal enforcement programmes) would not necessarily strengthen deterrence 
since criminal fines might not be able to give polluters adequate incentives to 
prevent environmental crimes; criminal enforcement may, indeed, reduce the 
effectiveness of enforcement policies. 
One of the main results of the second theoretical model, however, is that 
criminal enforcement can enhance deterrence by improving firms’ compliance. In 
terms of environmental policy implications, our result suggests that, even though 
EPA and DOJ have to work together for a better environmental quality, they 
should not share the same objective functions to maximize the level of compliance 
by the firms. Overall, both theoretical results may be somewhat surprising since 
they run counter to the general consensus in the literature that a consistent and 
predictable enforcement is preferable: we suggest, by contrast, that a discretionary 
enforcement strategy may generate higher compliance. Another common crucial 
point of our results is that EPA and DOJ engage in strategic interaction in their 
environmental enforcement behaviour. We show that not only do they influence 
each other in their enforcement decisions, but they also impact on decisions by the 
firms and increase (under certain circumstances) their probability of compliance.  
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Table 2.1 Payoff matrix for the strategic game between firm and EPA 
 EPA  
Inspect Do not inspect  
 
Firm 
Comply ),( icv   )0,( cv   p  
Do not 
comply 
),( feifv   ),( ev   p1  
  q  q1   
 
Table 2.2 Payoff matrix for the sub-game between firm and DOJ (model I) 
 DOJ  
Civil Criminal  
 
Firm 
Comply ),( 1 ckccv   ),( 1 jkccv   1p  
Do not comply ),( ckrefv   ),( jkejv   11 p  
  
1q  11 q   
 
 
Table 2.3 Payoff matrix for the game between firm and EPA in the two-stage 
game (model I) 
 EPA  
Inspect Do not inspect  
 
Firm 
Comply ),( icv   )0,( cv   p  
Do not 
comply 
),( 1 feiccv   ),( ev   p1  
  q  q1   
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Table 2.4 Payoff matrix for the sub-game between firm and DOJ (model II) 
 
 
 
DOJ  
Civil Criminal  
 
 
Firm 
Comply ),( 11 ckceccv 
 
),( 11 jkceccv   2p  
Do not 
comply 
)
,(
22
22
ckrfce
cfv


 
),( 22 jkcejcv   21 p  
  
2q  21 q  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.5 Payoff matrix for the game between firm and EPA in the second-
stage game (model II) 
 EPA  
Inspect Do not inspect  
 
 
Firm 
Comply ),( 1ceicv   )0,( cv   
 
2p  
Do not comply ),( 21 ceiccv 
 
),( ev   
21 p  
  
2q  21 q  
 
 
 
Table 2.6 Payoff matrix for the game between firm and EPA in the first-stage 
game (model II) 
 EPA  
Inspect Do not 
inspect 
 
 
Firm 
Comply ),( icv   )0,( cv   
1p  
Do not 
comply 



























 2
2
1
2
1 1, c
fr
kk
c
fr
kk
eiccv
cjcj  
),( ev   
11 p  
  
1q  11 q  
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Figure 2.1 Strategic game between firm and EPA in extensive form 
 Firm
  EPA
comply do not comply
(p) (1-p)
inspect inspect
do not
inspect
do not
inspect
(q) (1-q) (q) (1-q)
(v-c, -i) (v-c, 0) (v-f, -i-e+f) (v, -e)
 
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Figure 2.2 Strategic game between firm, EPA and DOJ in extensive form 
 Firm
  EPA
comply do not comply
(p) (1-p)
inspect insp.do  not
insp.(1-q)
do not
inspect(q) (q)
(1-q)
(v, - e)(v-c, -i) (v-c, 0)
   EPA
 Firm
comply (p1) do not comply (1-p1)
  DOJ
civil civil criminalcrim.
(q1) (q1) (1-q1)(1-q1)
 
(v-c-c1, -kc) (v-c-c1,-kj) (v-f, -e-r-kc) (v-j, -e-kj)
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Figure 2.3 Strategic game between firm, EPA and DOJ in extensive form 
 Firm
  EPA
comply do not comply
(p1) (1-p1)
inspect insp.do  not
insp.(1-q1)
do not
inspect(q1) (q1) (1-q1)
(v, - e, -e)(v-c, -i, 0)(v-c, 0, 0)
   EPA
 Firm
comply (p2) do not comply (1-p2)
  DOJ
civil civil criminalcrim.
(q2) (q2) (1-q2)(1-q2)
 
(v-c-c1,-i-e+c1,-e +c1-kc )
(v-c-c1, -i-e+ c1,-e +c1-kj)
(v-f2-c2, -i-e+c2 ,-e+ c2+ f2- kc-r)
(v-c2-j, -i-e+ c2,-e+ c2 – kj)
NOV
 Firm

do not comply
EPA refers to DOJ
comply
v-c-c1-f1, -i-e+c1+f1,-e+c1 (v, -i-e, -e)
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CHAPTER THREE 
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF DISCRETIONARY ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Departing from the game theory models previously developed, this chapter 
empirically tests, by means of laboratory experiments, the role of the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) in deterring firms from polluting. One of the main purposes of 
laboratory experiments is to test theoretical predictions when there is a lack of 
natural occurring data. 
Recently, Arlen and Talley (2008) stated that experimentalism and 
empiricism are important complementary methodologies in a number of ways. It 
is often difficult for a researcher to establish whether behavioural changes are 
determined by changes in legal rules or rather whether the result is influenced by 
omitted variables or reverse causality problems. Experimental approaches are 
often the most adequate tools able to deal with these shortcomings and can be one 
of the most persuasive way of testing existing theories or developing new ones. 
We tested, through two different experiments, the two game theoretic 
models discussed in chapter two, i.e. the first one where it is assumed that EPA 
and DOJ share the same objective function (we refer to this model as to Model I), 
and the second one where different objective functions are defined (we refer to 
this model as to Model II). The two experiments were conducted in different 
Italian Universities in different periods of time. 
The results of the first experiment are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of Model I and suggest that the introduction of civil and/or criminal 
enforcement reduces the probability of compliance by firms, undermining the 
efficacy of the enforcement strategy. In other words, under the game theoretic 
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model parameterisation, the presence of the Department of Justice does not 
increase the number of complying firms independently by the probability of 
inspection by the EPA. 
The results of the second experiment are also consistent with the 
theoretical predictions of Model II to the extent that the introduction of DOJ (i.e., 
adding-on DOJ civil and criminal enforcement to the EPA administrative 
enforcement actions) produces a rise in the firms’ compliance rate. 
This work brings new evidence in the realm of enforcement and discretion 
studies since, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first attempt to offer an 
empirical validation on the efficacy of a combined use of administrative and 
civil/criminal enforcement approaches by means of laboratory experiments. 
The present chapter is organized as follows: in the next section a brief 
excursus on experimental economics literature is presented; in section three the 
key aspects on the experimental methodology are outlined; section four reviews 
the two theoretical models to be tested; section five describes the different 
experimental methodologies employed; section six discusses the design of the 
experiments; section seven presents the experimental findings and section eight 
offers some concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS: A BRIEF EXCURSUS 
 
The first economic experiment can be dated back to 1931 when the 
American psychologist Thurstone tried to determine experimentally individual’s 
indifference curves. In his experiment, each subject was asked to make a large 
number of hypothetical choices between various combinations of commodities 
(hats and coats, hat and shoes, or shoes and coats). He reported detailed data for 
one female subject and from the tradeoff between hats and shoes and hats and 
coats that she exhibited, it was possible to estimate a curve which fit quite closely 
the data relative to the choices between shoes and coats. Thurstone concluded that 
these choice data could be represented by indifference curves and that it was 
possible to reduce the indifference curves to experimental treatment. Wallis and 
Friedman (1942) critically discussed Thurstone’s experiment. One of their major 
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criticisms was that the experiment was based on poorly specified and hypothetical 
choices.
29
 At this criticism a similar experiment followed up, at the beginning of 
the 1950s, constructed by Rousseas and Hart. They also attempted to empirically 
derive indifference curves, departing from Thurstone’s experiment and taking into 
consideration the Wallis-Friedman critique. Their experiment involved graduate 
sociology students at Columbia University and was built on what they viewed as a 
more realistic choice situation by having subjects choose among different 
breakfast combination, consisting of a specified number of scrambled eggs and 
bacon strips. To add concreteness, they specified that “each individual was 
obliged to eat all of what he chose – i.e., he could not save any part of the 
offerings for a future time” (p. 291).30 Their experiment had the advantage of 
avoiding the artificiality of having subjects make many choices of the same type, 
but their hypothesis of taste homogeneity and the way in which the choices 
combinations were put together to form indifference curves appeared quite 
arbitrary. From these early steps, as it has been recently noted by Fiore (2009), it 
emerges a feature that has become a constant in experimental economics: 
knowledge is part of a cumulative process in a system of experiments related to 
each other (Roth, 1988; Kagel and Roth, 1992). 
Experimental law and economics is a special subset of experimental 
analysis, and can play important role in both testing and generating theories. 
Much of the experimental work in law and economics has been focused on testing 
the leading theories of behaviour employed to predict the consequences of legal 
rules. The experimental economics literature has interlaced law and economics on 
several points: particularly important for the study of law and economics are the 
experimental analyses on bargaining and the Coase theorem and on litigation and 
settlement process. 
Hoffman and Spitzer (1982; 1985) were the first to introduce the idea of 
experimental law and economics, by running a set of experiments to test the 
                                               
29 Their position can be summarized as follows: “it is questionable whether a subject in so 
artificial an experimental situation could know what choices he would make in an economic 
situation; not knowing, it is almost inevitable that he would, in entire good faith, systematize his 
answers in such a way as to produce plausible but spurious results” (pp. 179-180). 
30 Moscati (2007) underlines that it is not clear whether this condition was just a theoretical 
constraint the students had to bear in mind while choosing among the different combinations or if 
the experiment considered a real consumption phase. 
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predictions of the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960). Their experiments confirmed the 
Coase theorem’s predictions (in at least one version of its various forms) 
according to which, in the absence of significant transaction costs and irrespective 
of the initial allocation of legal rights, self-interested parties will tend to reallocate 
rights efficiently through bargaining. These early Coase theorem experiments, 
however, did not attempt to control for the information structure of bargaining. 
Subsequently, experimentalists started to test the Coase theorem in bargaining 
contexts characterized by asymmetrically informed parties (McKelvey and Page, 
2000). 
Another important area of research for experimental research in law and 
economics has been in litigation processes. In various set of experiments 
(Babcock et al., 1995; Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997) subjects were instructed 
to act as attorneys in a dispute between two potential litigants, in which damages 
were known but liability was in doubt. Information was then elicited on what 
amount of money was likely to be remunerated the plaintiff, and on what amount 
of money a real judge would be awarded. 
More recently, another field of application for experimental law and 
economics has been in enforcement issues. Arruñada and Casari (2007) analyze, 
in an experimental setting, how different political and judicial institutions may fail 
to produce enforcement and, thus, determine market failures. Their experiment 
simulates a credit market with two transacting parties and a third-party enforcer: a 
series of transactions take place between rich lenders and poor borrowers, and 
when a borrower defaults, the judge (third party) can either force the borrower to 
repay the loan or accommodate the default. They show that institutional 
arrangements may produce different enforcement results and provide decision 
makers with different incentive functions, by encouraging or discouraging 
enforcement actions. 
 
3.3 ELEMENTS OF GOOD EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
In a standard laboratory experiment, a number of subjects receive 
instructions that place them in a stylized representation of an economic situation. 
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Subjects are aware that the situation they face is somewhat artificial (in the sense 
that the only rules are those explicitly given by instructions) and they can 
normally choose between different options and different monetary payoffs. The 
experimenter collects subjects’ decisions and uses them as a source of information 
for testing predictive theories and understanding economic behaviour. 
Some of the major difficulties encountered in implementing experiments 
in social sciences arise from the fact that these kinds of experiments deal with 
“people”, using a definition given by Sugden (2000) on experimental economics 
(“theory with people in it”). When conducting experimental research on human 
being, the variables that should be taken into account are, in theory, so numerous 
that it would be almost impossible to control for each one of them; as noticed by 
Fiore (2009) even the colour of the laboratory may have an effect. For this reason, 
current practices concerning the design of a laboratory experiment aim to create 
an environmental context as neutral as possible, in order to maintain an adequate 
control. 
An experiment is, by definition, a planned and fully replicable observation 
of a phenomenon under controlled conditions, where “control is the essence of 
experimental methodology” (Smith, 1976, p. 275). As Arlen and Talley (2008) 
emphasized, there is no “one size fits all” set of desiderata for an experiment 
within law and economics, since the ingredients for a good experiment may 
depend on the purpose of the experiment and on the theoretic context on which 
the experiment is based. They specify several criteria that all experiments must 
satisfy, among which are control, internal consistency, falsifiability of theory, 
replicability and external validity. 
- Control 
Control is considered to be one of the essential conditions of experimental 
methods. An experiment is said to have achieved control if the experimenter 
controls the factors that affect choices. Crucial issues to attain control in the 
laboratory are related to instructions, experience and deception. Once subjects 
have entered in the laboratory, the first thing generally done by the experimenter 
is to instruct them about the task they will be asked to perform. Experimenters 
have developed rather common rules. First of all, instructions are required to be as 
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simple as possible and to be framed in neutral words. Second, instructions are 
usually intended to give subjects only the relevant information to perform the 
experimental task. It is a common practice to avoid providing to the subjects the 
experiment’s goal in order to not affect their choices. As stated by Plott (1982, p. 
1490): “the instructions make clear the opportunities available to subjects, but the 
motivation is supplied by the people” and by Smith (1976): “it may be preferable 
not to embellish instructions with well-intentioned attempts at realism”. This 
practice proves to be essential not to contaminate behaviour with reasons 
unrelated to experimental setting, so that the main motivation for participants 
remains the monetary reward. Third, usually experimenters read instructions 
loudly: in this way it is assured, at least theoretically, that every participant is 
given the same amount of information before the experiment starts, establishing a 
scenario of common knowledge among them. For instance, the prisoner dilemma 
experiment has become a classical example: the recommended practice is to not 
label the two available strategies as “defect” or “cooperate”, but rather more 
neutrally as “strategy A” and “strategy B”, or “strategy 1” and “strategy 2”. 
Harrison and List (2004) and Guala (2003) argue that refraining from transferring 
any clues in experimental settings preserves the replicability of experiments even 
across different experimenters. 
Even though instructions are read loudly, subjects are always provided 
with some scripts: in this manner, they have always the opportunity to read again 
the instructions if they prove not to be clear enough.
31
 This practice also 
distinguishes experimental designs in economics and psychology (Hertwig and 
Ortmann, 2001). Usually experimenters, both economists and psychologists, after 
reading instructions loudly, give subjects the opportunity to ask the questions they 
want and are strongly encouraged to do this. 
Moreover, a more direct test to control if subjects have entirely understood 
                                               
31 However, sometimes the experimental design does not allow experimenters to read aloud 
instructions. For instance, this can happen in experimental games, where there are two types of 
players with completely different roles and strategies to be played, or in cases in which subjects 
are provided with different private information. Consider the case of oral double auction: as 
explained in Smith (1962) and Plott (1982), the payoff functions are induced by individual 
redemption values and cost schedules, for buyers and sellers, respectively, and the key-variable 
design is that everyone knows nothing about others’ schedules. In general, the standard practice 
should be the public reading of written, simple, and neutral instructions unless opposite and 
reasonable motivations require differently. 
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instructions is usually conducted. Several methods are used at this aim, each 
having its advantages and disadvantages. Up to now, no commonly accepted 
methodology has emerged about this, and there is some disagreement among 
different research groups. A first method consists of running a written test (known 
as control questions in the experimental literature) just after the reading of 
instructions. Generally, participants are required to fill in a paper or an electronic 
form with some questions about the available strategies for playing the game or 
about some examples regarding how to compute the payoff. Answers are checked 
before the experiment starts so that the experimenter has the opportunity to clarify 
further the design. The main shortcoming of this method is that it could create an 
anchoring effect, i.e., subjects may regard the examples in the questionnaire as 
having a particular meaning so that they could be influenced by these reference 
points for the entire experiment. 
A second method often used consists of running some trial periods. In this 
case, subjects play exactly the same game that they will play in the proper 
experiment for some periods, with the only difference that in these very first 
periods they will receive no rewards for decisions taken, being informed about 
this in advance. Friedman and Sunder (1994) named these as “dry-run periods”. 
This method has advantages and disadvantages, too. The principal advantage is 
that subjects have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the game (which 
is not possible with the control questions method). This could be especially 
important for computerized treatments, in which some subjects may present 
problems in interfacing with computers. On the other hand, the usual criticism 
against this method is that data referring to trial periods are not considered in 
further analyses, and that the significant part of learning usually takes place just in 
these very first periods. 
A third method which was developed to avoid these problems, while 
maintaining the advantages of the first two methods, could be termed as “dummy 
practice treatment”. This is substantially equivalent to running trial periods, 
except for the fact that parameter values in these periods are distinct enough from 
values used in the proper experiment, in order to avoid any possibility for 
anchoring effects, while obtaining some training about the task in general. As 
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already pointed out, up to now no work has been done to see if these pre-
experiment methods have any systematic effects on experimental results. 
- Internal consistency. 
Another important condition for a good experiment is its internal 
consistency. This implies that decisions made by subjects should not be affected 
by other factors not considered in the experimenter’s tested hypothesis. Incentive 
compatibility between subjects’ choices and their payoffs at the end of the 
experiment is important to internal consistency because there is no assurance that 
subjects evaluate choices with hypothetical payoffs in the same way that they 
evaluate choices with real payoffs. 
The use of monetary incentives as rewards for participants at the 
experiments has triggered an intense debate in the literature (Roth, 1995; Hertwig 
and Ortmann, 2001). There are several reasons for which experimentalists in 
economics choose to pay participants at their experiments. First, as recognized by 
Hertwig and Ortmann (2001), given that economic agents are seen as rational 
agents maximizing their own utility, theoretically there is no reason to believe that 
participants’ actions are not driven by the same incentives in the laboratory. 
Second, another common reason for financial incentives is the belief that 
rewarding participants has an important role in reducing variance in experimental 
data. The rationale behind this is that the financial incentives would induce more 
effort and would help in maintaining concentration. Consequently, they would 
produce more statistically reliable and more informative data. This belief has been 
supported by a survey study carried out by Smith and Walker (1993), in which 
they did find that “in virtually all cases rewards reduce the variance of data 
around the predicted outcome”. So far, there has been general agreement that 
using financial incentives produces more reliable data given the reduction in 
variance empirically observed. 
The experimenters’ choice of subject pool also may present internal 
consistency (and control) concerns. A debated issue in making experiments is the 
general use of college students as experimental subjects. The main reasons for 
which researchers usually observe students’ behaviour to test their hypotheses are 
the following. First of all, students are easy to recruit. In fact, usually researchers 
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sign up subjects for their experiments by means of notices around university 
campuses, or, more simply, by inviting students to volunteer during lectures. More 
recently, making use of new technologies, some online recruitment systems have 
also been developed (e.g., Greiner, 2004). In this way, a better indirect control 
could also be achieved thanks to randomization in recruiting subjects. Secondly, 
students are an adequate subject pool, generally quick to understand their task in 
the experiment, and generally more capable than other population groups of using 
computers in case of computerized experiments. Thirdly, the particularly low 
opportunity costs make students the ideal subjects to make experiments. 
Generally, people participating in an experiment are paid according to their hourly 
wage rates: it is clear how much more convenient can be to use students as subject 
pool compared to professionals. 
A further reason is of an empirical nature: some experiments compared 
students’ behaviour with other subject pools and found virtually no significant 
differences (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1973; Burns, 1985; Dyer et al., 1989). In 
reviewing some results in labour market experiments, Falk and Fehr (2003) 
conclude: “subject pool differences may be a real issue. However, the studies also 
show that the different subject pools do not behave in fundamentally different 
ways. [..] Thus, although there are some quantitative subject pool effects, the 
qualitative pattern of behaviour were rather similar across the different subjects 
pools”. 
- Falsifiability of underlying theory 
Since one of the main purposes of experiments is to test theoretical 
predictions, a theory’s falsifiability is an important consideration in designing an 
experiment. A general statement is said to be falsifiable if it can be shown to be 
false by either empirical or experimental observation. In other words, a theory is 
falsifiable if and only if the theory makes non-trivial predictions that can in 
principle be empirically falsified. If a theory makes no falsifiable predictions, then 
the theory cannot be empirically evaluated. 
- Replicability 
Experimental approaches must be replicable, in that other experimenters 
should be able to employ the same techniques, the same protocols, and the same 
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incentives to similar subject pools to attain comparable results. It is also quite 
common for authors to add instructions to their paper or to make them promptly 
available on request. This practice also contributes to reducing ambiguity and to 
enhancing replicability. 
- External validity 
External validity (generalizability) focuses on whether the decision that the 
experimentalist tried to examine can be said to provide insight into the real-world 
choices. External validity concerns are especially relevant when student subjects 
are used to examine decisions or behaviour by people who may have different 
experiences and preferences than the student subjects. 
The issues dealing with subject pool bias are not limited to problems 
related to the extension of results to other population groups, but also include 
some statistical problems. Indeed, since very often the set of experimental subjects 
is entirely constituted by students, any kind of inference could be problematic 
since the data may not be representative for a larger population. In addition, 
usually no more than one or two hundreds subjects are involved in an 
experimental study, but often even less. Therefore, the “law of large numbers”, in 
most cases, would be applied incorrectly. As pointed out by Harrison and List 
(2004) the problem with students is the lack of variability in their socio-
demographic characteristics, not necessarily the unrepresentativeness of their 
behavioural responses conditional on their socio-demographic characteristics. 
Regarding the misapplication of the law of large numbers, generally 
experimenters reply that the problem with small numbers is not effectively a real 
problem, since it is easily surmountable (usually they use small size sample 
because of financial constraints or because of practical implementation). Actually, 
it is sufficient to replicate the same experimental design with new subjects to 
enlarge the sample size. 
We can say that these are the desiderata for experiments, but the relative 
and absolute importance of each may depend on the purpose of each experiment 
and on the domain of the underlying theories. 
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3.4 THE THEORETICAL MODELS TO BE TESTED IN THE LAB 
 
Two laboratory experiments were conducted to explore compliance 
behaviour of firms when faced with enforcement conditions consistent with the 
model frameworks discussed in chapter two. More specifically, both experiments 
are grounded on the set up models proposed in sections from 2.4.1 to 2.5.4 where 
the firm’s behaviour is influenced by the course of actions discretionally 
implemented by both the EPA and the DOJ. The two laboratory experiments were 
conducted to test the findings of: 
1. the game theory model under the assumption that EPA and DOJ share the 
same objective function (model I: sections 2.4); 
2. the game theory model under the assumption that EPA’s objective function is 
different from DOJ’s objective function (model II: sections 2.5). 
As discussed in chapter two, each of the two models is subdivided into two 
games: first, the game between the firm and the EPA is considered. The firm can 
choose whether to comply with environmental regulations or not, by assessing the 
costs and benefits of compliance versus pollution. The EPA, not knowing the 
strategy chosen by the firm, must decide whether to carry out inspections or not. 
Subsequently, the DOJ is introduced in the model and a more complex game is 
considered. Now, the EPA can serve a notice of violation to the firm if the latter is 
found to be non-compliant and the task of environmental control is subsequently 
taken up by the DOJ, which exercises its discretion by deciding whether to initiate 
a civil or a criminal proceeding. 
As already mentioned, one of the most important results deriving from 
Model I is that the probability of compliance by the firm is unaffected by the 
presence of the DOJ. This finding is rather interesting, as it shows that firms are 
deterred in their behaviour solely by EPA’s administrative sanctions. Hence, it 
suggests that the presence of DOJ is just a cost for the society, as it does not 
increase the probability of firms following an environmentally sound behaviour. 
Opposite results were obtained in Model II, where the involvement of DOJ 
improves (under the assumptions of the model) the firm’s probability of 
compliance. 
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Both theoretical findings were tested in the laboratory by means of two 
experiments (one for each game theory model) composed by two treatments each 
(one for each game). The first experiment was conducted through the elicitation of 
preferences by means of pairwise choice lotteries, whereas the second laboratory 
experiment was conducted by means of different experimental procedures in 
laboratory. More precisely, we calculate the probability of compliance by letting 
subjects play the two experimental treatments – i.e., a treatment without the DOJ 
and a treatment with the DOJ – under a) the cold method (in which individuals 
must provide a complete strategy profile for the game), b) the hot method (in 
which subjects make choices only for realized nodes) and c) the pairwise choice 
lotteries, to ascertain whether differences in behaviour can be identified in the 
elicitation methods of participants’ decisions. Then, the experimental results 
obtained using the three methods are compared. This procedure allows for robust 
results, thus providing a generalization of the theoretical findings to a situation in 
which agents are not necessarily homogeneous and risk-neutral. We clarify these 
methodological issues in the following section. 
 
3.5 EXPERIMENTAL METHODS 
 
The elicitation method that the experimenter uses in the laboratory is a 
crucial aspect of any experiment, since it is important that the experimental design 
does not bias the choices made by participants. In order to elicit subjects’ 
preferences, given the nature of the models discussed in chapter two, we can 
employ two methods well known in the experimental literature: game methods 
and strategy methods. Game methods are also named hot or sequential decision 
protocol or direct-response method, while strategy methods are also named cold 
or strategy vector method (from now on, we refer to these methods as to hot and 
cold). When a hot method is utilized to elicit choices, subjects make a single 
choice only for realized nodes. When a cold method is employed, subjects state 
choices for every decision node they may face. Individuals’ decisions in hot 
condition could be different from those made in cold condition (the folk wisdom 
of counting to ten before one reacts is based on such a difference). Levitt and List 
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(2007) note that in the hot phase emotions might be quite important, whereas in 
the cold phase, immediate reactions may be suppressed. 
So, while under hot protocol individuals make decisions as they encounter 
them in the game, under the cold method individuals must provide a complete 
strategy profile for the game, i.e., they have to make contingent decisions for all 
nodes at which they may have to play. One of the main advantages of the cold 
method is that it allows collecting more data, since subjects are asked to give a 
complete strategy. In fact, as Charness and Rabin (2002) pointed out, the cold 
method is potentially very useful for gathering experimental data, since 
observations can be obtained even at nodes that are only reached occasionally in 
the course of the game.
32
 
It follows that the main distinction between the two methods is mainly 
about the amount of information experimentalists can obtain in the lab. Along this 
line of reasoning, we employed a third elicitation method (i.e., pairwise choice 
                                               
32 Note that, a priori, it is possible that hot and cold methods lead to different behaviour, but 
whether this conjecture is correct is an empirical question; theoretically there should be no 
differences between them. For some games, comparisons of the cold and the hot methods reported 
some differences in choices (e.g., Brandts and Charness, 2000; Cason and Mui, 1998; Oxoby and 
McLeish, 2004; Sonnemans, 2000). Brandts and Charness (2000), for instance, compare behaviour 
across hot and cold treatments of the prisoners’ dilemma game and the chicken game. In these 
experiments behaviour was stable across both treatments, even though the cold treatment provided 
more opportunities for participants to reflect on the behaviour of themselves and others. From this, 
they conclude that the method of eliciting behaviour does not matter for simple sequential games. 
More recently, Murphy et al. (2007) using direct-response treatment, compare the results from 
Murphy et al. (2006) in which cold method was employed. Subjects play a game in the form of 
trust dilemma, where there are three people in a group, and each person can stop the game in 
continuous time. They found that in the hot condition there is more co-operation and a higher 
dispersion in the winning stopping times. Casari and Cason (2009) also use a trust game, where the 
first-mover could either pass his entire endowment or nothing. The trust game is a sequential 
prisoner’s dilemma game in which the first mover decides how much money to pass to the second 
mover. In the cold condition, the responder made contingent choices for the possible cases, while 
with the hot condition the responder learnt the first-mover’s choice. They found that while the two 
methods yield similar rates of trust, the cold method may generate lower levels of trustworthiness. 
They provide two possible explanations for the differences observed between the two elicitation 
methods. The first one is that the hot procedure may give a better contribution to understand the 
experimental task than the cold procedure. The second one, however, is that emotions influence 
choices more in the hot than in the cold procedure. So, they open up the issue of exploring the 
“understanding” versus the “emotional” conjectures. Schotter, Weigelt and Wilson (1994) by 
representing strategically equivalent games in either normal or extensive form, find that 
presentation effects are significant. Similarly, Rapoport (1997) finds that two different extensive 
forms corresponding to the same normal form yield different experimental behaviour. However, in 
some cases the qualitative results can be reversed just by changing the response elicitation method 
(e.g., Güth, et al., 2001; Brosig, et al., 2003; Cooper and Van Huyck, 2003) or by changing the 
response elicitation method in combination with changing another factor such as context in which 
the game is played (e.g., Falk et al., 2003; Cox and Deck, 2005). 
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gamble) that, as we believe, allows us to collect as much information as the cold 
method but helps reduce the noise that can be intrinsically related to behavioural 
choices. 
In fact, since our game does not involve any strategic interaction among 
subjects (given that Nature plays always according to a common knowledge fixed 
probability consistent with the mixed strategy equilibrium in the theoretical 
model, i.e. the inspection starts with a fixed probability), we can decompose each 
node of the strategy method into two pairwise choice gambles, under the usual 
assumptions (transitivity, rationality, independence). The advantage associated to 
an elicitation method based on pairwise choice gamble rests on the evidence that 
subjects are less noisy when facing such elicitation framework - i.e., it has been 
proved (Hey, Morone and Smith, 2009) that pairwise choice gambles provide 
more accurate responses. In light of this, we believe that pairwise choice method 
allows to collect more accurate data.
33
 
 
3.6 THE EXPERIMENTS 
 
We shall now present the two experiments conducted in order to test each 
one of the game theoretic models briefly reviewed in section 3.4 and fully 
discussed in chapter two. 
 
3.6.1 THE FIRST EXPERIMENT: THE BASELINE MODEL EXPERIMENT 
34
 
First we tested in the laboratory Model I, which is grounded on the 
assumption that EPA and DOJ share the same objective function. A paper and 
pencil experiment was conducted at the University of Foggia (Italy) in October 
2008. Participants were first-year undergraduate students from the Faculty of 
Economics and the elicitation method employed was the pairwise choice lottery. 
The experimental session took place in a large classroom and subjects were seated 
so that they could not observe others’ choices. A total of 51 undergraduate 
                                               
33 Although from a theoretical point of view the pairwise choice gambles are constructed to elicit 
exactly the same preferences as in the hot experiment, it is worth noting that one shortcoming that 
should be considered is that transforming an extended game into a set of pairwise choice gambles 
might introduce a frame effect and distort findings. 
34 Funding for subjects’ payments was provided by the University of Foggia, Italy. 
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students participated in the study. None of them had previously participated in 
economic experiments. The experiment was facilitated through the use of a 
booklet, handed out to each subject. The booklet contained a brief instruction that 
was read aloud and that described the actual experiment to be carried out by each 
player. The whole procedure was carefully explained to all participants before 
starting the experiments. The subjects were encouraged to ask questions at any 
time during the experiment. The experiment was based on an incentive-
compatible elicitation mechanism. Specifically, once players handed in their 
booklets, the experimenter randomly selected a subject who is paid accordingly to 
the outcome of his preferred lottery. In this way, all subjects have an incentive to 
report their true preferences among the lotteries. All other subjects received €5 as 
a participation fee. 
The experiment builds on the decision problems described in the first 
game theory model in chapter two and briefly reviewed above. As mentioned 
before, there are two games corresponding to two experimental treatments. In the 
first treatment, players acting as firms play against the EPA (which is played by 
Nature). Each firm chooses between complying or not whereas the EPA chooses 
whether to carry out inspections or not with a given probability. If the firm 
complies, it has to sustain a cost. The EPA also has to incur a cost if it decides to 
carry out an inspection.
35
 
In this treatment we assigned values to the parameters reported in figure 
3.1 as follows: the probability q of EPA starting an inspection (chosen 
accordingly to the equilibrium conditions of the theoretical model) was set equal 
to 1/2 (q = c/f); the value for non-complying firm v was set equal to €50; the cost 
of compliance c was set equal to €5; the fine f was set equal to €10; the other two 
parameters reported in figure 3.1 the inspection cost (–i) and the environmental 
damage ( –e) are not relevant to our experiment as they characterize the EPA pay-
off which in the experiment is played out by Nature. All figures and tables are 
presented at the end of the chapter. 
In the second treatment, the EPA can serve a notice of violation to the firm 
if the latter is found non-compliant. A notice of violation describes the violation 
                                               
35 Note that players during the experiment are simply asked to choose among two lotteries. No 
information is provided on the “environmental setting” of the model. 
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and commands the violator to stop the activity.
36
 At this point, the firm must 
decide again whether to be compliant or non-compliant. If it does not comply, 
then the EPA will refer it to the Department of Justice for civil or criminal 
prosecution. Hence, the task of environmental control is taken up by the DOJ (also 
played by Nature) - which must then choose between a civil and a criminal 
prosecution. 
In this treatment we assigned values to the parameters reported in figure 
3.2: in this game, the probability q of EPA starting an inspection was set equal to 
1/4; probability q1 of DOJ starting a civil action was set equal to 5/6; the value v 
was set equal to 50 €; the cost of compliance c was set equal to €5; the additional 
compliance cost c1, if the firm did not comply in the first instance, was set equal 
to €15; the fine from civil prosecution f was set equal to €10; the cost to the firm 
from criminal prosecution j was set equal to €40. Also in this case some 
parameters where not relevant to our experiment as they characterize the DOJ 
pay-off which in the experiment is played out by Nature (kc the cost to DOJ of 
enforcing civil prosecution, kj the cost of enforcing criminal prosecution, and 
finally r the reputation cost of letting off an offending firm with only a fine). 
We elicit subjects’ behaviour using pairwise choice gambles, presented as 
segmented circles - see fig. 3.3. All the presented risky lotteries were composed of 
the following outcomes €5, €30, €35, €40, €45, and €50. The probabilities of 
these outcomes are recorded in Table 3.1. 
The pairwise choice gamble 1 reported in table 3.1 (visually presented in 
fig. 3.3), represents the firm’s decision problem depicted in fig. 3.1 (i.e. treatment  
1). On the one hand, if the firm decides to comply (see left gamble), whatever the 
EPA action is, it will receive v-c (set in the experiment equal to €45); on the other 
hand, if the firm decides to not comply its pay-off depends on the EPA action; 
more precisely it receives v-f (equal to €40) with probability q if the EPA decides 
to inspect, and v (equal to €50) otherwise (see right gamble). This is equivalent to 
choosing between lottery A and lottery B in figure 3.3. 
                                               
36 
The purpose of a notice of violation (NOV) is to initiate a corrective action that will stop the 
violation. For instance, to provide an incentive for continuing compliance, NOVs for the U.S: 
Clean Water Act may result in monetary penalties up to $27,500 per day, per violation, according 
to 33 U.S.C. 1319. 
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Pairwise choice gamble 2 represents one part of the firm decision problem 
developed in the second game of the model and presented in fig. 3.2. More 
precisely, if the firm decides to comply (see left gamble in table 3.1), whatever the 
EPA action is, it gets v-c; if the firm decides to not comply, its pay-off depends on 
the EPA’s action; if the EPA decides to not inspect it gets (with probability 1-q) v; 
if the EPA decides to inspect and the firm reacts to the EPA’s notice of violation 
by complying, then its payoff will be, independently of the DOJ decision, v-c-c1 = 
€30 (see right gamble in table 3.1). 
Pairwise choice gamble 3 represents the remaining part of the firm 
decision problem depicted in fig. 3.2. As always, if the firm decides to comply 
(see the left gamble in table 3.1), whatever the EPA action is, it gets v-c; if the 
firm decides to not comply and the EPA decides to not inspect, the firm gets (with 
probability 1-q) v; if the EPA decides to inspect and the polluting firm does not 
react to the EPA’s notice of violation by complying, then its pay-off is (with 
probability q x q1 = 5/24) v-c-f = €35 if the DOJ starts a civil procedure and (with 
probability q x (1-q1) = 1/24) v-c-j = €5 if the DOJ starts a criminal procedure (see 
right gamble in table 3.1). 
Finally, pairwise choice gamble 4 is a consistency test, as it allows to 
verify if subjects’ preferences respect the transitivity axiom. 
 
3.6.2  THE SECOND EXPERIMENT: THE EXTENDED MODEL EXPERIMENT
37
 
We tested in the laboratory also Model II (i.e., under the assumption that 
EPA and DOJ do not share the same objective function). This second experiment 
was also a paper and pencil experiment conducted at the Law School of the 
University of Rome “Sapienza” (Italy) in December 2010, with subjects being 
first and second-year undergraduate students attending Economics classes. The 
experimental session took place in a large classroom and subjects were seated so 
that they could not observe each others’ choices. None of the students had 
previously participated in economic experiments. The session lasted about 90 
minutes including the initial instruction time and payment of subjects. Subjects 
earned on average €25 including the €5 show up fee. 
                                               
37 Funding for subjects payment was provided by the University of Rome “Sapienza” (Italy). 
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Each subject was provided with a booklet containing the games to be 
played as well as printed instructions, which were read aloud to all participants. 
The subjects were encouraged to ask questions at any time during the experiment. 
Each subject played a total of 10 games (i.e., 6 pairwise choice lotteries, 2 game 
trees played out under the hot and two game trees played out under the cold 
elicitation procedures). At the end of the experiment, one of the 10 games was 
chosen randomly and played for real (subjects were payed accordingly).
38
 Upon 
completion of the experiment the subjects were asked one by one to approach the 
experimenter for payment of show up fees and payoffs from the game. 
 The experiment builds on the decision problems described in the model in 
chapter two and briefly reviewed above. As mentioned, there are two games 
corresponding to two experimental treatments and each treatment was played 
under both cold and hot procedures as well as under the form of pairwise choice 
lotteries. In the first treatment players, acting as firms, play against the EPA 
(which is played by Nature). Each firm chooses between complying or not 
whereas the EPA chooses whether to carry out inspections or not. If the firm 
complies, it has to sustain a cost. The EPA also has to incur a cost if it decides to 
carry out an inspection (see figure 3.4). 
Similarly to the first experiment, to both treatments (the one in which firm 
chooses between complying or not and EPA chooses whether to carry out 
inspections or not, and the other one in which EPA can refer the case to DOJ for 
civil or criminal prosecution) were assigned values compatible with the 
parameters and the restrictions of the theoretical models. Under the second 
parameterization (associated with Model II where EPA and DOJ do not share the 
same objective function), we assigned values to the parameters reported in figure 
3.4 as follows: the probability q1 of EPA starting an inspection was set equal to 
2/3; the value of non-complying firm v was set equal to €50; the cost of 
compliance c was set equal to €30; the fine f1 was set equal to €20; the other two 
parameters the inspection cost (–i) and the environmental damage (–e) are not 
relevant to our experiment as they characterize the EPA pay-off which in the 
experiment is played out by Nature. 
                                               
38 The game tree n.1 was drawn under the hot procedure. 
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In the second treatment, if the firm is still found non-compliant after the 
EPA has served a notice of violation, it can be referred to the DOJ that can 
exercise discretion on whether to initiate civil or criminal proceedings. 
In this treatment we again assigned values to the parameters as follows 
(figure 3.5): the probability q1 of EPA starting an inspection was set equal to 2/3; 
the probability q2 of DOJ starting a civil action was set equal to 4/5; the value v 
was set equal to €50; the cost of compliance c was set equal to €30; the additional 
compliance cost c1, if the firm did not comply in the first instance, but did comply 
after EPA issuing a notice of violation, was set equal to €15; the further abatement 
and clean up costs to the non-compliant firm, c2, was set equal to €16; the fine f1, 
from EPA if the firm is compliant after being served with a notice of violation, 
was set equal to €20; the fine f2 from civil prosecution when the firm chooses to 
remain non-compliant was set equal to €25; the cost to the firm from criminal 
prosecution j was set equal to €40. Also in this case some parameters where not 
relevant to our experiment as they characterize the DOJ pay-offs which in the 
experiment is played out by Nature (kc is the cost to DOJ of enforcing civil 
prosecution, kj the cost of enforcing criminal prosecution, and finally r is the 
reputation cost of letting off an offending firm with only a fine). 
In the experimental parameterization, we decided to focus only on the case 
in which 12 cc   [the cleanup costs for the firm when it is not compliant and it is 
forced to clean up by DOJ (c2) are greater than the cleanup costs if it is compliant 
(c1)] ignoring the other case in which 21 cc  (under this circumstance, the EPA is 
indifferent to the strategy chosen by the firm). 
As mentioned above, we elicited subjects’ behaviour using hot and cold 
methodology, as well as pairwise choice gambles presented as segmented circles. 
All the presented risky lotteries were composed of the following outcomes: -€15, -
€6, €5, €9, €20 and €50. The probabilities of these outcomes are recorded in Table 
3.2. 
Pairwise choice gamble 1 reported in table 3.2 (presented in figure 3.6) 
represents the firm’s choice problem in treatment one (see figure 3.4). If the firm 
decides to comply (see left gamble), whatever the EPA action is, it will receive v-
c (set in the experiment equal to €20). If, instead, the firm decides to not comply 
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its payoff depends on the EPA action; it will receive v-c-c1 (equal to €5) with 
probability q1 if the EPA decides to inspect, and v (equal to €50) otherwise (see 
right gamble). 
Pairwise choice gamble 2 represents one part of the firm’s decision 
problem developed in the second game and presented in figure 3.5. If the firm 
decides to comply (see left gamble in table 3.2), it receives v-c = €20 whatever 
the EPA action. If the firm decides to not comply, its pay-off depends on the 
EPA’s action: if the EPA decides to not inspect it receives v = €50 with 
probability 1-q1= 1/3; if the EPA decides to inspect and the firm reacts to the 
EPA’s notice of violation by complying, then its payoff will be v-c-c1-f1 = -€15 
independently of the DOJ decision (see right gamble in table 3.2). 
Pairwise choice gamble 3 represents another part of game tree depicted in 
fig. 3.5. As always, if the firm decides to comply (see the left gamble in table 3.2), 
whatever the EPA action is, it receives v-c = €20; if the firm decides not to 
comply and the EPA decides not to inspect, the firm receives v = €50 with 
probability 1-q1; if the EPA decides to inspect and the firm does not react to the 
EPA’s notice of violation by complying, then its pay-off is depend on the DOJ’s 
strategy. If the firm decides to remain not compliant its payoff is respectively: v-
f2-c2 = €9 if the DOJ starts a civil procedure and v-c2-j = -€6 if the DOJ starts a 
criminal procedure (see right gamble in table 3.2). 
Pairwise choice gamble 4 represents another part of the firm’s decision 
problem. If the firm decides to not comply and the EPA decides not to inspect, the 
firm receives v = €50 with probability 1-q1; if the EPA decides to inspect and the 
firm reacts to the EPA’s notice of violation by complying, then its payoff will be 
v-c-c1-f1 = -€15 independently of the DOJ decision (see left gamble in table 3.2). 
If, however, the firm decides to comply, after the EPA has referred the case to the 
DOJ, then its payoff is v-c-c1 = €5, either if DOJ starts a civil procedure or if the 
DOJ starts a criminal procedure (see right gamble in table 3.2). 
Pairwise choice gamble 5 represents almost the same decision problem 
described in pairwise choice gamble 4, except for the fact that the firm now 
chooses not to comply even after the EPA has referred the case to DOJ. So, in this 
case, if the firm decides not to comply and the EPA decides not to inspect, the 
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firm gets v = €50 with probability 1-q1; if the EPA decides to inspect and the firm 
reacts to the EPA’s notice of violation by complying, then its payoff will be v-c-
c1-f1 = -€15 independently of the DOJ decision (see left gamble in table 3.2). If, 
however, the firm decides to remain not compliant, after the EPA has referred the 
case to DOJ, then its two additional payoffs are v-f2-c2 = €9 if DOJ starts a civil 
procedure and v-c2- j = - €6 if DOJ starts criminal procedure (see right gamble in 
table 3.2). 
Pairwise choice gamble 6 is the last part of the firm’s decision problem to 
be analysed. If the firm decides to not comply and the EPA decides to not inspect, 
the firm gets, as before, (with probability 1-q1) v = €50; if the EPA decides to 
inspect and the firm reacts to the EPA’s notice of violation by not complying, but 
decides to comply after the case has been referred to DOJ, then its payoff is v-c-c1 
= €5 (see left gamble in table 3.2) independently by the enforcement action (civil 
or criminal) chosen by DOJ. If, however, the firm decides to remain non 
compliant, after the EPA has referred the case to DOJ, then its payoffs are v-f2-c2 
= €9 if DOJ starts a civil procedure and v-c2- j = - €6 if DOJ starts a criminal 
procedure (see right gamble in table 3.2). 
 
3.7 EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS 
 
3.7.1 EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS – FIRST EXPERIMENT 
Out of the 51 subjects who took part in the experiment, two did not pass 
the consistency test (i.e., they contradict the assumption of preferences’ 
transitivity). One of these two subjects also displayed irrational behaviour in the 
second session of the experiment (i.e., when the DOJ was introduced). 
Henceforth, we drop them both from the database and conduct our analysis on the 
remaining 49 observations. 
As discussed in the experimental design section, we first tested the 
strategic game between the EPA and the firm (figure 3.1). Out of the 49 subjects 
considered, almost half decided to comply (24 subjects – see figure 3.7). We then 
compared this result with those obtained in the second treatment of the experiment 
in order to test the finding for which the introduction of the DOJ does not affect 
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the probability of compliance and, therefore, that the DOJ represents a net cost for 
society. In the game played among firm, EPA and DOJ only 11 subjects complied 
with environmental measures in the first move. This striking result would suggest 
that introducing the DOJ produces a sharp reduction in the rate of compliance. 
However, we can observe that out of the 38 subjects that decided to 
pollute, almost 45% switched to non-polluting behaviour once the EPA notifies 
the violation. As set in the first game theory model, we know that the probability 
of inspection (and hence, for those firms who did not comply, of receiving a 
notice of violation) is q1 = c/(c+c1). So, under our experimental parameterization, 
this probability will be equal to ¼, consistently with the equilibrium conditions 
and with the numerical payoffs, i.e., q = 5/(5+15). Therefore, we can expect that 
out of the 38 firms that did not comply only 38/4 = 9.5 will be inspected by the 
EPA and then only 4.2 will switch to compliance. 
All in all, this adds up to 11 + 4.2 = 15.2 complying firms, which is less 
than two thirds of the number of firms that decided to comply in the first game 
(figure 3.8). Hence, we can conclude that the introduction of the DOJ in the game 
reduces sharply the number of complying firms and, therefore, reduces the 
efficacy of the enforcement strategy. 
In addition, we can calculate the threshold value of q1 which would lead to 
an equilibrium in which the same number of firms would comply in both games 
with and without the DOJ. This value would be 0.76, implying that the EPA 
should conduct an inspection with a probability of 76%. Note that this probability 
is higher than that required to obtain the same level of compliance in the game 
without the DOJ (which was q = 0.5). In turn, under the model parameterization, 
these experimental findings suggest that the presence of the DOJ is a cost for 
society, as it increases the number of complying firms only if the EPA increases 
the number of inspections. 
 
3.7.2 EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS – SECOND EXPERIMENT 
In this section we present the results of our experiment using the hot, the 
cold and the pairwise choice gamble elicitation methods. Out of the 33 subjects 
that took part in the experiment, one did not answered to all questions of the cold 
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and of the hot design. Henceforth, we drop this subject from the databases relative 
to the cold and hot procedures and conduct our analysis on the remaining 32 
observations. However, for the pairwise choice lotteries we have all the data 
relative to the 33 subjects. 
As discussed in the experimental design section, we first tested the 
strategic game between the EPA and the firm. Out of the 32 subjects considered, 
on the one hand, more than half (20 out of 32 in the hot treatment, and 18 out of 
32 in the cold treatment) decided to comply, on the other hand, in the lottery 
treatment only 12 out of 33 complied. We then compared this result with those 
obtained in the second treatment of the experiment in order to test whether the 
introduction of the DOJ does affect the probability of compliance. We report these 
results on the game tree in figures 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 at the end of the chapter. 
In the game played among firm, EPA and DOJ (as showed in figures 3.12, 
3.13 and 3.14 at the end of the chapter) only 15 subjects complied with 
environmental measures in the first move under the hot treatment; 18 complied in 
the cold treatment and 12 in the lottery one. At first sight, this result would 
suggest that the introduction of the DOJ produces, in the first move, an incisive 
reduction in the rate of compliance in the hot treatment, does not affect subjects 
behaviour in the cold and in the lottery treatments. However, we can observe that 
in the hot treatment the 38% of subjects that initially decided to remain non 
compliant switched to a compliant behaviour once the EPA notifies the violation; 
this percentage rise to 75% in the cold treatment and up to a 79% in the lottery 
one. We can also notice that under the cold procedure, unfortunately, 50% of 
participants didn’t provide any response on the second treatment (treatment with 
the DOJ) of the game. Even though in the experiment instructions, it was clearly 
stated that they should have made a decision every time they reached a node 
followed by dotted lines, only 16 subjects (out of 32) expressed their choices on 
the whole game tree. 
These findings allow us to affirm that the different experimental elicitation 
methods employed have an influence only in quantitative terms, i.e. on the 
number of subjects that at the end of the overall enforcement procedures decide to 
be compliant. In fact, the number of subjects that chooses to be compliant, once 
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the DOJ has been introduced, increases moving from hot to cold treatments (from 
5 subjects out of 13 in the hot treatment to 12 subjects out of 16 in the cold 
treatment), and keeps increasing moving from cold to the lottery treatment (from 
12 subjects out of 16 in the cold treatment to 26 subjects out of 33 in the lotteries).  
As set in the model, we know that the probability of inspection (and hence, for 
those firms who did not comply, of receiving a notice of violation) is q1 = 
c/(c+c1). So, under our experimental parameterization, this probability will be 
equal to 2/3. 
Therefore, we can expect that out of the 17 firms that did not comply, in 
the first instance, only 34/3 = 11.3 will be inspected by the EPA and then only 3 
will switch to compliance. All in all, this adds up to 15 + 4.3 = 19.3 complying 
firms in the hot treatment. In the cold treatment we observe 14 firms that did not 
comply, in the first instance, 9.3 of which will be inspected and so we can expect 
that out of the inspected firms 7 will comply; this adds up to 18 + 7 = 25 
complying firms in the cold treatment. In the lottery treatment we observe 21 
firms that did not comply in the first move, consequently only 14 will be 
inspected and out of the inspected firm 11.03 will comply; all in all, in the lottery 
treatment we will end up with 21+11.03 = 32.03 complying firms. 
We can affirm, therefore, that in qualitative terms there are no divergences 
among the different elicitation methods since, once the EPA has referred the case 
to the DOJ for civil or criminal prosecution, the firm’s probability of compliance 
might improve, consistent with one of the main results of the theoretical model. 
Therefore, our experimental results not only do show that introducing criminal 
enforcement consistently improves compliance under the different elicitation 
methods but also that the number of complying subjects slightly increases under 
the hot treatment, significantly increases under the cold treatment and strongly 
increases under the lottery treatment. 
Having observed these quantitative differences in the three elicitation 
methods, we also investigated whether these differences could be explained 
through gender differentiation or group effect. Our experimental results show that 
only under the hot treatment, some effects deriving from gender differentiation 
can be observed regarding females. The number of female subjects that chooses to 
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be compliant in the first step game (9 subjects out of 12), in fact, sharply 
decreases in the second treatment (2 subjects out of 12). No gender and group 
differentiations emerges, instead, under both the cold treatment and the lotteries, 
where it is confirmed that the introduction of DOJ improves the number of 
complying subjects. 
 
3.8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Criminal enforcement has always been perceived as a very important tool 
in deterring anti-social behaviour. However, one of the main criticisms of criminal 
enforcement is that often civil liability provides sufficient mechanisms of 
deterrence without involving expensive and protracted litigation costs (Hoffman, 
1992). Some critics have also noted that criminal enforcement does not lead to 
optimal deterrence because prosecutors are often accused of choosing cases 
arbitrarily based largely on political motivations (Lazarus, 1995).  Our first set of 
experimental findings may support such criticism as they show that it is possible 
to protect the environment without having to resort to criminal prosecutions. Our 
results, in fact, provide a first empirical validation of the theoretical outcomes 
obtained in the first game theory model by supporting the argument that it is more 
efficient to let the EPA resolve the cases internally (administratively) rather than 
refer them to the Department of Justice for civil or criminal prosecution. From our 
experimental test it emerges that the intervention of the DOJ acts merely as an 
additional enforcement cost which, in turn, might reduce the probability of 
conducting inspections by the EPA without affecting the probability of firm’s 
compliance. 
Moreover, the second set of experimental results (relative to the model in 
which EPA and DOJ are assumed to be characterized by different motivations on 
the conduction of their respective enforcement decisions) were obtained by 
making use of different experimental procedures in laboratory. More precisely, we 
calculate the probability of compliance by letting subjects play the two 
experimental treatments that correspond to the two games proposed in the 
theoretical model above - i.e. treatment without the DOJ and treatment with the 
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DOJ – under cold condition, hot condition and pairwise choice lotteries. 
Standard economic theory assumes implicitly that preferences do not 
depend on the elicitation procedure and are stable over time. In accordance with 
this view, we find that the three elicitation methods employed do not seem to 
affect subjects responses qualitatively, but there is a significant quantitative 
difference in terms of number of observations across the three treatments. So, 
while in our experiments subjects’ behaviour is generally internally consistent in 
the sense that there are no differences in results derived from cold, hot and lottery 
methods, some differences are noticeable in the number of observations collected. 
Under both hot and cold treatments some nodes of the game are not reached and 
then several observations are lost. More specifically, the hot treatment provides 
the smallest amount of data; the lottery experimental design provides, on the 
contrary, the biggest number of observations. 
The overall experimental findings lead to somewhat mixed considerations 
in terms of environmental policy implications. The first experimental results may 
suggest that enhancing criminal enforcement programs would not necessarily 
strengthen deterrence since criminal fines might not be able to give polluters the 
adequate incentives to prevent environmental crimes. Criminal enforcement may, 
indeed, reduce the effectiveness of enforcement policies. On the other side, the 
second experimental results show that criminal enforcement enhances deterrence 
by improving firms’ compliance. 
On the whole, the results allow us to say also that an environmental 
approach in which the choice of the enforcement strategy is randomized can be 
successful in encouraging firms’ compliance. One of the main implications of our 
results in terms of environmental policy suggestions is that the EPA and the DOJ, 
even though they jointly operate towards a better environmental quality, should 
not share the same objective functions but should keep and perceive them 
separately. 
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Figure 3.1 Strategic game between firm and EPA in extensive form 
 
 Firm
  EPA
comply do not comply
(p) (1-p)
inspect inspect
do not
inspect
do not
inspect
(1/2)
(1/2)
(1/2)
(€45, -i) (€45, 0) (40€, -i) (€50, -e)
 
(1/2)
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Figure 3.2 Strategic game between firm, EPA and DOJ in extensive form 
 
 Firm
  EPA
comply do not comply
(p ) (1-p )
(€50, - e)(€45 , -i) (€45, 0)
   EPA
notice of violation
 Firm
comply (p1) do not comply (1-p1)
  DOJ
civil civil criminalcrim.
(5/6 ) (5/6 ) (1/6)(1/6)
 
(€30, -kc) (€30,-kj) (€35 , -r-kc) (€5, -kj)
inspect
(1/4 )
do  not
inspect
(3/4)
inspect
(1/4 )
do  not
inspect
(3/4)
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Table 3.1 Gambles of all games – summary table (first experiment) 
 
Pairwise 
choice 
gambles 
 
 
Left gamble 
 
 
Right Gamble 
€ 5 30 35 40 45 50 5 30 35 40 45 50 
Gamble 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 
Gamble 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0.75 
Gamble 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.05 0 0.2 0 0 0.75 
Gamble 4 0 0.25 0 0 0 0.75 0.05 0 0.2 0 0 0.75 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Gambles of the game between firm and EPA 
 
      Lottery A                         Lottery B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
45 €; 100%
50 €, 50%
40 €, 50%
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Figure 3.4 Strategic game between firm and EPA in extensive form 
 Firm
  EPA
comply do not comply
(p1)
inspect inspect
do not
inspect
do not
inspect
(2/3) (1/3) (2/3) (1/3)
(€20, -i, 0) (€20, 0, 0) (€5, -i, 0) (€50, -e, -e)
 
(1-p1)
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Figure 3.5 Strategic game between firm, EPA and DOJ in extensive form 
 Firm
  EPA
comply do not comply
(p1) (1-p1)
inspect insp.do  not
insp.(1/3)
do not
inspect(2/3) (2/3)
(1/3)
(€50 - e, -e)(€20, -i, 0) (€20, 0, 0)
   EPA
 Firm
comply (p2) do not comply (1-p2)
  DOJ
civil civil criminalcrim.
(4/5) 4/5) (1/5)(1/5)
 
(€5,-i-e+c1,-e +c1-kc )
(€5, -i-e+ c1,-e +c1-kj)
(€9, -i-e+c2,-e+ c2+ f2- kc-r)
(- €6, -i-e+ c2,-e+ c2 – kj)
NOV
 Firm

do not comply
EPA refers to DOJ
comply
(- €15, -i-e+c1+f1 ,-e+c1) (€50, -i-e, -e)
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Table 3.2 Gambles of all games – summary table (second experiment) 
Pairwise 
choice 
gambles 
 
Left gamble 
 
Right Gamble 
€ -15 -6 5 9 20 50 -15 -6 5 9 20 50 
Gamble 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.66 0 0 0.33 
Gamble 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.66 0 0 0 0 0.33 
Gamble 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.18 0 0.49 0 0.33 
Gamble 4 0.66 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0.66 0 0 0.33 
Gamble 5 0.66 0 0 0 0 0.33 0 0.18 0 0.49 0 0.33 
Gamble 6 0 0 0.66 0 0 0.33 0 0.18 0 0.49 0 0.25 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Gambles of the game between firm and EPA 
 
 
  
Lottery B Lottery A 
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Figure 3.7 Subjects’ behaviour in the game between firm and EPA- results 
 Firm
  EPA
comply do not comply
24/49 25/49
inspect inspect
do not
inspect
do not
inspect
(q) (1-q) (q) (1-q)
(45 €, -i) (45 €, 0) (40 €, -i) (50 €, -e)
 
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Figure 3.8 Subjects’ behaviour in the game between firm, EPA and DOJ - 
results 
 Firm
  EPA
comply do not comply
11/49 38/49
inspect insp.do  not
insp.(1-q)
do not
inspect(q) (q)
(1-q)
(50 €,  - e)(45 €,  -i) (45 €,  0)
   EPA
notice of violation
 Firm
comply
28/49
do not comply
21/49
  DOJ
civil civil criminalcrim.
(q1) (q1) (1-q1)(1-q1)
 
(30€, -kc) (30 €,-k j) (35€,  -r-kc) (5 €,  -k j)
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Figure 3.9 Strategic game between firm and EPA under hot method- results 
 Firm
  EPA
comply do not comply
20/32 12/32
inspect inspect
do not
inspect
do not
inspect
(q) (1-q) (q) (1-q)
(20€, -i, 0) (20€, 0, 0) (5€, -i-e+c1+f1,DOJ ) (50€, -e, -e)
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Strategic game between firm and EPA under cold method- 
results 
 Firm
  EPA
comply do not comply
18/32 14/32
inspect inspect
do not
inspect
do not
inspect
(q) (1-q) (q) (1-q)
(20€, -i, 0) (20€, 0, 0) (5€, -i-e+c1+f1,DOJ ) (50€, -e, -e)
 
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Figure 3.11 Strategic game between firm and EPA under lotteries method- 
results 
 Firm
  EPA
comply do not comply
12/33 21/33
inspect inspect
do not
inspect
do not
inspect
(q) (1-q) (q) (1-q)
(20€, -i, 0) (20€, 0, 0) (5€, -i-e+c1+f1,DOJ ) (50€, -e, -e)
 
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Figure 3.12 Strategic game between firm, EPA and DOJ under hot method- 
results 
 Firm
  EPA
comply do not comply
15/32 17/32
inspect insp.do  not
insp.(1-q1)
do not
inspect(q1) (q1)
(1-q1)
(50€ - e, -e)(20€, -i, 0) (20€, 0, 0)
   EPA
 Firm
comply (p2) do not comply (1-p2)
  
DOJ
civil civil criminalcrim.
(q2) (q2) (1-q2)(1-q2)
 
(5€,-i-e+c1,-e +c1-kc )
(5€, -i-e+ c1,-e +c1-kj)
(9€, -i-e+c2,-e+ c2+ f2- kc-r)
(-6€, -i-e+ c2,-e+ c2 – kj)
NOV
 Firm

do not comply
13/13
comply
(-15€, -i-e+c1+f1,-e+c1 (50€, -i-e, -e)
0/13
5/13 8/13
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Figure 3.13 Strategic game between firm, EPA and DOJ under cold method- 
results 
 Firm
  EPA
comply do not comply
18/32 14/32
inspect insp.do  not
insp.(1-q1)
do not
inspect(q1) (q1)
(1-q1)
(50€ - e, -e)(20€,  -i,  0) (20€,  0, 0)
   
EPA
 Firm
comply (p2) do not comply (1-p2)
  
DOJ
civil civil criminalcrim.
(q2) (q2) (1-q2)(1-q2)
 
(5€,-i-e+c1,-e +c1-kc )
(5€,  -i-e+ c1,-e +c1-k j)
(9€,  -i-e+c2,-e+ c2+ f2- kc-r)
(-6€,  -i-e+ c2,-e+ c2 – k j)
NOV
 Firm

do not comply
16/16
comply
(-15€,  -i-e+c1+f1,-e+c1 (50€,  -i-e, -e)
0/16
12/16
4/16
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Figure 3.14 Strategic game between firm, EPA and DOJ under lotteries 
method- results 
 Firm
  EPA
comply do not comply
12/33 21/33
inspect insp.do  not
insp.(1-q1)
do not
inspect(q1) (q1)
(1-q1)
(50€ - e, -e)(20€,  -i,  0) (20€,  0, 0)
   
EPA
 Firm
comply (p2) do not comply (1-p2)
  
DOJ
civil civil criminalcrim.
(q2) (q2) (1-q2)(1-q2)
 
(5€,-i-e+c1,-e +c1-kc )
(5€,  -i-e+ c1,-e +c1-k j)
(9€,  -i-e+c2,-e+ c2+ f2- kc-r)
(-6€,  -i-e+ c2,-e+ c2 – k j)
NOV
 Firm

do not comply
33/33
comply
(-15€,  -i-e+c1+f1,-e+c1 (50€,  -i-e, -e)
0/33
26/33
7/33
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APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS (ORIGINALLY IN ITALIAN) 
In this appendix, we report the instructions that we used for the treatments 
played. 
Instructions for participating to the experiment (these instructions are the 
same for both experiments). 
Welcome and thank you for having accepted to participate at this 
experiment. You will receive €5 for participating. Please, carefully read the 
following instructions that are identical for every participant. 
During the experiment you are not allowed to talk with any of the other 
participants. If you will not respect this rule you will be excluded from the 
experiment and you will not receive any payment. 
If you have any question, please, raise your hand and wait that one of the 
experimenters will come close to you to respond to your answer. 
What you will earn will depend partly by your choices and partly by the 
case. You will earn €5 for being here plus the half of the overall amount you will 
gain during the experiment will be paid cash directly at the end of the experiment. 
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FIRST EXPERIMENT 
Information on the experiment 
In this part of the experiment you will see four pairwise choice gamble 
lotteries, as follows. 
For every pairwise lottery you will have to specify if you prefer to play 
lottery A or lottery B. 
 
 
 
If you choose lottery A you will receive €75 with certainty, if you choose 
lottery B you will receive €50 with 75% of probability and €100 with 25% of 
probability. You will find ten pairwise choice lotteries: your task is to choose for 
every pair of lotteries if you prefer lottery A or lottery B. 
Turn page and begin the experiment! 
  
Lottery A Lottery B 
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1.  
Lottery A           Lottery B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. 
   Lottery A          Lottery B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 
  Lottery A         Lottery B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. 
  Lottery A            Lottery B 
 
 
 
 
 
30 €, 
25%
50 €, 
75%
5 €, 
5%
35 €, 
20%
50 €, 
75%
45 €; 
100%
5 €, 
5%
35 €, 
20%
50 €, 
75%
45 €; 
100%
30 €, 
25%
50 €, 
75%
50 €, 
50%
40 €, 
50%45 €; 
100%
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SECOND EXPERIMENT 
Information on the experiment 
The experiment is made of three independent parts. Your choices in each 
part would not influence in any way the outcomes that you will reach in the 
successive parts. You will be paid only for one of the three parts which will be 
randomly determined at the end of the experiment. Therefore, you should try to be 
as more accurate as possible in every part of the experiment since your profit will 
depend only by one of the three parts. 
 
Information on Part 1 (cold) 
In this part of the experiment you will see two figures (called trees) as the 
one presented below. 
 
 
In the above presented tree, as example, starting from the dark circle 
(called node) you should choose whether to move on the right or on the left side 
of the tree. To identify your choice, you have to underline with your pen one of 
the two dotted lines. If you choose left, you will play a lottery where you could 
win €20 with 50% of probability or €30 with 50% of probability. If you choose 
right, you will play a lottery where you could €5 with 66.6% of probability or €50 
with a probability of 33.3%. 
In the trees presented in this first part, you should make a decision every 
time you reach a node followed by dotted lines. 
Turn page and start your experiment. 
 
66.6% 33.3%
5€ 50€20€
50% 50%
30€
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Information on Part 2 (hot) 
The second part of the experiment is identical to part one, but now every 
time you make a decision, underlining a dotted line, you have to raise your hand 
to call one of the experimenters that are in the classroom to know how to proceed. 
 
Information on Part 3 (lottery) 
In this part of the experiment you will see six pairwise choice gamble 
lotteries, as follows. 
For every pairwise lottery you will have to specify if you prefer to play 
lottery A or lottery B. 
 
 
 
If you choose lottery A you will receive €75 with certainty, if you choose 
lottery B you will receive €50 with 75% of probability and €100 with 25% of 
probability. You will find ten pairwise choice lotteries: your task is to choose for 
every pair of lotteries if you prefer lottery A or lottery B. 
Turn page and begin the experiment! 
  
Lottery A Lottery B 
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Game Trees (under both cold and hot procedures) 
 
Game Tree 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66.6% 33.3%
5€ 50€20€
100%
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Game Tree 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20€ 50€
-15€
5€ 9€
73%
27%
100%
-6€
66.6% 33.3%
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1. 
 
 
 
2. 
 
 
 
3. 
 
 
 
 
Lottery B 
33.3% 
Lottery A 
Lottery A 
Lottery A Lottery B 
Lottery B 
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4. 
 
 
5. 
 
 
6. 
 
  
Lottery B 
Lottery B 
Lottery A 
Lottery A Lottery B 
Lottery A 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ENFORCEMENT AND AIR POLLUTION: AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Environmental justice is a movement that emerged in the United States in 
the 1980s
39
 and has become a concern in the U.S. federal policy agenda in the 
early 1990s. In 1994, in fact, environmental justice was institutionalized at federal 
level through an Executive Order
40
 which focused attention on human health and 
environmental conditions in low-income and minority communities. The key 
concept of environmental justice issues is that low-income groups and ethnic 
minorities bear disproportionate environmental burdens, in the form of polluted 
air and water, unsafe jobs, under-enforcement of environmental laws, etc. 
(Ringquist, 1997; Evans and Kantrowitz, 2002). 
As argued by Ringquist and Clark (1999), environmental equity involves 
an equal distribution of environmental risk across all social classes, races and 
geographic areas. The concept of environmental equity is substantially similar to 
environmental justice, with the only difference that the latter has a stronger 
nuance in terms of environmental policy. Environmental justice, thus, deals 
mainly with the question of whether disadvantaged population groups, such as 
racial and socioeconomic minorities, are disproportionately exposed to pollution 
and whether demographic composition influences the amount of pollutants. 
However, while environmental groups continue to focus their attention on 
                                               
39 More exactly, the environmental justice movement was launched in 1982, when residents of 
Warren County (North Carolina) protested the construction of a hazardous waste landfill in their 
predominantly African-American community. 
40 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin. Environmental justice as a national policy goal was first through Executive Order 
12898.  
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environmental justice problems, the evidence from empirical studies has been 
ambiguous. There is no general agreement on whether minorities or disadvantaged 
population groups are exposed to more pollution, and if so which minorities 
(racial, age, socioeconomic) are more at risk. 
In the United States it has been widely shown that socioeconomic status 
and ethnicity are associated with exposures to environmental hazards (Brown, 
1995; Arora and Cason, 1999). In particular, minorities and people with low 
income often tend to live closer to contaminated sites, thus suffering more than 
the general population from adverse environmental risks. Contrary to the United 
States, as far as we know in Italy the impact of socioeconomic factors on 
environmental outcomes has been rarely studied. Empirical analyses on Italian 
data with focus on social inequalities in exposures to traffic emissions have only 
been done with regard to the city of Rome (Forastiere et al., 2007), and on waste 
generation and landfill diversion (Mazzanti et al., 2009). 
This chapter aims to cover this gap in the empirical literature by 
investigating whether income and the ethnic and social composition of population 
in Italy may have a role in explaining air emissions. The analysis is conducted at 
the provincial level
41
 to investigate the existence of provincial differences in the 
determination of environmental pollution. Air pollution emissions data (from 
2005 data) were combined with data from the latest available Italian Census (the 
2001 Italian Census). The main objective of this chapter is twofold: first we assess 
whether the economic characteristics (such as income levels, percentage of 
foreigners, percentage of children, etc.) of provinces help to explain the level of 
emissions in the air; secondly, we test the social inequality hypothesis linked to air 
pollution. The results obtained show no evidence of environmental inequity 
against the foreign component of the population but provide evidence that releases 
are higher in provinces with higher percentage of both children and female-headed 
households. These first results imply that, in Italy, environmental injustices are 
more likely to be observed in terms of social conditions that in terms of racial 
                                               
41In Italy, a province is an administrative sub-division of a region, which is an administrative sub-
division of the State. A province consists of several administrative sub-divisions called “comune”. 
Italy was divided into 103 provinces at the time we collected our data; as of 2011, there are 110 
provinces. Provinces are equally distributed on the territory between north west, north east, centre 
and south, even though the level of urbanization is higher in the northern part of the country.  
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discrimination. 
The environmental justice issue is closely linked to the enforcement issue. 
In fact, the enforcement of environmental quality regulations is an important 
element of any environmental policy: only a coherent and homogeneous 
enforcement of laws guarantees the inexistence of social or ethnic inequalities in 
exposure to environmental risk. In order to account for the enforcement issue, we 
consider the number of pending proceedings in the courts located in the Italian 
provinces as a measure of the inefficiency of law enforcement. Arguably pollution 
will be lower in provinces with efficient courts and efficient enforcement, since 
long trials are likely to postpone the timing of punishment (Becker, 1968) and this 
could be an important factor inducing firms to commit illegal activities. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section two presents 
a review of the key conceptual issues that are addressed by the environmental 
justice literature. Section three presents the theoretical framework. In sections four 
and five, respectively, the model specifications and the datasets used in the 
analysis are discussed, while in section six the results from the estimations are 
presented. Section seven concludes with some final considerations in which are 
discussed, in particular, the potential implications (if any) between enforcement of 
air emissions regulation and low-income groups in Italy. 
 
4.2  KEY REFERENCES IN LITERATURE 
 
The relationship between the distribution of environmental pollution and 
the population characteristics has been studied by a substantial body of literature. 
In the next two sections, the main U.S. and E.U. empirical contributions on this 
issue are reviewed. 
 
4.2.1 U.S. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In the United States, the pioneering study on race and environmental 
quality Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States was conducted by the United 
Church of Christ's (UCC) Commission for Racial Justice (1987). Race is found to 
be the most significant variable associated with the location of hazardous waste 
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sites since communities with the greatest number of hazardous waste facilities had 
the highest composition of racial and ethnic population. The study also found that 
three out of every five African Americans lived in communities with abandoned 
toxic waste sites and that 60 percent of African Americans lived in communities 
with one or more waste sites.
42
 Twenty years after the release of Toxic Wastes and 
Race, the recent results by Bullard et al. (2010) are still very similar to the 
findings from 1987. They confirm that significant racial and socioeconomic 
disparities persist today since Hispanics or African Americans are concentrated in 
neighbourhoods with the greatest number of hazardous waste facilities. 
Over the last two decades, environmental justice literature has grown very 
rapidly. However, mixed evidences were obtained by various studies. Numerous 
studies document inequities in the spatial distribution of environmental quality 
(e.g., Bullard, 1983; Bullard and Wright, 1987, 1989; Goldman, 1991; Nieves and 
Nieves, 1992; Hamilton, 1993, 1995) and many others find limited support for the 
existence of environmental inequities (e.g., Anderton et al., 1994; Been and 
Gupta, 1997). Anderton et al. (1994) and Been and Gupta (1997) use binary 
response models to analyze plant location decisions, comparing neighbourhoods 
with industrial plants to neighbourhoods without a plant. Anderton et al. (1994), 
using the 1980 U.S. census data and employing multivariate regression techniques 
to investigate environmental equity in the demographics of dumping, find that 
education and occupation, but not race, are significant indicators of waste 
facilities in a region. Been and Gupta (1997) using 1990 U.S. census data 
investigated, through multivariate techniques, whether waste facilities were placed 
in minority communities or minorities moved in afterwards. They obtain mixed 
evidence on environmental inequities: while waste disposal sites proved to be 
correlated with race and income, neither the percentage of poor nor the percentage 
of African Americans were significant factors in deciding the siting of waste sites. 
Mohai and Bryant (1992) reviewed fifteen various environmental inequity 
studies conducted between 1971 and 1992 and concluded that nearly all the 
                                               
42
 More precisely, the report found that zip code areas with one hazardous waste facility had twice 
the nonwhite population (24%) than those without such facilities, and that communities with more 
than one waste facility had an average 38% of nonwhite population (the national average nonwhite 
population was 16%.). 
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studies showed evidence of inequities, based on income and race, in the 
distribution of environmental hazards. The fifteen studies varied substantially in 
terms of geographic areas considered. About half of the studies focused on a 
single urban area, while the rest focused on a region, an aggregation of urban 
areas, or the U.S. as a whole. Eleven of the studies examined the distribution of air 
pollution, four examined the distribution of solid or hazardous waste facilities, 
while one focused on toxic fish consumption. The scale and the statistical 
methods employed cannot always be determined from the Mohai and Bryant 
review. They also suggest that factors such as housing discrimination and the 
location of jobs may have led poor and racial minorities to move closer to 
hazardous facilities due to the cheapest available housing and potential job 
opportunities. 
More recently, Cory and Rahman (2009) studied the association between 
income, race and hazardous levels of arsenic concentrations in Arizona and found 
no supporting evidence that selective enforcement of the arsenic standard could 
disadvantage minority or low-income groups. They use data on arsenic water 
concentration and socioeconomic data from 2000 U.S. Census. Out of 359 zip-
code areas, 121 were found to be exposed to arsenic levels greater than the 
maximum level of arsenic allowed in water, while the other 238 were not exposed. 
They use logistic regression models to estimate the relationship between the 
likelihood of arsenic contamination at zip-code level and its associated 
demographic and economic characteristics. The dependent variable is arsenic 
exceedance in respect to the maximum level and the explanatory variables are the 
following: percent of white population, percent of black population, percent of 
Hispanic population, percent of minority (black and Hispanic population), per 
capita family income, average value of house and average income per household. 
If a particular zip-code had average arsenic concentration greater than the 
maximum limit allowed it was assigned the value of 1, otherwise it was assigned 
the value of 0. Their results support the conclusion that selective enforcement of 
arsenic standard is unlikely to have disadvantaged minority or low-income groups 
in Arizona. 
In another work, however, Aradhyula  et al. (2006) found the existence of 
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disproportionate environmental risk in low-income and minority communities for 
the Phoenix metropolitan area in Arizona. Using data from 1990 and 2000 U.S. 
Census and from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI),
43
 they estimate a 
simultaneous equations model to explain jointly firms’ siting decisions and 
minorities’ decision to move. Their results suggest two main conclusions. First, 
there is a positive and highly significant relationship between TRI exposure and 
minority communities. Second, the presence of a TRI facility increased the 
minority share in a community by nearly 10%. 
As a matter of fact, notwithstanding the U.S. well-established literature, 
there is still significant disagreement whether race and social class generate 
environmental inequities in the United States. This is partially explained by the 
sensitivity of Environmental Justice results to the type of contaminant considered, 
its geographical location, and the spatial unit of analysis. 
 
4.2.2 E.U. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The environmental justice debate is only beginning to develop at the 
European Union level. This approach can be dated from the drafting of the 
UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, adopted at the Fourth 
Ministerial Conference in the “Environment for Europe” process in Aarhus 
(1998). In its Article 1, the Convention states as an objective to “guarantee the 
rights of access to information, public participation in decision-making, and 
access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with the provisions of 
this Convention.” 
However, especially in the U.K. the environmental justice debate has 
started to expand by integrating environmental issues and social justice 
perspective. In Europe, in fact, the majority of the empirical studies took place in 
U.K. In England and Wales, McLeod et al. (2000) investigate the relationship 
                                               
43
 The U.S. Toxics Release Inventory is a database compiled and maintained by the EPA since 
1981. Over 75,000 companies are required to report their emissions to the EPA by chemical and 
amount released. So through the TRI the EPA collects data on toxic chemical releases and waste 
management activities. 
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between particulate matter (PM10)
44
, nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and sulphur dioxide 
(SO2), and a vector of socioeconomic indicators. They found that higher social 
classes were more likely to be exposed to greater air pollution. In contrast, 
Brainard et al. (2002) found that the level of NO2 and carbon monoxide (CO) in 
Birmingham was higher in communities with a greater proportion of black people 
and deprived classes. They found that the average carbon monoxide and nitrogen 
dioxide emissions for districts with poor populations are higher than in wealthy 
ones. The averages of these pollutants were also higher among districts with high 
proportion of blacks than among more white districts. Wheeler and Ben-Shlomo 
(2005) also found that air quality is poorer among households of low social class. 
More recently, social inequalities in NO2 levels in Leeds were confirmed by 
Namdeo and Stringer (2008) at the detriment of poorer groups. Naess et al. (2007) 
using a number of socioeconomic indicators (income, education, living in a flat or 
in a crowded household) showed that in Oslo (Norway) the most deprived areas 
were exposed to higher particulate matter emission levels. In contrast, no 
association between nitrogen dioxide emission levels and education or occupation 
was found in a cohort of Norwegian men. 
Environmental inequalities were explored also in Helsinki (Finland) by 
Rotko et al. (2000) and Rotko et al. (2001): levels of NO2 decreased with a higher 
level of education. Much greater contrasts in exposure were observed between 
socio-economic groups for men than for women, both for NO2 and PM2.5. In 
Sweden, two studies showed evidence of social inequalities related to NO2. Stroh 
et al. (2005) found that the strength of the association between the socio-economic 
status and NO2 concentrations varied considerably between cities. In another 
                                               
44 Particulate matter of solid or liquid matter suspended in the atmosphere; PM10 particles (<10 
µm) and PM2.5 particles (<2.5 µm) are of major health and environmental concern. Fine 
particulates (PM10 and PM2.5) together with nitrogen dioxide (NO2), sulphur dioxide (SO2), carbon 
monoxide (CO) and benzene are part of the Air Quality Strategy (AQS) (DETR 2000) developed 
in response to the 1995 Environment Act and the EU Air Quality Framework Directive 
(96/62/EC). Each of these pollutant can have potential effects on health. Short-term and long-term 
exposure to ambient levels of particulate matter are associated with respiratory and cardiovascular 
illness and mortality as well as other ill-health effect (DEFRA, 2007; World Health Organization, 
2005; Committee On the Medical Effects of Air Pollutants, 2007). At high levels NO2 causes 
inflammation of the airways. Long term exposure may affect lung function and respiratory 
symptoms (DEFRA, 2007). Carbon monoxide substantially reduces capacity of the blood to carry 
oxygen to the body’s blocking important biochemical reactions in cells (DEFRA, 2007). SO2 
causes constriction of the airways of the lung. Benzene is a recognized human carcinogen 
(DEFRA, 2007). 
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study, Chaix  et al. (2006) found that children from areas with low neighbourhood 
socio-economic status were more exposed to NO2 both at home and at school. 
Four other European studies explored social inequalities related to air 
pollution. In Rijnmond (Netherlands), according to Kruize et al. (2007), lower 
income groups live in areas with higher levels of NO2 than greater income groups. 
In Germany, Schikowski et al. (2008) revealed the existence of a social gradient 
with higher PM10 exposures among subjects with less than 10 years of schooling 
than among those with higher education. By contrast, in Rome, Forastiere et al. 
(2007) found that the higher social classes appear to reside in areas with high 
traffic emissions. This disparity is even stronger when socio economic status 
rather than income is considered. Havard et al. (2009), using a French deprivation 
index (Havard et al. 2008),
 
found that in Strasbourg the mid-level deprivation 
areas were the most exposed to NO2, PM10 and CO. 
From this review, it is clear that in Europe the empirical literature that 
investigates the relationship between exposure to environmental pollution and 
socio-economic status is a relatively novel topic compared to the USA. European 
studies (similarly to the U.S. literature) also generate mixed findings regarding 
exposure disparities. Italy is one of the less investigated countries. In what follows 
we aim to cover this gap by trying to establish the existence or not of 
environmental injustices. 
 
4.3 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
The environmental justice literature has its own theoretical roots in the 
“inverse U” relationship, commonly referred to as the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve (EKC), which suggests that the level of per capita income has a negative 
effect on environmental quality measured by the levels of pollution, but, beyond a 
certain level, per capita income has a positive effect on environmental quality. A 
crucial issue becomes the existence of a turning point in the relationship between 
income and pollution. The EKC assumes that the relationship between 
environment and income might be similar to that suggested by Kuznets (1955) 
between income inequality and economic development. Since the pioneering 
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works by Grossman and Krueger (1991, 1993, 1995) on the environmental 
Kuznets curve, there has been a large amount of both theoretical and empirical 
studies.
45
 A comprehensive review of the literature on EKC is provided by Brock 
and Taylor (2005) whose analysis aims to underline how a non-monotonic 
inverted U-shaped curve may emerge from the relationship between income and 
pollution emissions. 
The so-called environmental justice approach aims to expand the structural 
factors assumed to drive the environmental Kuznets curve relationship, in order to 
better integrate economic and social issues with environmental issues. Ethnic 
diversity and race have been the most significant variables which have been 
neglected in empirical studies (for example, Cole et. al. 1997; Selden and Song, 
1994) on the EKC, but that have started to be used by the environmental justice 
literature to investigate the possible causal relationship between income 
inequalities and pollution levels. The EKC function usually takes the form Eit =  
+ Yit/pop + (Yit/pop)
2 
+  (Stern and Common, 2001) where E is environmental 
degradation, Y is real income, pop is population,  is an error term, i is location, t 
is time and ,  and  are parameters to be estimated. 
Grossman and Krueger (1994) argue that knowledge of the shape of the 
relationship between environment and income could help policy makers in 
improving or developing new environmental policies. However, as de Bruyn et al. 
(1998) point out, studies on EKC are based on reduced-form models. This means 
that the endogenous variable (environmental quality) is expressed only as a 
function of predetermined variables, and no indication about the direction of 
causality (whether growth affects the environment or vice versa) is known. As 
stated by Cole et. al. (1997, p. 401) reduced-form relationship “reflect correlation 
                                               
45 In particular, Grossman and Krueger analyse the EKC through the discussion of three different 
mechanisms: scale effect, composition effect and technique effect. Scale effect shows that even if 
the structure of the economy and technology does not change, an increase in production will result 
in an increase of pollution and environmental degradation. Thus, economic growth through scale 
effect has a negative impact on the environment. On the other hand, the authors argue 
that composition effect may have a positive impact on the environment. Pollution increases in the 
earlier stages of development, while in the later stages of development pollution decreases as the 
economic structure moves towards services and light manufacturing industries. Therefore, 
composition effect could lower environmental degradation through this change in the structure of 
production. Finally, technique effect captures improvements in productivity and adaptation of 
cleaner technologies, which will lead to an increase in environmental quality. 
  
 135 
rather than causal mechanism”. 
To motivate this empirical analysis, we adopt the theoretical framework 
developed by Hamilton (1995) in which he puts forward three alternative 
explanations to account for the pollution patterns examined in environmental 
justice studies: i) pure discrimination related to race/gender, ii) the Coase 
Theorem, and iii) the theory of collective action (Olson, 1965). 
Under the race/gender discrimination hypothesis, facility operators are 
assumed to look at the racial composition of communities surrounding polluting 
facilities and decide to locate or increase releases in areas with higher 
concentrations of minority or low-income groups. Hence, race is perceived to be a 
factor behind such decisions, that prevails compared to other economic factors 
(i.e., costs, efficiency) that would be of greater importance to a rational profit-
maximizing firm. Mohai and Bryant (1992) have identified a number a possible 
relationships between race/gender composition and facilities’ siting decisions, 
such as (a) lower costs of doing business (due to the availability of lower land 
values and lower incomes in minority communities); (b) lack of conflict in poor 
areas due to weak political power or insufficient community resources; and (c) 
limited mobility of minorities due to poverty and housing discrimination. 
The second explanation applies the standard version of the Coase theorem, 
suggesting that, in a world without transaction costs, a polluting firm will locate 
(or increase pollution) in areas in which the releases will cause the least damage. 
Looking for the lowest damage can be translated, from the polluting firm’s 
perspective, in locating in areas where potential compensation demands (i.e., for 
adverse health impacts and property loss caused by exposures to pollution) and 
liability costs are expected to be lower. Areas with higher incomes and property 
values will increase the potential damages from releases in an area, so polluting 
firms will attempt to conduct these activities in areas with low income residents 
and associated lower property values. 
Finally, under the last explanation, firms may decide to increase releases in 
minority and poor communities areas because they face less (political) collective 
actions. In an ideal Coasean world, the “victim” would be able to negotiate 
compensation directly with the polluter. However, the compensation demands, in 
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reality, are typically negotiated at community level through the political process. 
This could lead to results that appear similar to the pure race/gender 
discrimination hypothesis: firms will decide to locate or increase releases in areas 
where they face the lowest political opposition to their actions. To the extent that 
minority communities are less likely to be politically active, then these 
communities will be more likely to experience higher levels of pollution. 
These alternative theories predict that certain variables should explain 
pollution levels. The race/gender discrimination hypothesis tests whether factors 
such as the race and the gender composition of the population predict releases. 
The Coase theorem hypothesis tests whether economic factors such as income 
levels and unemployment rates explain releases. The political/collective action 
tests whether the political activity of local residents influences environmental 
quality. Factors such as age, education and the number of households with 
children are expected to influence the incentives to undertake political actions 
(Filer, Kenney and Morton, 1993). 
 
4.4 MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
 
The main objective of this work is to test whether air releases generated by 
the industrial sector could be explained using socio-economic-and demographic 
variables. However, a methodological issue that arises in the environmental 
justice literature is that regressing pollution levels on demographic characteristics 
can introduce endogeneity problems. In fact, when investigating if pollution 
amounts may be determined by a number of factors such as income, gender, 
education levels and other demographic variables, it must be considered that firms 
may be attracted to locate in minority and low-income areas (Hamilton 1993, 
1995), but also some groups (minorities or low-income) may choose to live in or 
nearby polluted areas for social or economic reasons (e.g., cheaper rents) or other 
social factors. Hence, there is a problem of reverse causality,
46
 due to the fact that 
                                               
46
 Reverse causality is one of the main sources of endogeneity problems. Been (1994) also points 
out this endogeneity problem and resolves it by using pre-siting demographic data (i.e., data from 
before the industrial plants were built). Ringquist (1997) uses a control variable approach by 
controlling for housing prices; Gray and Shadbegian (2004) use instrumental variables. 
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(a) firms can decide to locate in a minority or low-income area, or (b) minority 
and low-income groups decide to live in polluted areas. 
We collected some of the measures that have been employed in prior 
environmental justice studies and, in order to minimize possible bias due to this 
endogeneity problem, we developed our investigation through two steps of 
analysis. In the first step, in a standard ordinary least-squares linear regression, 
per-capita income is estimated as a function of a vector of fairly standard variables 
(the set of explanatory variables comprise different classes of population’s ages, 
sex, different types of levels of education, entrepreneurial spirit, and geographical 
dummies). Predicted values from this regression are then used in the second step 
where an ordered probit is used to address the extent to which socio-economic 
factors influence air pollution levels. 
Moreover, the values of the explanatory variables are observed at their 
2001 Census values: thus, the 2001 socio-economic characteristics are used to 
explain air releases in 2005 (see Arora and Cason, 1999, on the use of lagged 
explanatory variables to avoid endogeneity bias). Hence, in our estimation model, 
we assume that the socio-economic conditions (pre-determined economic and 
demographic provincial data observed at time t) take some time (a four-years time 
lag) to exhibit their effects on the levels of air pollution (observed at time t+1). 
Equation 4.1 presents the first auxiliary linear ordinary least-squares 
regression of per-capita income. Each of the variables will be discussed in more 
detail in the following sections. 
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We, then, substitute the obtained predicted values of income in the second 
step of analysis (equation 4.2), where we estimate a standard ordered probit model 
(Greene, 2003) in which explanatory variables are used to predict the probabilities 
of being exposed to different levels of pollution emissions as shown below: 
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We will now discuss in more details the two-steps model here introduced 
and all variables will be properly defined. 
 
4.4.1 INCOME REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The first step focuses on identifying the factors which are related to the 
determination of per-capita income. An OLS regression is estimated (for the year 
2001) using equation 4.1, where pcenterpr is the number of registered firms at 
provincial level every 100 people, infrastructure is an indicator of the 
transportation infrastructure level, females is the number of population which is 
female, age15to34 is the number of population aged between 15 and 34 years old, 
age35to49 is the number of population aged between 35 and 49 years old, 
unidegree is the number of people with an undergraduate university degree, 
lowsecschool is the number of people with low secondary school diploma, 
primschool is the number of people with only primary school, noedu is the 
number of people with no education at all, north is a geographical dummy 
variable representing the Northern Italian provinces, centre is a geographical 
dummy variable representing the Central Italian provinces. Table 4.4 shows the 
results of coefficients and t-statistics. 
 
4.4.2 AIR POLLUTION REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
This second step of analysis aims to identify the demographic 
characteristics that could explain the distribution of the levels of air pollution. To 
accomplish this objective, in the ordered probit regression the dependent variable 
(air pollution emissions) is categorized into four levels and is coded 1 for low air 
emissions, 2 for medium-low air emissions, 3 for medium-high air emissions and 
4 for high emissions.
47
 To measure socioeconomic status, we use the variable 
                                               
47 The standard ordered probit is built around a latent regression of the form   '* xy  where 
x is the vector of explanatory variables, is the vector of estimated parameters, and ε is the error 
term, which is assumed to be normally distributed across observations and is normalized with the 
mean and variance of zero and one, with cumulative distribution denoted by    and density 
function denoted by    The air pollution data, y, are related to the underlying latent variable y*, 
through cut offs points or thresholds n, where n = 1…3. The probabilities are the followings: Prob 
(y = n) = n - ’x) - n-1 - ’x), n = 1…3, where 0 = 0 and 3 =+  and 1<2<3 are 
defined as three thresholds between which categorical responses are estimated; ordered probit 
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(lpcincomehat), the logarithm of the predicted income values; we also considered 
the quadratic specification of the same variable (lpcincomehat2) which allows us 
to capture the presence of an inverse U-shaped relation between income and 
pollution. Regarding ethnic groups characteristics, the percentage of African 
population (pcafr) and the percentage of Asian population (pcasia) are used. The 
percentages of children and of family households with a female as the head of the 
household are considered to be groups that could suffer from possible 
environmental discrimination. As mentioned above, we control for a measure of 
law enforcement (pending proceedings). Table 4.5 include the coefficients, their 
standard errors and z-ratios. 
A multitude of different statistical approaches are employed in the 
environmental justice analysis, depending on the nature of the dependent variable. 
Multivariate analysis (for example, Been and Gupta, 1997; and Pastor et al. 2001), 
as well as logit (for example, Cory and Rahman, 2009; Hamilton, 1995; or Brooks 
and Sethi, 1997, where the dependent variable, i.e. the level of exposure to 
pollution levels, assumes the value of 1 if there was an increase of exposure in the 
zip code and 0 otherwise) and probit models (Ringquist, 1997; Aradhyula et al., 
2006) are used. 
The advantage of the ordered probit model is that the marginal effects 
allow us to determine the impact of each explanatory variable (e.g., ethnicity, 
income and minorities) on the probability of each level of air pollution emissions. 
Even though this ranking approach to measure the amount of pollution has not 
been widely used in previous environmental justice studies, there are some 
precedents for using an ordered probit analysis. Sadd et al. (1999) estimate an 
ordered logit model on Los Angeles neighbourhoods. They constructed a 
dependent variable ordered according to the level of assumed health hazard, 
which takes a value of 0 if the tract has no air release, a value of 1 if it has an air 
release that does not contain carcinogen compounds, and a value of 2 if it contains 
carcinogen air release. Forastiere et al. (2007), in their investigation of the 
                                                                                                                                
estimation will give the thresholds  and parameters . The thresholds  show the range of the 
normal distribution associated with the specific value of the dependent variable; the parameters  
represent the effect of changes in explanatory variables on the underlying scale. The marginal 
effects show how the probability of air pollution releases change with a small unit change in the 
explanatory variables. 
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relationship between exposure to traffic emissions and socioeconomic conditions 
in Rome, grouped air pollution (i.e., particulate matter emissions, PM10) into four 
categories: low, mid-low, mid-high, and high emissions, using the 20
th
, 50
th
, and 
80
th
 percentiles as cut-off points. 
To build our dependent variable in the ordered probit regression, beside 
using air pollution emissions raw data and simply aggregating together the 
fourteen different pollutants, we also defined a province-level index of air 
pollution. In order to do that, following Brooks and Sethi (1997),
48
 we use 
Threshold Limit Values (TLVs) in order to adjust for toxicity: “A threshold limit 
value is the amount of airborne concentration in mg/m
3
 of a substance to which a 
worker may be repeatedly exposed for a normal 8-hour workday and a 40-hour 
workweek without adverse health effect” (Brooks and Sethi, 1997: 236). 
We employed both the Italian threshold limit values established by law for 
ambient pollution (D.P.C.M. 28/3/83,
49
 D.P.R. 203/88,
50
 D.Lgs. 351/99
51
) and the 
U.S. threshold values (see Table A2, in appendix) using the GESTIS-Substance 
Database which contains information for the safe handling of hazardous 
substances and other chemical substances at work.
52
 In the U.S., the major 
providers of the Occupational Exposure Limits are the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH)
53
, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), and the National Institute of Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH). We considered the limit values released and enforced by the 
U.S. OSHA that sets workplace standard; where the OSHA threshold limit values 
were not available, we used the U.S. National Institute of Occupational Safety and 
                                               
48 Brooks and Sethi (1997) created a weighted toxicity index using Threshold Limit Values (TLV), 
combined with a distance function, to develop an exposure measure for each U.S. zip code. 
49 Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers. 
50 Decree of the President of the Italian Republic. 
51 Decree Law. 
52 The database provides an overview of the limit values from various E.U. member States, Canada 
(Québec), and the United States as of 2010. The GESTIS-Substance Database is maintained by the 
Institut für Arbeitsschutz der Deutschen Gesetzlichen Unfallversicherung (IFA, Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health of the German Social Accident Insurance). 
53 The ACGIH is a professional organisation of occupational hygienists from universities or 
governmental institutions. The list of TLVs includes more than 700 chemical substances and 
physical agents, as well as dozens of biological exposure indices for selected chemicals. ACGIH 
threshold values do not have a legal force in the USA, but they are only recommendations. OSHA 
defines regulatory limits. However, ACGIH threshold values are a very common base for setting 
TLVs in the USA and in many other countries. ACGIH exposure limits are in many cases more 
protective than OSHA's ( http://www.acgih.org). 
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Health (NIOSH)
54
 values. 
For example, under the Italian environmental law, sulphur dioxide has a 
threshold limit value of 80g/m3 (D.P.R. 203/88) into ambient air, while nitrogen 
dioxide has a limit value of 40g/m3 (D.P.R. 203/88). Thresholds available from 
the U.S. OSHA define, instead, the maximum concentration mg/m
3
 of a substance 
to which a worker may be repeatedly exposed for a normal 8-hour workday and a 
40-hour workweek without adverse health effects. For example, arsenic has a 
threshold limit value of 0.2 mg/m
3
, while chromium has a threshold limit value of 
1mg/m
3
. 
For the purpose of aggregating pollutants, our air pollution index was 
constructed in the following way. Let E
i
j define the emission of pollutant j from 
province i, and let Tj denote the threshold limit value associated with substance j. 
Then, the toxicity-weighted aggregated level of air pollution in province i is 
defined as: 

AP i 
E j
i
Tjj
 . This procedure provides us with a measure of emission 
for each province, which represents our dependent variable in the ordered probit 
model. So, for every province in our data set, the sum of the fourteen hazardous 
substances considered, weighted by their associated threshold limit values (under 
both Italian and U.S. regulations), was calculated. This procedure allows us to get 
a more accurate measure of emissions for each Italian province. 
On the basis of the different threshold limit values available, we were able 
to formulate nine different specifications of the dependent variable, that is: 1) E: 
raw data on emission levels; 2) NE: normalized raw data on emission levels; 3) 
zE: standardized raw data on emission levels;
55,56
 4) AWE: data on emission 
levels divided by the U.S. threshold limit values; 5) NAWE: normalized data on 
emission levels divided by the U.S. threshold limit values; 6) zAWE: standardized 
                                               
54 The U.S. National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health publishes recommended exposure 
limits (RELs) which OSHA takes into consideration when promulgating new regulatory exposure 
limits (http://www.osha-slc.gov/SLTC/pel/index.html). NIOSH’s documents and threshold limit 
values list are available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/database.html. 
55 Standardization and normalization are the re-scaling techniques most frequently used to better 
compare a sample. To normalize the data, we used the following command on STATA: su E, 
meanonly gen NE = (E-r(min))/(r(max)-r(min)), where r(min) and r(max) are respectively the 
minimum and the maximum values of the data. 
56 To standardize the data, we use the formula )(  xz
 
where x is the observation to be 
standardized,  is the mean of the population,  is the standard deviation of the population. 
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data on emission levels divided by the U.S. threshold limit values; 7) IWE: data 
on emission levels divided by the Italian threshold limit values; 8) NIWE: 
normalized data on emission levels divided by the Italian threshold limit values; 
9) zIWE: standardized data on emission levels divided by the Italian threshold 
limit values. Except for the three specifications of the dependent variable in which 
the data are standardized and for the specifications where U.S. threshold limit 
values are employed, the remaining four specifications (E, NE, IWE and NIWE) 
yield very similar results both in terms of their statistical significance and of the 
signs of coefficients. 
 
4.5 DATA 
 
In order to assess whether air emissions are influenced by socioeconomic 
status at the Italian provinces level, and whether social inequalities are linked to 
air pollution, data from the latest available 2001 Census by the Italian Statistical 
Agency (ISTAT) are used (see Table A1 in the appendix), in which both socio-
demographic characteristics (sex, age, type of family, nationality) and socio-
economic variables (educational degree) are observed. These data are merged with 
data available at provincial level on household income (Istituto Tagliacarne). 
 
4.5.1 THE ISPRA DATABASE 
With regard to the environmental data, some papers in the literature use 
proximity to dangerous facilities as a proxy for environmental risk, [e.g. Anderson 
et al. (1994), Been (1994), Boer et al. (1997), Oakes et al. (1996), Pollock and 
Vittas (1995)] whereas other studies use actual pollution emissions levels [see 
Brooks and Sethi (1997), Daniels and Friedman (1999), Gray and Shadbegian 
(2004), Morello-Frosch et al. (2004), Ringquist (1997)]. In our analysis, given the 
lack of more disaggregated data, it was not possible to document the proximity 
and the exposure of poor and minority communities to sources of industrial air 
pollution. We are aware of the fact that the use of too broad a scale or unit of 
analysis has been discouraged (Anderton et al. 1994), but the most disaggregated 
available Italian data are only at provincial level. 
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We use the information on air pollution provided by the Italian Institute 
for Environmental Protection and Research (ISPRA)
57
 which is responsible for the 
National Emission Inventory. The ISPRA dataset includes data on air emissions in 
all the Italian provinces (103 provinces distributed over 20 regions). This is a 
comprehensive database that collects all emission estimates of the major 
pollutants including greenhouse gases, ozone precursors, benzene, particulate 
matters, heavy metal and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon. The national inventory 
is reported to the European Commission at the national aggregated level, but it is 
calculated at the regional level and then disaggregated at the provincial level. In 
the "Disaggregation of the National Inventory 2005" Report, data related to the 
disaggregation of the emissions of the national inventory at the provincial level 
are available, divided by activity according to the SNAP (Selected Nomenclature 
for Air Pollution) classification.
58
 The SNAP classification consists of the 
following 11 groups of activities: 1) combustion in energy and transformation 
industry; 2) non-industrial combustion plants; 3) combustion in manufacturing 
industry; 4) production processes; 5) extraction and distribution of fossil fuels; 6) 
solvent and other product use; 7) road transport; 8) other mobile sources and 
machinery; 9) waste treatment and disposal; 10) agriculture; 11) other sources. 
We use data relative only to macro-sector 1 (combustion in energy and 
transformation industry), macro-sector 3 (combustion in manufacturing industry) 
and macro-sector 4 (production processes), since we want to base our analysis on 
air pollution emissions released by the industrial sector and not also from 
agriculture or road, air, or sea transportation. Descriptive statistics relative to the 
fourteen contaminants selected for this analysis are provided in table 4.1. Air 
                                               
57 ISPRA is the Institute for Environmental Protection and Research established by Italian Law 
133/2008. The Institute performs the functions of three former institutions: APAT (Agency for 
Environmental Protection and Technical Services), ICRAM (Central Institute for Applied Marine 
Research), INFS (National Institute for Wildlife). 
58 This classification includes all activities which are considered relevant for atmospheric 
emissions. The ISPRA database is characterized by three different typologies of emissions: area, 
point and linear sources. For area emissions (emissions from sources distributed on the territory) a 
direct measurement is not feasible, and it is necessary, therefore, to estimate them from statistical 
data and specific emission factors. The approach that ISPRA has applied is based on a linear 
relation between source activity and emission, following this relation: Ei= A * FEi, where: Ei = 
emission of the pollutant i (g year-1); A = activity indicator (i.e. produced amount, fuel 
consumption, etc.); FEi= emission factor for the pollutant i (i.e., g t-1of product, kg/kg of solvent, g 
inhabitant-1). 
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pollution emissions are expressed in megagrams: the average level of air releases 
is 3.532.766 megagrams with a minimum value of 13.1997 megagrams (Prato) 
and a maximum value of 2.86 megagrams (Rome). The average per-capita air 
emission levels, instead, is 7.14 megagrams with a minimum value of 0.57 
megagrams (Prato) and a maximum value of 41.04 (Taranto). Figure 4.1.1 and 
figure 4.1.2 (at the end of the chapter) show, respectively, air emission levels and 
per-capita emission levels for the first twenty most polluted provinces. 
 
4.5.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The primary source for the demographic data used in this analysis is 
derived from the Italian Census 2005 Population and Housing by the Italian 
Statistical Agency. The variables selected and their summary statistics are 
provided in table 4.2. All tables are reported at the end of the chapter. 
The independent variables were chosen according to the most commonly 
used in environmental justice studies. Additional variables, such as the 
entrepreneurial spirit, the infrastructural endowment and the efficiency of the 
judicial system constitute an improvement upon previous studies. 
Demographic data 
Age/sex/race 
In the first step of analysis (ordinary least square regression - OLS), 
following the traditional and conventional estimation of the Mincer (1958; 1974) 
equation, we regress income on a set of independent variables which include age, 
gender, educational attainment and geographical dummy variables. More 
specifically, the distribution of income among different working age group 
population is examined. The independent variable age (grouped into ranges of 5 
years each) is categorized into two groups of age, namely (i) age range from 15 to 
34 years and (ii) age range from 35 to 49 years. Another independent variable 
employed is female (percentage of population which is females) to examine 
female-based variations in the distribution of households income. 
In the second step of analysis (ordered probit regression), children 
(percentage of population less than six years old) and elders (percentage of 
population more than 65 years old) are also examined as they are assumed to be 
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inherently more susceptible to air pollution (Greenberg, 1993; Chaix et al., 2006). 
Regarding racial characteristics, the percentage of African residents and the 
percentage of Asian residents are used. Moreover, the percentage of family 
households with a female as the head of the household is considered to be a group 
that could suffer from possible environmental discrimination (Arora and Cason, 
1999). 
Education 
In the OLS regression, educational levels are considered as determinants 
of income and are classified into four categories corresponding to the International 
Standard Classification of Education: university degree, lower secondary 
education, primary education and no education at all. 
Income 
The Tagliacarne Institute and the Union of Italian Chambers of Commerce 
provide the data related to real household disposable income per capita in each 
province. 
Territorial variables 
In the OLS regression, we introduced two geographical dummy variables 
to reflect the territorial subdivision of Italy (Bagnasco, 1977): North Italy 
(comprehensive of North-eastern and North-western Italian provinces) and 
Central Italy. The dummy South Italy is left out as reference. 
Other independent variables 
In the OLS regression, two additional variables are included: provincial 
entrepreneurial spirit (number of registered firms every 100 people at the 
province level) and the level of infrastructure present in each province, measured 
as an indicator of the transportation infrastructure endowment (Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales, 2004). These data were drawn from the yearly report of data and 
social indicators on quality of life performed by the leading Italian financial 
newspaper, Il Sole 24 Ore.
59
 
                                               
59 Il Sole 24 Ore publishes this annual report on quality of life every year since 1989. The 103 
Italian provinces are ranked according to a summary indicator of their quality of life constructed 
collecting official statistical data. The final quality of life indicator is based on 36 social indicators 
related to six main areas: consumption and wealth, labor and business, environment and services, 
justice efficiency and criminality, population, leisure. Even though the statistical robustness of 
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In the ordered probit regression, the demographic and economic data are 
implemented with the variable pending proceedings which is a measure of the 
inefficiency of law enforcement in terms of number of pending trials in each 
province (data collected from “Il Sole 24 Ore”).60 Pending proceedings have risen 
to almost 9 millions in the last few years in Italy, two thirds of which belong to 
the criminal sector, while the remaining are civil ones. Trial and appeal delays and 
the large number of pending proceedings are one of the major problems associated 
with the inefficiency of justice in Italy. 
By merging the above described environmental, demographic and 
economic data we produced a database that can contribute to extremely exiguous 
literature on environmental justice studies in Italy. 
Table 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the economic and the 
demographic variables: these measures are the independent variables in our 
regressions. Average per capita income is in million liras; average income is 
14.675 which varies from a minimum of 9.104 (province of Caltanissetta) to a 
maximum of 20.613 (province of Milan). Entrepreneurial spirit reflects the 
number of registered firms; the average number of firms on the territory is 23.970 
with a minimum value of 9.85 (province of Vibo Valentia) and a maximum value 
of 37.93 (province of Verbania). The maximum value of the infrastructural index 
belongs to Trieste while its minimum value is 443 and belongs to Sondrio. On 
average, 10% of the population has an undergraduate university degree with a 
minimum value of almost 7% (province of Prato) and a maximum value of almost 
18% (Rome). On average 35.8% of the population has a lower secondary school 
diploma, with a minimum value of 26.4% (Rome) and a maximum value of 45.7% 
(Bolzano). On average 1.2% of the population have no education at all, with a 
minimum value of 0.3% (Sondrio) and a maximum value of almost 3.6% 
(Crotone). About 0.27% of the population is Asian with a minimum value of 
0.015% (Enna) and a maximum value of 2.09% (Prato). About 0.64% of the 
population is African with a minimum value of 0.07% (Taranto) and a maximum 
                                                                                                                                
these rankings is often criticized (Lun et al,. 2006; Vitali and Merlini, 1999), the results of the Il 
Sole 24 Ore report it constitutes a very regular collection and analysis of data on quality of life.  
60 The data on the number of pending proceedings by the Il Sole 24 Ore is an elaboration of the 
data released by the Italian Ministry of Justice. 
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value of 2.19% (Modena). The average number of family households with a 
female as the head of the household is 11.7% with a minimum value of 7.7% 
(Nuoro) and a maximum value of 20.1% (Savona). The average percentage of 
children is 5.2 with a minimum value 3.69 (Ferrara) and a maximum value of 7.35 
(Naples). On average, the 19.8% of the population is composed by elders with a 
minimum value of 12.5% (Naples) and a maximum value of 25.9% (Savona). The 
average number of pending proceedings is 41.14 every thousand people, but there 
is a high variability among the provinces. Some provinces have a number of 9.5 
(Lecco) or 11.44 (Trento) pending proceedings, others go as high as 132.96 
(Messina) or 158.06 (Reggio Calabria) per thousand people. 
Table 4.3 reports the cross-correlations between the various socio-
economic variables and the environmental variable. Limiting our comments on the 
strength of the relationship between the main independent variables of interest and 
the dependent variables, we can observe that there is a quite high collinearity 
between some of the independent variables. In particular there is a high positive 
correlation between the following independent variables: (i) between the number 
of firms and per-capita income (r = 0.84) and between the number of firms and 
North (r = 0.7); (ii) a high negative correlation between per-capita income and no 
education (r = - 0.73); (iii) a fairly high positive correlation between per-capita 
income and North (r = 0.6); (iv) there is also collinearity between the number of 
pending proceedings and North (r=0.71). However, given the model specifications 
presented in section 4.4, there is no high correlation between any of the 
independent variables that might pose a serious specification problem of 
collinearity. 
 
4.6 RESULTS 
4.6.1 INCOME REGRESSION ANALYSIS - RESULTS 
In the first OLS regression, the dependent variable is per-capita income 
and is regressed over the above specified set of explanatory variables. Table 4.4 
presents the OLS regression’s results (obtained using STATA/SE 9.0). Overall, 
this model performs well in explaining the dependent variable with an R-squared 
value of 84.29%. Among all the independent variables, the entrepreneurial spirit 
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(number of firm) and the infrastructure endowment have the strongest effect on 
per-capita provincial income level. Note that the coefficients on age classes are 
both statistically significant. The sign of the coefficient on people aged between 
15 and 34 is negative, while the one on people aged between 35 and 49 is positive, 
suggesting that income profiles rise with age (experience). These outcomes are 
not new in literature. Gomez and Hernandez de Cos (2008), in fact, examined the 
role of the age structure of the population as a determinant of economic growth 
and they found that productivity peaks during the working ages of 35 and 54 when 
“the balance between formal education and experiential human capital reaches its 
optimum”. 
The coefficient on female participation to the determination of per-capita 
income is negative but it is not statistically significant. Almost all the education 
variables (except the lower secondary school diploma) are significant in 
explaining per-capita provincial income. We find that higher levels of education 
(undergraduate university degree) are positively related to per-capita provincial 
income; consistently, no education at all has a statistically significant and negative 
impact on per-capita income. Our findings also suggest that geography (Northern 
and Central Italian provinces) has a positive and significant effect on per-capita 
provincial income (relative to Southern provinces). Hence, population age, 
educational attainment and geographic factors seem to matter in explaining the 
variability of per-capita income across Italian provinces. 
 
4.6.2 AIR POLLUTION REGRESSION ANALYSIS - RESULTS 
Table 4.5 reports the results of the ordered probit model. For convenience 
we report in full details the results associated only to one specification of the 
independent variable (i.e., raw data). It should be noted that when the dependent 
variable is ordered, estimated parameters do not reflect a unit change of an 
independent variable on probability; thus, the estimated coefficients in an ordered 
probit have no direct interpretation. For this reason, we also calculate the 
associated marginal effects (see Greene, 2003, p. 738, for a discussion of 
calculating marginal effects). These can be interpreted as the change in the 
probability of attaining different levels of air pollution emissions as a result of a 
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unit change in each explanatory variable. Notice that the sum of the marginal 
effects equals zero. The signs on the marginal effects of the significant variables 
do not remain constant: more specifically, in the third and the fourth air pollution 
categories, Pr(Y=3: medium-high emissions) and Pr(Y=4: high emissions), the 
statistically significant variables have opposite signs compared to the first and the 
second air pollution categories. In the fourth scenario, for example, a 1% increase 
in income is associated with a 35.92% increase in the probability of attaining high 
emission levels. 
Tables from 4.5.1 to 4.5.5 report the marginal effects that each explanatory 
variable has on the four scenarios of air pollution – that is the impact that an 
increase of one unit of the explanatory variables has on the probability of 
attaining, respectively, low, medium low, medium high and high air pollution 
emissions. From table 4.5.4, the income variables (in their logarithmic linear and 
quadratic specifications) are both statistically significant, showing that an increase 
in income translates to an increase in the probability of attaining high levels of air 
pollution emissions. Moreover, the statistical significance of the squared term for 
income and its negative relationship with the dependent variable, allow us to 
identify an inverse U-shaped relationship between income and air releases. The 
interpretation of this environmental Kuznets curve is that an increase in economic 
activity leads to a higher probability of attaining high levels of air pollution, but 
beyond a turning point, as income increases further, the demand for a cleaner 
environment reduces the level of pollution. This outcome implies that in the 
richest Italian provinces industrial firms are more likely to invest in technology 
and innovation and to control air pollution. 
We can notice that the percentages of Asian and African foreigners are 
never, in the four scenarios, statistically significant. Hence, the results provide no 
support for the contention that ethnicity could be associated with a disparate-
impact discrimination for environmental harm. The results, however, indicate that 
a 1% increase in the number of family households with a female head translates 
into a 0.49% increase in the probability of attaining high levels of air pollution 
emissions: so, these estimates suggest that air releases are greater, on average, in 
provinces with greater proportion of female-headed households. The results for 
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children are somewhat similar: a 1% increase in the percentage of resident 
children translates into an increase by 1.6 percentage points in the probability of 
attaining high levels of air pollution emissions. Those are key results: greater 
concentrations of females as household heads and of children are likely to be 
associated with increased levels of air pollution. 
We can notice that the sign of the coefficient of judicial inefficiency is 
positive (although this variable is not statistically significant), implying that an 
increase in judicial inefficiency is associated with an increase in the probability of 
having high releases. In other words, provinces with high judicial inefficiency are 
more likely to experience more releases than provinces with lower judicial 
efficiency. We were motivated to refine the model and to capture potential 
interactions (which are the product of two independent variables) in influencing 
air pollution. To account for this, we tried out several possible interactions of 
judicial inefficiency with other explanatory variables but the only interaction term 
which was statistically significant (and improved the estimation results) was that 
between pending proceedings and children (hence, pending proceedings*children 
was included as an additional independent variable).
61
 Intuitively, the interaction 
term reflects the possibility that the result could be influenced by this particular 
independent variables’ combination. 
The model incorporating the interaction is: 
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Similar to the previous estimation model, the same explanatory variables 
remain significant and the levels of statistical significance of all the estimated 
coefficients improve overall. In table 4.6, the results of the ordered probit model 
with the interaction term are provided. Tables from 4.6.1 to 4.6.5 report the 
marginal effects that each explanatory variable has on the four scenarios of air 
                                               
61 The following interactions were also tried out: pendingproceedings*incomehat, 
pendingproceedings*incomehat2, pendingproceedings*pcfemhead, pendingproceedings*pcasia, 
pendingproceedings*pcafr . 
(4.3) 
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pollution. The statistical significance of the income variables improves and the 
signs are confirmed, again validating the existence of an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between income and air releases. The key result from this model is, 
however, that pending proceedings not only are statistically significant but also 
that the interaction term shows a statistically significant impact on air releases. 
When the variable pending proceedings is present in the regression also 
interacted with the proportion of children, its overall sign is given by the sum of 
the coefficients of the variable itself plus the product between the interaction 
coefficient and the proportion of children in each province. For instance, when the 
coefficient of pending proceedings is 5.66 and the interaction coefficient is -3.12, 
the overall effect will depend on the proportion of children in the province. If this 
proportion in a certain province is 0.10 (i.e., 10%), the net effect in this province 
is given by [5.66 – (3.12 * 0.10) = (5.66 - 0.312) = 5.348]; if the proportion of 
children in another given province is 0.20 (i.e., 20%), the net effect in this other 
province would be [5.66 – (3.12*0.20)= (5.66- 0.624) = 5.036], and, thus, the 
overall effect would be always positive even though it decreases at the increasing 
of the proportion of children. 
From our results, therefore, an increase of judicial inefficiency (weaker 
law enforcement) is associated with an increase in the probability of air releases. 
The interaction term suggests that an increase of judicial inefficiency in the 
provinces with higher proportions of children leads to a decrease in the probability 
of having high levels of air pollution, even though the net effect is always 
positive. 
More specifically, if we look at table 4.6.4, a 1% increase in the number of 
pending proceedings translates into a 1.6 percentage points increase in the 
probability of attaining high levels of air pollution emission. In general, therefore, 
it seems that wherever law enforcement is weak, firms pollute more implying that 
enforcement of law does matter, other conditions being equal, to explain air 
pollution. However, further investigation needs to be done to clarify the 
interpretation of the interaction between the effects of judicial inefficiency and the 
proportion of children. 
We employed all the alternative model specifications (although the results 
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are not reported in full detail) to estimate the same ordered probit models reported 
above for the five other alternative specifications of the dependent variable, as 
explained in section 4.4.2. Our results are substantially confirmed in both ordered 
probit models (with and without the interaction variables), in terms of statistical 
significance and coefficient signs, when using normalized raw data (NE) and 
when using Italian threshold limit values for ambient air pollution (in both forms, 
normalized and not normalized data), as one can see from tables 4.7 to 4.8.1. 
However, when using U.S. threshold limit values for hazardous substances, all the 
independent variables lose their statistical significance. So, while the estimated 
coefficients on some specifications of the dependent variable (i.e.: E, NE and 
IWE) were definitely robust (see table 4.9), on the remaining alternative 
specifications (NIWE, AWE and NAWE) they do not perform well under the 
same set of explanatory variables. 
 
4.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter presents a reduced form statistical analysis on the relationship 
between air pollution and socioeconomic characteristics across the Italian 
provinces. Our approach uses the level of air pollution emissions (fourteen types 
of pollutant substances from the industrial sector), released by industrial plants in 
2005 as the measure of environmental quality, merged with 2001 data on socio-
demographic characteristics at provincial level. The main objective is to ascertain 
whether income, ethnicity and gender composition of the population can help 
explain releases and whether environmental injustice arguments can be identified 
in Italy. 
The estimates obtained by the ordered probit models indicate that an 
increase in income by one unit is expected to increase the probability of higher 
levels of air pollution releases, that is releases increase with income, but our 
estimates are also consistent with an inverse U-shaped environmental Kuznets 
curve: once income exceeds a turning point, air pollution decreases with 
increasing income. 
Our search for environmental injustice finds evidence that releases tend to 
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be higher in provinces with high concentration of females as households’ head 
and with high concentration of children. Our findings do not allow identifying any 
environmental discrimination based on ethnicity suggesting that environmental 
justice issues are not likely in Italy to be perceived in racial and ethnic terms but 
in terms of social categories and gender composition. 
We find also that greater judicial inefficiency (or lenient law enforcement) 
is associated with higher levels of pollution. This result suggests that a better 
implementation, all through the territory, of the local enforcement of 
environmental laws can play an important role in creating the conditions for better 
relationships between firms and judicial institutions improving, thus, the overall 
environmental quality. 
 Extension of the work and future research. Data on Italian air emissions 
releases are available for the years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005, so it would be 
possible, for future research, to use a panel data analysis using also the 
penultimate 1991 Italian Census data and the imminent release of the 2011 Census 
data. In the present chapter, a cross-section regression was run on 2005 pollution 
emissions data. Estimating other cross-section regressions for each year would 
allow us to check for structural changes over time in the relationship between the 
variables, under both fixed effects and random effects.  
 One of the main limitations of the ISPRA dataset is that it is not possible 
to obtain information on the compliance trends and on the enforcement activities 
in each province. It would be desirable to have access to more detailed data sets 
on the number of inspections conducted by enforcement authorities, on 
compliance levels and on the implications of the different penalty means. The lack 
of accurate and incomplete information does not allow policymakers to 
understand how the Italian system of enforcing environmental laws work and 
what reforms may be needed.     
 Another interesting investigation for future research can be to estimate 
separate air pollution regressions for the local and the global pollutants. Sulphur 
dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO) and nitrogen monoxide (NOX) are three 
major local air pollutants whereas carbon dioxide (CO2) is the major global 
pollutant. With regard to the relationship between pollutants and income, while in 
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the literature there is a general agreement on the existence of an inverted-U curve 
for local pollutants, there is less consensus on the shape of the curve for global 
pollutants (Lopez, 1994; Meers, 2000). Treating differently local and global 
pollutants, thus, might add important further insights into the empirical and 
theoretical debate.   
 Another area of improvement of the present work could be the 
measurement of the dependent variable. We examine toxicity (by employing 
threshold limit values), but risk exposure is not covered in this analysis: instead of 
using actual pollution levels, the use of spatial analysis using Geographical 
Information System (GIS) would allow to use proximity from hazardous facilities 
as a proxy for environmental risk. 
 Finally, concerning on the use of instrumental variables, instead of 
performing a two-steps regression model it may be useful to estimate the model in 
a single step. Modeling an ordered probit with instrumental variables in one single 
step, however, cannot be run by STATA software. We leave the programming of 
this model as our future task to be solved.  
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Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of the air pollutants that compose the 
dependent variable in the ordered probit regression 
 
Pollutants - descriptive statistics (N = 103 provinces) 
 
 
pollutants 
 
mean 
 
median 
 
standard 
deviation 
 
minimum 
value 
 
maximum value 
      
sulphuric dioxide*  8557.90 1990.71 17423.36 0.303 96385.52 
nitrogen oxides*  8980.24 3946.46 11918.65 14.60 54407.96 
carbon monoxide**  16963.46 9025.16 38034.08 1502.72 376509.9 
carbon dioxide***  3493031 1848533 4561720 129135.4 2.85e+07 
nitrous oxide* 1381.87 848.42 2176.10 112.85 20518.56 
ammonia**  3847.59 2224.30 4817.7 14.25 28817.56 
arsenic**** 363.38 107.35 894.59 0.56 8076.338 
chromium** 508.68 185.51 810.91 0.65 4481.793 
copper** 405.63 126.35 1524.76 3.53 15151.66 
mercury** 69.95 34.18 138.26 1.58 1076.05 
nickel* 1332.13 564.34 1978.39 3.64 13554.87 
lead* 1943.42 695.85 4622.00 0.83 42187.82 
selenium* 109.11 30.93 215.34 0.36 1665.048 
benzene* 153.64 114.53 140.91 16.82 917.8066 
total air emissions 3532766 1863494 4606910 131997.8 2.86e+07 
per-capita air emiss. 7.140 4.468 8.137 0.5792 41.04 
Notes: *substance measured in micrograms; **substance measured in milligrams; ***substance 
measured in megagrams; ****substance measured in nanograms. In the ordered probit regression 
analysis, all the different measurement units were converted into megagrams. 
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Figure 4.1 Air pollution emissions for the first twenty most polluted Italian 
provinces (in millions megagrams) 
 
  
- 5 10 15 20 25 30 
Roma
Taranto
Milano
Venezia
Brindisi
Cagliari
Livorno
Mantova
Siracusa
Torino
Viterbo
Rovigo
Messina
Genova
Brescia
Savona
Ravenna
Palermo
Firenze
  
 157 
 
Figure 4.2 Per-capita air emissions levels for the first twenty most polluted 
provinces (per-capita megagrams) 
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Table 4.2. Independent variables descriptive statistics (N = 103 provinces) 
Variable mean standard 
deviation 
minimum value maximum 
value 
     
pcincome 14675.68 3024.42 9104.12 20613.52 
entrepreneurial spirit 23.970 4.964 9.85 37.93 
infrastructure 556.902 81.927 443 1000 
females 247242 271537.8 39886 1696080 
age15to34 90399.67 101921.6 12641 678961 
age35to49 93498.53 106050.4 14172 714986 
pcunivdegree 0.105 0.022 0.067 0.178 
pclowsecschool 0.358 0.035 0.264 0.457 
pcprimschool 0.116 0.022 0.046 0.161 
pcnoedu 0.012 0.007 0.002 0.035 
pcasia 0.0027 0.0031 0.00015 0.020 
pcafr 0.0064 0.0048 0.0007 0.021 
pcfemhead 0.117 0.023 0.077 0.201 
children 5.27 0.75 3.69 7.35 
elders 19.84 3.09 12.52 25.91 
pendingproc 41.146 29.107 9.55 158.06 
Note: The variables used in logs in the regression are presented in their original levels.  
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Table 4.3. Independent variables descriptive statistics – Correlation matrix (N = 103 provinces) 
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pcemissions 1                   
pcincome 0,050 1                  
# firms 0,087 0,848 1                 
infrastructure 0,027 0,203 0,113 1                
females -0,079 0,141 0,117 0,447 1               
age15~34 -0,082 0,167 0,156 0,427 0,993 1              
age35~49 -0,077 0,219 0,193 0,416 0,990 0,993 1             
pcunidegree -0,089 -0,127 -0,204 0,468 0,463 0,392 0,414 1            
pclowsec 0,055 0,127 0,216 -0,250 -0,228 -0,157 -0,190 -0,794 1           
pcprimary -0,185 -0,520 -0,560 -0,363 -0,269 -0,277 -0,310 -0,220 0,185 1          
pcnoedu -0,085 -0,738 -0,758 -0,041 0,004 -0,036 -0,071 0,354 -0,304 0,652 1         
pcasia -0,014 0,461 0,453 0,110 0,304 0,338 0,357 -0,073 0,099 -0,157 -0,332 1        
pcafr -0,063 0,528 0,567 -0,137 0,073 0,140 0,143 -0,375 0,335 -0,167 -0,375 0,536 1       
pcfemhead -0,077 0,251 0,092 0,292 0,154 0,118 0,151 0,294 -0,346 -0,150 -0,068 0,189 -0,107 1      
pcchildren -0,245 -0,600 -0,477 -0,022 0,257 0,267 0,200 0,140 -0,017 0,325 0,602 -0,098 -0,069 -0,150 1     
pcelders 0,144 0,626 0,509 0,019 -0,321 -0,337 -0,272 -0,092 -0,089 -0,308 -0,529 0,096 0,151 0,228 -0,875 1    
pendingproc -0,031 0,443 0,506 -0,194 -0,099 -0,039 -0,032 -0,547 0,504 -0,340 -0,578 0,173 0,531 -0,274 -0,182 0,176 1   
north 0,116 0,643 0,704 0,061 0,019 0,077 0,088 -0,404 0,399 -0,481 -0,606 0,241 0,609 -0,120 -0,283 0,304 0,711 1  
centre -0,039 0,162 0,068 -0,060 -0,019 -0,041 -0,010 -0,008 -0,156 0,010 -0,220 0,219 -0,084 0,336 -0,301 0,286 -0,172 -0,455 1 
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Table 4.4 First-step regression with OLS estimation - dependent variable: 
per-capita income 
per-capita income 
(dep. variable) 
coefficients standard 
errors 
t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
entrepreneurial spirit 214.36 72.960 2.94 0.004 69.43              359.28 
infrastructure 4.99 1.563 3.20 0.002 1.88                    8.09 
females -0.003 0.004 -0.66 0.512 -.012                 0.006 
age15to34 -0.032 0.015 -2.17 0.033 -.063                -0.002 
age35to49 0.039 0.008 4.71 0.000 .022                    0.05 
university education 36452.35 16535.96 2.20 0.030 3605.69           69299 
lower secondary school 1622.864 6213.95 0.26 0.795 -10720.4     13966.13 
primary school 36152.43 8619.007 4.19 0.000 19031.84    53273.03 
no education -97931.4 27214.3 -3.60 0.001 -151989.3  -43873.53 
North 3554.092 696.63 5.10 0.000 2170.30       4937.88 
Centre 2415.81 508.23 4.75 0.000 1406.25        3425.36 
_cons -2663.83 3427.3 -0.78 0.439 -9471.80      4144.12 
num. of observations = 103 
F(11, 91) = 79.69 
prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.84 
Root MSE = 1269.1 
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Table 4.5 Second-step regression with ordered probit estimation - dependent 
variable: air pollution emissions – specification: raw data (E) 
air pollution emissions 
(dependent variable) 
coefficients standard error z P>|z [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
lpcincomehat 123.11 63.30 1.94 0.052 -0.95    247.19 
lpcincomehat2 -6.47 3.29 -1.96 0.050 -12.9   -0.011 
lpcasia -0.17 0.17 -0.96 0.339 -0.52    0 .17 
lpcafr -0.21 0.22 -0.95 0.340 -0.66    0.23 
lpcfemhead 1.69 0.69 2.43 0.015 0.32    3.069 
lchildren 5.51 1.93 2.85 0.004 1.72    9.30 
lelders 2.73 1.65 1.65 0.098 -0.50    5.97 
lpendingproceedings 0.26 0.28 0.93 0.350 -0.29    0.82 
      
cut1 601.25 305.05   3.35    1199.15 
cut2 602.06 305.06   4.14    1199.98 
cut3 602.87 305.07   4.93    1200.81 
num. of observations = 103 
LR chi2(8) = 28.48 
prob > chi2 = 0.0004 
log likelihood = -128.53 
pseudo R2 = 0.099 
 
 
Table 4.5.1 Marginal effects of the ordered probit for Pr (Y =1: low air 
pollution emissions) 
air pollution emissions 
(dependent variable) 
Coefficients Standard error z P>|z 
lpcincomehat -34.84 15.31 -2.28 0.023 
lpcincomehat2 1.83 0.79 2.30 0.021 
lpcasia 0.04 0.05 0.97 0.333 
lpcafr 0.06 0.06 0.96 0.338 
lpcfemhead -0.48 0.20 -2.30 0.021 
lchildren -1.56 0.55 -2.83 0.005 
lelders -0.77 0.47 -1.63 0.102 
lpendingproceedings -0.07 0.08 -0.92 0.359 
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Table 4.5.2 Marginal effects of the ordered probit for Pr (Y=2: medium-low 
air pollution emissions) 
air pollution emissions 
(dependent variable) 
Coefficients Standard error z P>|z 
lpcincomehat -14.26 8.78 -1.62 0.104 
lpcincomehat2 0.75 0.45 1.64 0.102 
lpcasia 0.019 0.021 0.91 0.364 
lpcafr 0.025 0.027 0.91 0.361 
lpcfemhead -0.196 0.103 -1.90 0.058 
lchildren -0.639 0.304 -2.10 0.035 
lelders -0.316 0.216 -1.46 0.143 
lpendingproceedings -0.03 0.034 -0.90 0.369 
 
 
 
Table 4.5.3 Marginal effects of the ordered probit for Pr (Y=3: medium high 
air pollution emissions) 
air pollution emissions 
(dependent variable) 
Coefficients Standard error z P>|z 
lpcincomehat 13.18 7.25 1.82 0.069 
lpcincomehat2 -0.69 0.37 -1.83 0.067 
lpcasia -0.018 0.02 -0.92 0.359 
lpcafr -0.023 0.025 -0.92 0.359 
lpcfemhead 0.181 0.099 1.82 0.069 
lchildren 0.59 0.28 2.07 0.038 
lelders 0.292 0.203 1.44 0.150 
lpendingproceedings 0.028 0.032 0.88 0.381 
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Table 4.5.4 Marginal effects of the ordered probit for Pr (Y=4: high air 
pollution emissions) 
air pollution emissions 
(dependent variable) 
Coefficients Standard error z P>|z 
lpcincomehat 35.92 15.79 2.27 0.023 
lpcincomehat2 -1.89 0.82 -2.30 0.021 
lpcasia -0.05 0.05 -0.97 0.334 
lpcafr -0.06 0.06 -0.96 0.338 
lpcfemhead 0.49 0.21 2.31 0.021 
lchildren 1.60 0.56 2.86 0.004 
lelders 0.79 0.48 1.64 0.101 
lpendingproceedings 0.07 0.08 0.92 0.357 
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Table 4.5.5 Summary of marginal effects of significant variables for the 
ordered probit estimation (I) – dependent variable: air pollution emissions – 
specification: raw data (E) 
Probability in air 
pollution levels 
Coefficient Marginal Effect 
lpcincomehat 
 
Pr (Y=1) 
Pr (Y=2) 
Pr (Y=3) 
Pr (Y=4) 
 
123.11 
 
 
-34.84 
-14.26 
13.18 
35.92 
lpcincomehat2 
 
Pr (Y=1) 
Pr (Y=2) 
Pr (Y=3) 
Pr (Y=4) 
 
-6.47 
 
 
1.83 
0.75 
-0.69 
-1.89 
lpcfemhead 
Pr (Y=1) 
Pr (Y=2) 
Pr (Y=3) 
Pr (Y=4) 
 
1.69 
 
 
-0.48 
-0.19 
0.18 
0.49 
lchildren 
Pr (Y=1) 
Pr (Y=2) 
Pr (Y=3) 
Pr (Y=4) 
 
5.51 
 
 
-1.56 
-0.63 
0.59 
1.60 
Notes:Y =1: low air pollution; Y=2 : medium-low air pollution; Y=3: medium-high air pollution; 
Y=4: high air pollution. 
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Table 4.6 Ordered probit estimation with interaction variable - dependent 
variable: air pollution emissions – specification: raw data (E) 
 
 
Table 4.6.1 Marginal effects of the ordered probit for Pr(Y =1: low air 
pollution emissions) 
air pollution emissions 
(dependent variable) 
Coefficients Standard error z P>|z 
lpcincomehat -42.74 18.23 -2.34 0.019 
lpcincomehat2 2.24 0.95 2.36 0.018 
lpcasia 0.04 0.05 0.93 0.353 
lpcafr 0.07 0.06 1.21 0.227 
lpcfemhead -0.50 0.20 -2.53 0.012 
lchildren -6.61 2.70 -2.45 0.014 
lelders -0.88 0.47 -1.84 0.065 
lpendingproceedings -1.57 0.77 -2.02 0.043 
lpendproc*lchildren 0.86 0.44 1.94 0.053 
air pollution emissions 
(dependent variable) 
Coefficients Standard error z P>|z 
lpcincomehat 153.58 65.45 2.35 0.019 
lpcincomehat2 -8.06 3.41 -2.36 0.018 
lpcasia -0.16 .17 -0.93 0.354 
lpcafr -0.28 .23 -1.22 0.224 
lpcfemhead 1.83 .70 2.58 0.010 
lchildren 23.76 9.55 2.49 0.013 
lelders 3.16 1.68 1.87 0.061 
lpendingproceedings 5.65 2.77 2.04 0.041 
lpendproc*lchildren -3.12 1.59 -1.95 0.051 
     
cut1 780.39 319.84   
cut2 781.22 319.86   
cut3 782.04 319.87   
number of observations = 103 
LR chi2(9) = 32.37 
log likelihood = -126.58 
prob > chi2 = 0.0002 
pseudo R2 = 0.1134 
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Table 4.6.2 Marginal effects of the ordered probit for Pr(Y = 2: medium-low 
air pollution emissions) 
air pollution emissions 
(dependent variable) 
Coefficients Standard error z P>|z 
lpcincomehat -18.51 8.96 -2.07 0.039 
lpcincomehat2 0.97 0.46 2.08 0.038 
lpcasia 0.02 0.022 0.89 0.372 
lpcafr 0.03 0.029 1.15 0.250 
lpcfemhead -0.22 0.11 -1.98 0.048 
lchildren -2.86 1.42 -2.01 0.044 
lelders -0.38 0.23 -1.64 0.101 
lpendingproceedings -0.68 0.38 -1.75 0.080 
lpendproc*lchildren 0.37 0.22 1.70 0.090 
 
 
 
Table 4.6.3 Marginal effects of the ordered probit for Pr(Y = 3: medium high 
air pollution emissions) 
air pollution emissions 
(dependent variable) 
Coefficients Standard error z P>|z 
lpcincomehat 16.76 8.35 2.01 0.045 
lpcincomehat2 -0.88 0.43 -2.02 0.044 
lpcasia -0.01 0.020 -0.89 0.374 
lpcafr -0.03 0.027 -1.14 0.256 
lpcfemhead 0.19 0.10 1.90 0.058 
lchildren 2.59 1.32 1.96 0.049 
lelders 0.34 0.21 1.58 0.114 
lendingproceedings 0.61 0.35 1.72 0.085 
lpendproc*lchildren -0.34 0.20 -1.68 0.093 
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Table 4.6.4 Marginal effects of the ordered probit for Pr(Y = 4: high air 
pollution emissions) 
air pollution emissions 
(dependent variable) 
Coefficients Standard error z P>|z 
lpcincomehat 44.48 19.07 2.33 0.020 
lpcincomehat2 -2.33 0.99 -2.35 0.019 
lpcasia -0.04 0.05 -0.93 0.354 
lpcafr -0.08 0.06 -1.21 0.227 
lpcfemhead 0.53 0.20 2.53 0.011 
lchildren 6.88 2.83 2.43 0.015 
lelders 0.91 0.49 1.86 0.063 
lpendingproceedings 1.63 0.81 2.01 0.045 
lpendproc*lchildren -0.90 0.47 -1.92 0.055 
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Table 4.6.5 Summary of marginal effects of significant variables for the 
ordered probit estimation (II) with interaction variable – dependent variable: 
air pollution emissions – specification: raw data (E) 
Notes: Y =1: low air pollution; Y=2 : medium-low air pollution; Y=3: medium-high air pollution; 
Y=4: high air pollution. 
 
Probability in air 
pollution levels 
Coefficient Marginal Effect 
lpcincomehat 
 
Pr (Y=1) 
Pr (Y=2) 
Pr (Y=3) 
Pr (Y=4) 
 
153.58 
 
 
-42.74 
-18.51 
16.76 
44.48 
lpcincomehat2 
 
Pr (Y=1) 
Pr (Y=2) 
Pr (Y=3) 
Pr (Y=4) 
 
-8.06 
 
 
2.24 
0.97 
-0.88 
-2.33 
lpcfemhead 
Pr (Y=1) 
Pr (Y=2) 
Pr (Y=3) 
Pr (Y=4) 
 
1.83 
 
 
-0.50 
-0.22 
0.19 
0.53 
lchildren 
Pr (Y=1) 
Pr (Y=2) 
Pr (Y=3) 
Pr (Y=4) 
 
23.76 
 
 
-6.61 
-2.86 
2.59 
6.88 
lpendingproceedings 
Pr (Y=1) 
Pr (Y=2) 
Pr (Y=3) 
Pr (Y=4) 
 
5.65 
 
 
-1.57 
-0.68 
0.61 
1.63 
lpendproc*lchildren 
Pr (Y=1) 
Pr (Y=2) 
Pr (Y=3) 
Pr (Y=4) 
 
-3.12 
 
 
0.86 
0.37 
-0.34 
-0.90 
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Table 4.7 Ordered probit estimation without interaction variable (dependent 
variable: air pollution emissions – specification: NE – normalized raw data) 
 
 
  
air pollution emissions 
(dependent variable) 
Coefficients Standard error z P>|z 
lpcincomehat 137.92 63.65 2.17 0.030 
lpcincomehat2 -7.25 3.31 -2.19 0.029 
lpcasia -0.24 0.18 -1.37 0.169 
lpcafr -0.18 0.22 -0.82 0.414 
lpcfemhead 1.76 0.70 2.51 0.012 
lchildren 5.32 1.92 2.76 0.006 
lelders 2.52 1.64 1.54 0.125 
lpendingproceedings .26 0.28 0.95 0.342 
     
cut1 671.13 306.72   
cut2 671.96 306.74   
cut3 672.79 306.75   
number of observations = 103 
LR chi2(8) = 31.26 
prob > chi2 = 0.0001 
log likelihood = -127.14 
pseudo R2 = 0.1095 
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Table 4.7.1 Ordered probit estimation with interaction variable (dependent 
variable: air pollution emissions – specification: NE – normalized raw data) 
 
air pollution emissions 
(dependent variable) 
Coefficients Standard error z P>|z 
lpcincomehat 169.74 65.87 2.58 0.010 
lpcincomehat2 -8.90 3.43 -2.60 0.009 
lpcasia -0.24 0.18 -1.35 0.176 
lpcafr -0.25 0.23 -1.08 0.278 
lpcfemhead 1.90 0.71 2.68 0.007 
lchildren 24.09 9.56 2.52 0.012 
lelders 2.96 1.68 1.76 0.078 
lpendingproceedings 5.81 2.77 2.10 0.036 
lpendproc*lchildren -3.21 1.59 -2.01 0.045 
     
cut1 857.67 321.90   
cut2 858.52 321.92   
cut3 859.37 321.93   
number of observations = 103 
LR chi2(9) = 35.37 
prob > chi2 = 0.0001 
log likelihood = -125.08 
pseudo R2 = 0.1239 
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Table 4.8 Ordered probit estimation without interaction variable (dependent 
variable: air pollution emissions – specification: IWE – Italian threshold limit 
values) 
 
air pollution emissions 
(dependent variable) 
Coefficients Standard error z P>|z 
lpcincomehat 106.91 62.83 1.70 0.089 
lpcincomehat2 -5.58 3.27 -1.71 0.088 
lpcasia -0.27 0.17 -1.55 0.121 
lpcafr 0.04 0.22 0.20 0.839 
lpcfemhead 1.68 0.68 2.46 0.014 
lchildren 4.38 1.88 2.32 0.020 
lelders 1.83 1.63 1.12 0.261 
lpendingproceedings 0.01 0.28 0.04 0.966 
     
cut1 521.28 302.64   
cut2 522.06 302.65   
cut3 522.85 302.66   
number of observations = 103 
LR chi2(8) = 22.11 
prob > chi2 = 0.0047 
log likelihood = -131.71 
pseudo R2 = 0.0774 
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Table 4.8.1 Ordered probit estimation with interaction variable (dependent 
variable: air pollution emissions – specification: IWE – Italian threshold limit 
values) 
 
air pollution emissions 
(dependent variable) 
Coefficients Standard error z P>|z 
lpcincomehat 135.42 64.90 2.09 0.037 
lpcincomehat2 -7.06 3.38 -2.09 0.037 
lpcasia -0.27 0.17 -1.56 0.119 
lpcafr -0.004 0.22 -0.02 0.986 
lpcfemhead 1.81 0.69 2.62 0.009 
lchildren 22.21 9.51 2.34 0.020 
lelders 2.33 1.67 1.40 0.163 
lpendingproceedings 5.26 2.75 1.91 0.056 
lpendproc*lchildren -3.03 1.58 -1.92 0.055 
     
cut1 690.53 316.96   
cut2 691.32 316.97   
cut3 692.14 316.99   
number of observations = 103 
LR chi2(9) = 25.82 
prob > chi2 = 0.0022 
log likelihood = -126.58 
pseudo R2 = 0.0904 
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Table 4.9 Comparison among ordered probit estimations with interaction 
variable across alternative specification of the dependent variable  
Note: dependent variable: air pollution emissions specifications: E – raw data; NE – normalized 
raw data and IWE – data weighted by the Italian threshold limit values. 
air pollution 
emissions 
(dependent variable) 
coefficients 
(dep. var.: 
E) 
 
P>|z 
coefficients 
(dep. var.: 
NE) 
 
P>|z 
coefficients 
(dep. var.: 
IWE) 
 
P>|z 
lpcincomehat 153.58 0.019 169.74 0.010 135.42 0.037 
lpcincomehat2 -8.06 0.018 -8.90 0.009 -7.06 0.037 
lpcasia -0.16 0.354 -0.24 0.176 -0.27 0.119 
lpcafr -0.28 0.224 -0.25 0.278 -0.004 0.986 
lpcfemhead 1.83 0.010 1.90 0.007 1.81 0.009 
lchildren 23.76 0.013 24.09 0.012 22.21 0.020 
lelders 3.16 0.061 2.96 0.078 2.33 0.163 
lpendingproceedings 5.65 0.041 5.81 0.036 5.26 0.056 
lpendproc*lchildren -3.12 0.051 -3.21 0.045 -3.03 0.055 
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APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
 
TABLE A1 – Variable Description and Data Sources 
Variable 
 
Description Source 
 
air pollution emissions 
 
data on air emissions in all the 
Italian provinces 
 
ISPRA – Air Emissions 
Provincial Inventory – year 
2005 
 
per-capita income 
 
natural logarithm of per-capita 
income at provincial level, year 
2001 
 
elaborated from Institute 
Tagliacarne – our calculation 
 
entrepreneurial spirit 
 
 
number of registered firm at 
provincial level 
 
 
Il Sole 24 Ore - Quality of 
Life Report data- year 2001 
 
infrastructure 
 
 
transportation infrastructural 
index 
 
Il Sole 24 Ore - Quality of 
Life Report data- year 2001 
 
females 
 
 
number of female component the 
population 
 
ISTAT data Census data, 
2001 
 
age15to34 
 
 
number of people aged between 
15 and 34 years old 
 
 
ISTAT data Census data 
2001 
 
age35to49 
 
 
number of people aged between 
35 and 49 years old 
 
 
ISTAT data Census data 
2001 
 
 
pcuniversitydegree 
 
 
percentage of the population 
which has an undergraduate 
university degree 
 
 
 
elaborated from ISTAT data 
Census data 2001 
 
pclowersecondaryschool 
 
 
percentage of the population 
which has a lower secondary 
school diploma 
 
 
 
elaborated from ISTAT data 
Census data 2001 
 
pcprimaryschool 
 
 
percentage of the population 
which has a primary school 
diploma 
 
 
elaborated ISTAT data 
Census data 2001 
 
pcnoeducation 
 
 
percentage of the population 
which has a no education at all 
 
 
elaborated ISTAT data 
Census data 2001 
 
pcfemalehead 
 
percentage of family households 
with a female as the head of the 
household 
 
 
elaborated from ISTAT data 
Census data 2001 
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pcasia 
 
percentage of Asian residents 
 
elaborated from ISTAT data 
Census data 2001 
 
 
pcafr 
 
percentage of African residents 
 
elaborated from ISTAT data 
Census data 2001 
 
 
children 
 
 
percentage of children < 6 years 
old 
 
elaborated from ISTAT data 
Census data 2001 
 
 
elders 
 
percentage of people >65 years 
old 
 
elaborated from ISTAT data 
Census data 2001 
 
 
pending proceedings 
 
number of civil proceedings 
pending at courts located in a 
province every thousand 
inhabitants 
 
 
Il Sole 24 Ore – Quality of 
Life Report data- year 2001 
 
territorial dummies: northern 
provinces, central provinces 
 
the geographical distinction in the 
three macro-areas it has been 
done following the definition of 
ISTAT. 
- North-west and north-east 
regions comprehend: Liguria, 
Lombardia, Piemonte, Valle 
d’Aosta, Friuli Venezia Giulia, 
Emilia R., Trentino, Veneto. 
- Central regions: Toscana, 
Marche, Umbria, Lazio. 
-Southern regions: Abruzzo, 
Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, 
Molise, Puglia, Sardegna, Sicilia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISTAT 
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TABLE A2 – Pollutants description and threshold limit values 
In the following table the pollutants and their respective U.S. and Italian threshold 
limit values are reported 
Table A2: threshold limit values 
Code 
 
 
Pollutant 
 
 
U.S. TLVs – eight hours 
mg/m3 
 
 
Italian laws on air pollution – 
eight hours 
001 SO2 – sulphur dioxide  13 80 g/m
3* 
002 NOX – nitrogen monoxide 30 40 μg/m3 
005 CO – carbon monoxide 55 10 mg/m
3** 
006 CO2 – carbon dioxide 9000 100.000t/year*** 
007 N2O – nitrous oxide (NIOSH) 30 50 μg/m3 
008 NH3 – ammonia 35 10 mg/Nm3 
M01 As – arsenic 0,2 6 ng/m3**** 
M03 Cr – chromium 1 0,05 mg/m3 
M04 Cu – copper 1 1 mg/m3 
M06 Ni - nichel 1 0,1 µg/m3 
M07 Pb - lead 0,05 0,5 µg/m3 
M08 Se - selenium 0,2 0,2 µg/m3 
P11 Benz - benzene (NIOSH) 0,32 5 µg/m3 
Notes: *substance measured in micrograms; **substance measured in milligrams; ***substance 
measured in megagrams; ****substance measured in nanograms. In the ordered probit regression 
analysis, all the different measurement units were converted into megagrams. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis develops both a theoretical and an experimental analysis 
(chapters 2 and 3) on environmental enforcement, and carries out an empirical 
investigation (chapter 4) on the issue of environmental justice. The present 
chapter discusses some further implications from the theoretical model and from 
the experimental and empirical analyses and puts forward some indications for 
possible future research directions. 
In chapter 2 specific reference is made to the U.S. environmental 
enforcement structure as a case characterized by well-defined roles of institutions 
and by a longstanding application of administrative, civil and criminal 
enforcement procedures. The main aim of the chapter was to reinforce the 
importance of the strategic interactions between governmental institutions 
(enforcers) and the regulated community (firms). 
During the last few decades, the enforcement toolbox of U.S. 
environmental regulators and institutions has been harshly criticized (see, for 
example, Abbot, 2005) for leaving too large amount of discretion, administrative 
and/or investigative, in the hands of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
and prosecutorial in the hands of the Department of Justice (DOJ). The U.S. EPA 
has been promoting enforcement activities on all fronts but especially on criminal 
actions
62
. Such a trend has come under criticism as it has been argued that the fear 
of being indicted may, in the long run, undermine environmental compliance 
thereby worsening both the relations between EPA and firms and environmental 
conditions (Gaynor and Lippard, 2002; Coffee, 1991; Green, 1997). Moreover, as 
noted by Firestone (2003), the decision about whether to enforce and what kind of 
enforcement action to undertake rests entirely in the discretion of the enforcer. 
                                               
62 U.S. EPA, Compliance and Enforcement Annual Results (various years). 
  
 183 
This discretion implies that, rightly or wrongly, some cases are handled 
administratively, whereas very similar cases end up in the courts (Babbit, Cory, et 
al., 2004). 
These are the core reasons why the U.S. enforcement system has become 
the object of political, economic and environmental debate with regard to the 
possibility that environmental regulations are enforced selectively or arbitrarily. 
This, in turn, raises the issue of potentially inadequate enforcement, partly due to 
the regulatory competition between EPA and DOJ [e.g., Yeager (1991) on the 
Clean Water Act enforcement]. 
These considerations constitute the main motivation for developing 
specific models of environmental enforcement in chapter 2 of this thesis, in which 
the relationships between EPA and DOJ, that have traditionally been treated as 
independent of each other, are investigated in a strategic game together with 
firms. This part of research centres around the question on how firms, EPA and 
DOJ can interact, given their respective objective functions, to increase regulatory 
compliance and to choose the best enforcement strategy that could lead to 
increased environmental quality. Two game theory models are developed, i) a 
model in which EPA’s and DOJ’s enforcement decisions are made under the same 
objective function, and ii) a model in which EPA and DOJ are assumed to not 
share the same objective function. In both models, firms’ compliance decisions 
are analyzed as well as the institutional enforcement decisions (in terms of 
strategy to adopt) and their effects on firms’ choices. These models may assist 
regulators and enforcers in environmental policy development and decision-
making, by contrasting the impact of alternative enforcement strategies. 
The main result of the first theoretical model (where EPA and DOJ share 
the same objective function) shows that it is more efficient to let the EPA solve 
the cases administratively rather than refer them to the Department of Justice for 
civil or criminal prosecution. This may suggest that increasing the scope of 
criminal enforcement programmes would not necessarily strengthen deterrence 
since criminal fines might not be able to give polluters adequate incentives to 
prevent environmental crimes. In the context of the model employed, criminal 
enforcement may, indeed, reduce the effectiveness of enforcement policies. This 
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result is particularly relevant considering that both in the United States and in the 
European Union environmental regulators have recently been actively reviewing 
how to extend criminal sanctions in terms of their scale and scope to enhance 
deterrence (U.S. Senate, 2003; House of Commons, 2005; European Commission, 
2007). 
One of the main results of the second theoretical model (under the 
assumption that EPA’s and DOJ’s objective functions are different), however, is 
that criminal enforcement can enhance deterrence by improving firms’ 
compliance. In terms of environmental policy implications, our result suggests 
that, even though EPA and DOJ should work in coordination, in order to 
maximize the level of compliance by the firms they should act independently of 
each other without sharing the same objective function. 
Overall, a defence of the U.S. environmental enforcement system is 
provided, suggesting that, contrary to the prevailing consensus in the literature 
(Sunstein et al., 2002) that a consistent and predictable enforcement is preferable, 
a discretionary enforcement may generate higher compliance (Baker et al., 2004). 
Another important point of our results is that EPA and DOJ engage in strategic 
interaction in their environmental enforcement behaviour. It is shown that not 
only do they influence each other in their enforcement decisions, but they also 
impact on decisions by the firms and increase (under certain circumstances) the 
probability of compliance. 
Chapter 3 discusses the experimental approaches performed to test the 
theoretical findings of the two game theoretic models developed in chapter two. 
Both experimental validations fully agree with the theoretical results thus 
confirming the importance of the strategic interactions between enforcers and 
firms. The results can have notable policy implications concerning the optimal 
choice of enforcement strategies. 
While motivated by and intended to analyze the enforcement of 
environmental regulations, the game theory models developed in the present thesis 
are applicable to other contexts that entail relationships between different 
enforcement institutions. For example, they can be applied to analyze enforcement 
options and players’ behaviour in financial crime areas, such as tax law 
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enforcement, money laundering, etc. 
One possible way to extend this study for future research could be to 
develop dynamic game theory models where players can learn how to play over 
time and can update their beliefs by learning how to play based on their past 
experiences and acquired knowledge of the other players’ actions and their 
payoffs. 
Moreover, the patterns of the different enforcement strategies considered in 
the game theory models are based on the conventional enforcement system mostly 
applied in the U.S.; it would be interesting, in a future research, to extend this 
analysis to game theoretical models for Europe, where the environmental 
enforcement institutional mechanisms are different. 
Chapter 4 presents an environmental justice empirical analysis on the 
relationship between income, demographic characteristics and concentrations of 
air industrial pollutants within the Italian provinces. Within a law and economics 
approach, environmental justice and enforcement of laws are strictly related. If 
environmental laws and regulations are uniformly and equally enforced, they do 
protect all groups in society, including minority and low-income populations. In 
general, the enforcement of environmental laws has environmental justice 
implications embedded within it. 
Two general conclusions can be drawn from the empirical results. First, 
the estimates obtained indicate that air pollution releases increase with income, 
but they are also consistent with an inverse U-shaped environmental Kuznets 
curve: once income exceeds a turning point, air pollution decreases with 
increasing income. Second, there is some evidence that air releases tend to be 
higher in provinces with high concentration of females as households’ head and 
with high concentration of children. Since the findings do not point to 
environmental discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, this suggests that 
environmental justice issues in Italy are not likely to manifest themselves along 
racial and ethnic terms but instead in terms of social categories and gender 
composition. 
We also find that judicial inefficiency (a measure of the inefficiency of 
law enforcement) is associated with higher levels of pollution. In terms of policy 
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implications, this result suggests the need to strengthen, all through the territory, 
the local enforcement of environmental laws in order to possibly reduce the 
negative effects of ambient air pollution. 
A possible development of this study for future analysis is that as more 
data (Italian Census data) will become available the research can move in a more 
dynamic direction and check whether, over time, consistent results will continue 
to emerge. The study of the links between public health and the location of 
industrial plants or waste treatment facilities is another possible way to extend the 
analysis in order to help supporting public policy decisions and minimize public 
health impacts. It would also be useful to extend the study to other environmental 
variables (water and/or waste pollution) and to develop a more comprehensive 
analysis of the social aspects and environmental concerns. An area that warrants 
further investigation is the analysis of the behaviour of Italian enforcement 
authorities. One challenge here is that it might be difficult to obtain information 
on the number and on the frequency of inspections and of other enforcement 
actions for air or water pollution, given the fragmentation of the Italian 
enforcement system among several institutional authorities. 
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